


095065

JPRS-NEA-84-026

16 February 1984



## Near East/South Asia Report

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED

19980319 145

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

6  
175  
A08

## NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

## PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

16 February 1984

## NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Briefs	
Iraq-Syria Rapprochement	1

## ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Cable Sent to Reagan Attributes Ashjian Kidnaping to Turks (MARMARA, 14 Jan 84).....	2
1915 Massacres Survivor Sends Letter to President Reagan (ALIK, 31 Dec 83).....	3
Turks Angered by Mitterrand's Pro-Armenian Remarks (AZTAG, 9 Jan 84; MARMARA, 9 Jan 84).....	5
Mitterrand: 'Traces of Genocide Cannot Be Obliterated'	
HURRIYET: 'France Makes Armenians More Demanding'	
Soviet Efforts for Educational Domination of Armenia (V. Brutian; AZTAG, 5 Jan 84).....	7
ASALA Reportedly Threatens Also Other Countries, Armenian Groups (JAMANAK, 13 Jan 84).....	9
Paper Commemorates Anniversary of Ashjian Kidnaping (Editorial; AZTAG, 29 Dec 83).....	10

## ARAB AFRICA

### EYIPT

Minister of State Ghali Discusses 'Arafat Visit (Butrus Ghali Interview; MAYU, 2 Jan 84).....	12
Current Scientific Research Philosophy Viewed as Futile in Solving Problems (Ahmad 'Abd-al-Jawad; AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, No 779, 19 Dec 83).....	18
Reasons for Decline of Small Trades Explored (Nu'man al-Zayyati; AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, No 779, 19 Dec 83).....	26
Negative Trends in Farming in Recent Years Decried (Mahmud 'Abd-al-Fudayl; AL-AHALI, 4 Jan 84).....	33
Expert Reviews Mistakes in Agricultural Policy Since Nasir's Time (Mahmud 'Abd-al-Fudayl; AL-AHALI, 28 Dec 83).....	37

### TUNISIA

Interior Minister Discusses Local Government, Political Pluralism, Democracy (Driss Guiga Interview; AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYAH, 1-7 Jan 84).....	44
---	----

## ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

### IRAQ

Ramadan Opens Irrigation Project in Al-Ta'min Governorate (AL-THAWRAH, 5 Nov 83).....	49
--	----

### ISRAEL

Briefs West Bank Crop Restrictions	52
---------------------------------------	----

### JORDAN

Mineral Resources Play Major Role in Development (AL-MAJALLAH, No 202, 24-30 Dec 83).....	53
--	----



## LEBANON

Leftist Journal Offers Detailed Critique of Agreement With Israel, America (Ilyas Saba; AL-SAFIR, 28-30 Nov 83).....	55
Economic, Political Changes in South Discussed (AL-TADAMUN, No 40, 14 Jan 84).....	79
Views on First Geneva Conference Polled (AL-TADAMUN, No 40, 14 Jan 84).....	83
Karim Maruwah Discusses Crisis of Arab Communists (Karim Maruwah; AL-TADAMUN, No 35, 10 Dec 83).....	88
Industry's Problems, Elimination of Fuel Subsidies Discussed (George Afram Interview; AL-SAFIR, 7 Dec 83).....	95
Press Syndicate Condemns Recent Law (AL-NIDA', 16 Dec 83).....	104

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Publication, Consumption of Books in Occupied Areas Analyzed (Ibrahim Du'aybis; AL-'AWDAH, No 28, 26 Nov 83).....	109
---	-----

## SYRIA

Anomalies, Contributions of Production Incentive System Discussed (Wasif Muhanna; TISHRIN, 28 Oct 83).....	115
Various Improvements in Rural Living Conditions Reviewed (Nadir Makanisi; TISHRIN, 31 Oct 83).....	120

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Ministries Report on Budget Allocations for 1984 (AL-KHALIJ, various dates).....	124
Deficit Budget Financing Considered, by 'Abd-al-Razzaq Isma'il	
Budget Provides Fellowship Allocations, by Husayn al-Samadi	
Labor Ministry Submits Budget, by Mahir al-Kayyali	
Abu Dhabi's 1984 Budget	
Temporary Budget Financing Measures	
Information Ministry Budget Requests, by Thabit Malakawi	

Ministries Report on Budget Activities for 1983 (AL-KHALIJ, various dates).....	136
Allocations for Roads September Commercial Bank Budget Described Allocations for Electricity, Water No New Investment Projects	
Ra's al-Khaymah Pharmaceuticals Plant Begins Production (AL-RIYAD, 29 Dec 83).....	141

## SOUTH ASIA

### AFGHANISTAN

All Eligible Men Reportedly Ordered To Join Army (NEW STRAITS TIMES, 3 Jan 84).....	143
--	-----

### BANGLADESH

Officials Discuss Saudi Assistance to Bangladesh (THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 27 Dec 83).....	144
Asian Development Bank Agricultural Loans Announced (THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 27 Dec 83).....	146
Dhaka, Sri Lanka Review Economic Cooperation (THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 27 Dec 83).....	147
Land Reforms Bill Approved, Features Told (THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 27 Dec 83).....	149

### IRAN

Khamene'i Discusses Politics in Christmas Message (ETTELA'AT, 1 Jan 84).....	151
Iranian Minister Speaks on Moslem Common Market (DAWN, 20 Jan 84).....	153
Suicide Operations Discussed by Minister of Revolution Guards (KEYHAN, 9 Jan 84).....	154
IRNA Carries Papers Headlines on Iraqi Threat (IRNA, 6 Feb 84).....	157

Pakistani Paper on Costs of Iran-Iraq War (M. B. Naqvi; DAWN, 7 Jan 84).....	159
Ehsan Tabari's 'Brain Stroke' Reported (TEHRAN TIMES, 14 Jan 84).....	162
Saudis Criticized for 'Myopic Attitude Towards Islamic Revolution' (TEHRAN TIMES, 14 Jan 84).....	163

#### PAKISTAN

Contradictions in Regime's Claims vs Policies Noted (VIEWPOINT, 12 Jan 84).....	165
Misuse of Hospitality by Refugees Discussed (VIEWPOINT, 12 Jan 84).....	166
Briefs	
Proposal for Women Judges	168
Refugee Settlement Opposed	168

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

IRAQ-SYRIA RAPPROCHEMENT--Gulf circles are talking of a secret effort being made by the Soviet Union in an attempt to end the Syrian-Iraqi dispute in preparation for embarking on talks to help end the Iraq-Iran war and revive the eastern front. These circles say that Moscow has decided to engage in this large-scale secret effort to counter the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance agreement. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 316, 12 Dec 83 p 12] 8494

CSO: 4404/249

CABLE SENT TO REAGAN ATTRIBUTES ASHJIAN KIDNAPING TO TURKS

Istanbul MARMARA in Turkish 14 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] The organization called "the Armenian Assembly" in the United States has alleged in a cable sent to President Reagan that Apo Ashjian, one of the prominent leaders of the Dashnak organization in Beirut, was kidnaped by the Turks.

The ARMENIAN WEEKLY provides more details on this issue and reports that the Armenian Assembly has directly accused Turkish agents of complicity in its telegram to President Reagan. Apo Ashjian disappeared mysteriously on 29 December 1982 while he was going from his home in Beirut's Ashrafiyah quarter to his work place. The next day, his car was found abandoned. Although no organization has claimed responsibility for the kidnaping, the Armenian Assembly charges that Turkish agents have staged similar plots on other occasions and notes that Turkish officials stated and the Turkish papers reported that the Turks have set up a commando unit to fight against Armenians in other countries.

The weekly states that California Governor George Deukmejian has also begun to pursue the issue. Deukmejian reportedly had a meeting with Secretary of State Shultz and demanded that the Lebanese government be contacted for possible inquiries into the matter.

Beside President Reagan, the Armenian Assembly has also sent similar cables to Secretary of State Shultz, members of the U.S. National Security Council, the Headquarters of the International [word illegible] Organization, the General Secretariat of the United Nations and other international organizations.

The cables contain no reference to the fact that Apo Ashjian was one of the leaders of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation; it is only stated that he was a prominent public personality in Beirut. The Armenian Assembly states in its cable to Reagan that the kidnaping of Apo Ashjian is an unprecedented act against the Armenian people which is seeking the restoration of its rights. The Armenian Assembly further pleads for President Reagan's help in efforts to return Ashjian to his family.

9588  
CSO: 4605/42

1915 MASSACRES SURVIVOR SENDS LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 31 Dec 83 pp 2,8

[Text] Ronald Reagan, President of the United States  
White House, Washington

Dear Mr President:

I was appalled by the following segment of your reply to an Armenian journalist's question concerning the stance of the United States on the Armenian genocide organized by Turkish authorities in 1915 during a gathering you held in the White House on October 18 with the editors of ethnic publications and representatives of ethnic radio stations in the United States: "I cannot believe that today there are survivors of that period of terrible hardships." (HORIZON, 7 November 1983) This statement of yours makes the Armenian Genocide, an indisputable historical fact, an imagined event.

I am a survivor of the 1915 genocide. There are thousands of other survivors like me who were uprooted from their homes by the Turks and who have been dispersed to the four corners of the world. If they too could make their protests heard to you, I am afraid, by what your statement implies, that you would term their evidence also as imaginary.

I was seven or eight years old at the time of the Armenian genocide in 1915. The horrors and the agony I was subjected to have been so terrifying and shocking that they were indelibly impressed on my childhood memory. I can tell anyone exactly how many people the Turks massacred and where, I can tell how many innocent Armenians the Turks hanged and where, I can tell in which churches they burned thousands of Armenian men, women, children and old people alive. I am sure that other survivors have even more horrifying memories. My family's exile trek passed through Maras, Antep, Nizib, Berecik, Carabulus, Meskene and finally Der Zor.

Mr President, to prove that what I am saying is not just empty words I would like to ask you to appoint an individual whom you trust and to provide me with safe passage so that I could take this trusted individual to my birthplace and show him the house I was born in and the government house where more than 300 Armenians from Zeytoun were held in chains. Then I could take him to the square in front of the Ulu Mosque where some of the imprisoned Armenians were hanged. I could tell him how we were kept awake for so many nights by the clatter of the

chains and the screaming insults of the gendarmes, how I would watch, trembling at my mother side, these innocent victims being led to their death and how their faces, covered by the shadow of death, could be seen in the dim light of the lanterns held by the gendarmes. I could show him with pain in my heart the two churches which were burned together with 2,500 and 1,500 people in them, including my own relatives. I could then walk with your trusted aide on the path of exile of my broken family and other close relatives, and I could tell him where we stopped for breaks and what happened, where and how people were massacred, where brides and young girls were abducted, where members of my family fell exhausted and I could show him where and how I was saved from death by miracles on four occasions. The memories of these bloody days have remained a recurrent nightmare for many years.

[Signed] Sincerely, Movses Bazarian, Survivor of the 1915 Genocide

[Date] 15 November 1983, Toronto

9588

CSO: 4605/41

TURKS ANGERED BY MITTERRAND'S PRO-ARMENIAN REMARKS

Mitterrand: 'Traces of Genocide Cannot Be Obliterated'

Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 9 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] Vienne, Southeastern France--"France wants, under all circumstances, to remember and to remind others that the great tragedy of genocide has left an indelible mark on the Armenian character", declared President Francois Mitterrand on Saturday during a speech honoring Armenians.

President Mitterrand was speaking in Vienne where he became an unexpected guest at a Christmas festivity organized by local Armenians.

The French president was accompanied by Louis Mermase, the mayor of Vienne and the president of the National Assembly. Mitterrand praised the traditions and culture of the Armenian people and then made a direct reference to the acts that have been committed in France in the name of the Armenian cause.

He declared to the Armenian community gathered before the city hall that "there can be no misunderstanding between the Armenians and France" and added: "Elements generally coming from abroad want to commit acts of violence against France, acts which hurt us all. They must know that their methods are not and will never be acceptable."

Referring to the Armenian genocide of 1915, Mitterrand declared: "The traces of the genocide that struck you cannot be obliterated. This must be inscribed in mankind's memory and must be a lesson of survival for young people so that it becomes clear to everyone that this nation does not belong to the past and that it has a present and a future."

The Armenian Cause Committee in Paris has expressed satisfaction at President Mitterrand's remarks.

HURRIYET: 'France Makes Armenians More Demanding'

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 9 Jan 84 pp 1,4

[Text] President Mitterrand of France staged a new performance of slander against Turkey on 6 January, on the occasion of the Armenian Christmas Day, in an effort to win the favor of the Armenians. In a speech in Vienne, which has a



sizable Armenian community, Mitterrand said: "The traces of the Armenian genocide cannot be obliterated."

Mitterrand was attending festivities held on the occasion of the Armenian Christmas Day. The president said that he has made arrangements to commemorate Misak Manoushian, a terrorist who was killed in February 1944, in all of France on the anniversary of his death.

Mitterrand also referred to Armenian terrorist acts directed against France and said that these acts are organized by individuals who come to France from other countries.

The French president added that the Armenian genocide has created unity and oneness among the Armenians.

France's television channel 2 reported Mitterrand's remarks in its afternoon broadcast and stated that his words carry major political significance. The program also carried a panel discussion held in an Armenian school and featuring Ives Ternon, a writer familiar with Armenian issues. Ternon said that with Mitterrand's remarks France has officially acknowledged the Armenian genocide and that, consequently, Armenian terrorism has lost its raison d'etre.

In an article on this issue, HURRIYET says in its today's edition that the more concessions the French make, the more the Armenians will demand.

Reacting to Mitterrand's speech on the occasion of the Armenian Christmas Day, Ara Toranian, the leader of the Armenian National Movement, said that while the discussion of the Armenian genocide is beneficial, it is also necessary to distinguish between the armed front of the Armenian National Movement and a handful of terrorists who are not linked with the movement. Toranian added: "We demand the immediate release of the 38 Armenian political prisoners held in France. These individuals are innocent; their only crime is that they have participated in the struggle against the Turkish government which is responsible for the Armenian genocide."

9588  
CSO: 4605/39

SOVIET EFFORTS FOR EDUCATIONAL DOMINATION OF ARMENIA

Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 5 Jan 84 p 4

[Article by V. Brutian: "Spread of Russian and Related Matters"]

[Text] In all probability the readers are acquainted with the lead article entitled "Spread of Russian in Armenia," which appeared in Issue No 36 of AZTAG SHAPATORYAG - TROSHAG.

The Alarming Language of Statistics

Cries of alarm over the "retreat" of the Armenian language throughout the Diaspora have been heard for the past half century. We seldom realize, however, that these same cries of alarm should apply to Soviet Armenia as well, where our native tongue is retreating, although with different patterns and mechanisms involved. The article mentioned above stresses weighty facts which indicate that this is happening, and particularly stresses the fact of the propagation of Russian-language schools, a development which is taking place in response to the demands of the central authorities and because of the spineless position taken by local government leaders.

The lead article in AZTAG SHAPATORYAG - TROSHAG presents a number of figures which project sad prospects to us. Prior to 1950, for example, there were a total of 7-8 Russian-language schools in all of Soviet Armenia. Today (citing 1980 figures) there are 33 Russian-language schools operating in Yerevan alone, as compared with 150 Armenian-language schools. The ratio of enrolled students between Russian and Armenian schools in Yerevan is 20 to 100. Again quoting 1980 figures, more than half of the total number of departments at the higher educational institutions in Armenia are totally Russianized, while in the remainder of the departments one fourth of all lectures are presented in Russian, with the exception of departments of Armenian language, literature, and history. In addition, graduates of Armenian universities are not permitted to present their graduation speech in Armenian....

As regards textbooks, the article notes that up to 1950 80 out of 100 textbooks at Armenia's higher educational institutions were printed in Armenian, while today barely 10 percent are in Armenian.

## Language of Government Correspondence

The picture is even more dismal at governmental and other establishments, where correspondence has changed from Armenian into 95 percent Russian. The article ascribes all this to a persistent government policy: "The spread of Russian has experienced a rapid growth, especially following Premier Kosygin's edict (No 13, October 1973, and No 835)."

All this, however, is only one side of the coin. On the other side there is the Soviet Armenian Diaspora, where the situation is more than tragic and disturbing.

## Soviet Diaspora: Principal Area of the White Pogrom

While the Soviet authorities on the one hand commenced a policy of opening up to the external Diaspora beginning in the years 1955-60, during those same years 200 schools and approximately 20 newspapers shut down within the Soviet Diaspora. "In spite of the fact that more than 1 million Armenians live in various areas of the RSFSR, frequently in concentrated assemblages, there is not one Armenian school in operation and not one Armenian-language newspaper being published there: even the weekly HAYRENIKI DZAYN, which is published for the Diaspora, as well as other newspapers are not permitted to be distributed to Armenian families in the Soviet Armenian Diaspora."

While the Soviet Armenian Diaspora suffers because of this policy of persecution of Armenians, on the other hand the Committee for Cultural Ties with Armenians in the Diaspora is not even permitted to show any interest in the internal, neighboring Diaspora. The capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, at one time contained 76 Armenian schools, while today that number has declined to... zero.

8817

CSO: 4605/37

ASALA REPORTEDLY THREATENS ALSO OTHER COUNTRIES, ARMENIAN GROUPS

Istanbul JAMANAK in Armenian 13 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] Washington--Recent remarks shedding light on international terrorism made by the U.S. Department of State indicate that Armenian terrorism has stopped using the Turkish republic and Turks as its sole target and that it has started threatening "third countries" like all other international terrorist organizations.

During a press conference in Washington, Terrel Arnold, the head of the counterterrorism division of the U.S. State Department, said that five major developments were observed in international terrorism last year: a) The dispersion of mainly Middle Eastern terrorist groups (such as the breakup of the PLO); b) Increased indiscrimination in terrorist incidents (Arnold showed the Orly airport massacre staged by the Armenians as an example of this and said: "The goal of the attack was to blow up the Turkish Airlines plane in the air and to kill 350 people, but as a result of the incompetence of the terrorists the bomb exploded in the airport.") c) The emergence of bomb-laden truck attacks; d) The fact that certain Middle Eastern organization have begun attacking Arab countries in their region in addition to Western targets; e) The use of terrorism as official policy by certain countries (Arnold gave as examples, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, North Yemen, Syria, Iran, North Korea and four unnamed Soviet Bloc countries). Arnold urged the United States and other Western countries to formulate national policies against terrorism in the face of these developments. Arnold dedicated part of his remarks to Armenian terrorism and said that, after the Orly massacre, ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia] began threatening France in addition to Turkey. He said: "ASALA now threatens not only Turkey, but the people of third countries. ASALA has also announced that it intends to attack the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] and its sympathizers."

In a letter to the New York ARMENIAN REPORTER, ASALA stated that the recent verbal attacks aired by the ARF are aimed gaining control of the Armenian community in Lebanon and that if these attacks continue they will be subject to violent retaliation.

9588

CSO: 4605/43

PAPER COMMEMORATES ANNIVERSARY OF ASHJIAN KIDNAPING

Beiruty AZTAG in Armenian 29 Dec 83 p 1

[Editorial: "We Shall not Forget"]

[Text] It is exactly one year since Comrade Apraham Ashjian, a member of the Lebanon Central Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF], was abducted while on his way from his home to his work place.

It is exactly one year since the days when the Lebanese-Armenian community, together with other communities of our diaspora, stood up as one body to express their indignation at the base act of kidnaping and to point fingers of condemnation and accusation at the perpetrator of that act: the Turkish government.

We accused then and we accuse today the Turkish government without any hesitation, because in addition to the circumstances related to the act of kidnaping and beyond them, the Armenian nation is deeply familiar with the real face and character of the Turkish state--a familiarity that is older than the first genocide of the 20th century.

We declared to the entire world that the Turkish government is the perpetrator of this base act, because we knew full well that Comrade Ashjian, his party of affiliation and the Armenian nation have no other enemies in Lebanon or elsewhere. We knew and we know that only the historic enemy of the Armenian nation, the Turkish government, which has a rich history of government-level criminal acts, could conceive and implement such acts which are directed against the entire Armenian nation and which cast dark shadows on the the civilized world.

One year ago, we accused the Turkish government and we resolutely reaffirmed our accusation on several occasions by demanding justice and inquiries from the Lebanese government, which Comrade Ashjian, his fellow party members and his countrymen served loyally. We also took our demands to all those who pose before the world public opinion as the protectors and the champions of human rights and dispossessed peoples.

The Turkish military junta resorted to its familiar policy of denial, which was, in fact, a loud confession of its criminal act. In fact, the Turkish state, no matter what its form of government has been seen to be by the outside world, has

always only known one way to explain its inhuman acts: the way of the ostrich, that is denial.

The Lebanese government, in its turn, announced that it has done everything that it could to trace and to bring to justice the perpetrators of the kidnaping act, but that its efforts have so far remained futile.

The protectors and the champions of human rights, who often engage in contests to condemn government perpetrated crimes, endorsed in this case a policy of "not see, not hear and not know" for reasons which are neither surprising nor unfamiliar: in order not to arouse the wrath of the Turkish government, NATO's "expensive" ally, employing a sycophantic and unctuous approach of ignoring even the most flagrant violations of the Turkish junta, knowing well--perhaps unknowingly--that they were simply encouraging the Turkish government to concentrate its criminal mind on plotting new conspiracies against the Armenian people.

By kidnaping Comrade Ashjian, did the Turkish government think that it could force the ARF and the entire Armenian nation to forget its act of genocide and its violation of the historic rights of the Armenian people?

Did the governments which encourage Turkey's government terrorism with their silence deceive themselves for a moment by thinking that by ignoring the abduction of Comrade Ashjian, they could drive the ARF and the entire Armenian nation to despair and to renounce their rights?

To those who have even the remotest of such suspicions, we have and we will always have one answer:

We have not forgotten and we shall not forget the perpetrator of Comrade Ashjian's abduction, namely the Turkish government, whether it appears in the world stage in military uniform or in civilian dress, because these are only masks worn to cover the Turkish government's true face of terrorism.

Furthermore, the Armenian people has shown and will continue to show that the dictionary of its legitimate struggle does not contain the terms "despair" and "surrender" no matter how big and costly are the sacrifices demanded from them. The history of our liberation struggle has been forged by battles without retreat, by conscious sacrifices and by an absolute belief about our indisputable rights.

9588

CSO: 4605/38

MINISTER OF STATE GHALI DISCUSSES 'ARAFAT VISIT

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 2 Jan 84 p 5

/Interview with Dr Butrus Ghali, minister of state for foreign affairs, by Hidayat 'Abd-al-Nabi; "Dr Butrus Ghali, minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Speaks to MAYU About Yasir 'Arafat's 81st Visit to Cairo; 'Arafat's Visit Is Indication of Prevalence of Philosophy of Negotiation and Dialogue over Philosophy of Rejection and Radicalism; Egypt Has Never Tried to Impose Custodianship on Palestinians and Is Hopeful on Possibility of Resumption of Jordanian-Palestinian Dialogue"/

/Text/ Yasir 'Arafat, the PLO Executive Committee chairman, had paid 80 visits to Cairo by 9 November 1977. The 81st visit came on 22 December 1983 after a lapse of 6 years. This visit and President Mubarak's meeting with 'Arafat, a meeting which lasted more than 2 hours at the Republican Palace in al-Qubbah, have generated immense regional and international reverberations. Nine days after the visit, which is considered one of the most important political events of 1983, Dr Butrus Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs, gave MAYU an exclusive interview on the dimensions /of the impact/ of this visit on Egyptian-Palestinian relations on the one hand and on Arab relations on the other hand and on the impact of the visit on Israel.

Despite the preference shown by the minister of state for foreign affairs with regard to discussing with MAYU the most important events of the hour in the external arena to which Egypt is a party, his interview today is of extreme significance and concerns an unusual event that after 6 years of estrangement, has surprised everybody.

Dr Butrus Ghali asserted that the visit is an indication of the prevalence in the Arab mind of the philosophy of negotiation and dialogue over the philosophy of rejection and radicalism.

He noted that the United States should, for its part, help 'Arafat move on the path of peace with longer strides.

He said that the visit is an event toward which it is futile to stand neutral because all the Arab countries are parties responsible for the issue.

He pointed out that the cause of peace will not be strengthened and will not stand on firm foundations unless the Palestinians accept the philosophy of peace, saying that the PLO chairman's acceptance of this philosophy is the best guarantee for Israel.

He also stressed that the Palestinians have received 'Arafat's meeting with President Mubarak with optimism and confidence and welcomed it, that the Palestinians are the cornerstone of any future settlement and that their opinion must be taken into consideration before that of any other party.

Following is the text of this important interview given by Dr Butrus Ghali exclusively to MAYU:

/Question/ Your Excellency, what, in your opinion, is the significance of Yasir 'Arafat's meeting with President Mubarak in Cairo on 22 December 1983 after 6 full years of estrangement?

/Answer/ The real significance of Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Cairo and of his meeting with President Mubarak lies in what we may call an indication of the prevalence in the Arab mind of the philosophy of negotiation and dialogue over the philosophy of rejection and radicalism. When such an indication comes from the leader of the Palestinian struggle and the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, it is likely to gain profounder significance by virtue of the central importance of the Palestinian issue to the history of the entire modern Arab world. As a consequence of the above and based upon it, the importance and significance of the meeting are also embodied in what the meeting has led to, namely breaking the psychological barrier" governing the relationship between Egypt and some Arab countries, considering that the Arab boycott of Egypt is the result of and for the Palestinian cause. Therefore, the oneupmanship vis-a-vis the Palestinian position has become unjustifiable and illogical.

The 'Arafat-Mubarak meeting perhaps carries in its folds the sense of the acknowledgement of the soundness of the Egyptian peace strategy and of the Egyptian peace course--a strategy and a course proven by practical experience to be successful and proven in actual practice to be capable of wresting Arab rights under the most difficult and complex circumstances. Consequently, the meeting comes as a confirmation of this strategy and of the need to continue it.

Finally, in addition to weakening the Arab rejectionist position, the Egyptian-Palestinian meeting breaks up and marginalizes this position and makes its movement discordant and ineffective.

It is worth noting that even though we consider the 'Arafat-Mubarak meeting a new and qualitative step on the part of the Palestinian leadership--a step unprecedented in the past 6 years--we must acknowledge in this regard that the Egyptian-Palestinian contacts were never really severed but were maintained constantly via the PLO office in Cairo and by way of Palestinian notables such as Sidqi al-Dajani, Nabil Sha'th, Sa'id Kamal and others with whom consultations were held and views exchanged between the two sides on all Palestinian affairs.



What after Visit?

/Question/ What are the results expected from Yasir 'Arafat's meeting with the president insofar as the Palestinian issue and the search for a peaceful solution to the issue are concerned?

/Answer/ If we consider the Cairo meeting the first step in the new history of the Palestinian issue on the path of the peaceful solution, then the opportunity available to 'Arafat at present undoubtedly requires a daring initiative that surpasses the Arab complexes founded on concepts and criteria of nationalism that have been exploited by the Arab nation's enemies to intensify inter-Arab conflicts and disputes, whereas what is needed is that all the positions rise to the level of the political responsibility connected with the serious situation that is currently prevalent.

Accordingly, the entire present situation depends, in my view, on the extent of 'Arafat's ability to contain the acts of oneupmanship coming from the Palestinian and Arab rejectionist forces and on his ability to turn to dealing with the issues of the Palestinian house from within and to contain the causes of disintegration and collapse through committed democratic dialogue. This is because safeguarding the Palestinian struggle, liberated from the custodianship of others and capable of maintaining its free decision, is an objective for which all the loyal parties that believe in the Palestinian cause are eager.

It is certain that the real starting point in this new phase of the Palestinian action will depend on 'Arafat's success in achieving a harmony of opinions within the organization over this step. 'Arafat's historical leadership of the Palestinian struggle gives him the moral assets sufficient to insure success in this regard.

If the immediate significance of the Cairo meeting is in its being a practical manifestation of the efforts to enhance the procession of peace in the Middle East area that has lived in tension for a long time, then the United States shoulders a special responsibility in this regard because this meeting will undoubtedly revive and renew the U.S. efforts seeking to achieve a peaceful settlement and to attract the PLO to the Middle East peace talks.

/Question/ What is your view of the U.S. role in the wake of this visit?

/Answer/ U.S. policy is now required to exert efforts to encourage the positive development that has occurred in the situation by reconsidering its rejection to engage in any direct contact with the PLO unless the organization officially approves Security Council resolution No 242 and recognizes Israel's right to exist. This is the position reaffirmed recently by a spokesman of the U.S. State Department in the wake of 'Arafat's meeting in Cairo even though 'Arafat has declared in numerous statements, meetings and positions his readiness to negotiate for the achievement of justice and the establishment of a comprehensive, lasting and firm peace in the area and even though he has recognized all the resolutions issued by the United Nations on the Palestinian issue. For its part, the United States must help 'Arafat move with longer strides on the path of peace.

The outcome of 'Arafat's visit will continue to hinge on the Arab countries' recovery from the surprise caused by the Cairo meeting and by their abandonment of reluctance, reserve and silence. This is an event toward which it is futile to stand neutral because all the Arab countries are parties responsible for the issue and for efforts to enhance the peace process and to take advantage of all the opportunities now available after the long freeze and stagnation. The Palestinian people have been the primary victim of this freeze, stagnation and oneupmanship for which it is now time to end.

#### After First Step in Right Direction

/Question/ On what logic have those rejecting this meeting, which is the first step in the right direction in a number of years, founded their position?

/Answer/ At present, a lamentable scene now prevails in the area because we find rejectionism uniting elements with totally conflicting positions. Palestinian rejectionism, for example, finds itself on the same grounds as Israeli rejectionism, despite the contrast in the intellectual premises of each. There is Palestinian rejectionism, which is a part of the broader Arab rejectionism, and there is Israeli rejectionism emanating from Israeli society's most intransigent, radical and unrealistic factions. This latter rejectionism is embodied in the official statement issued by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 22 December 1983--a statement noting that the president's reception of 'Arafat represents a serious undermining of the Middle East peace process. The statement also notes that the existence and activities of the PLO are in conflict with peace in this area and inevitably lead to obstructing the possibilities of peaceful solutions. The words of this statement show how strange the logic is on which it is founded and how discordant it is. In fact, the cause of peace will not be strengthened and will not be based on a firm foundation unless the Palestinians accept the philosophy of peace. The PLO chairman's acceptance of this philosophy is the best guarantee for Israel, and we had expected Israel to welcome such acceptance with enthusiasm.

Israeli excessiveness has gone to such an extent that Ge'ula Cohen, the deputy from the radical rightist Tehiya Party, has demanded withdrawal of the Israeli ambassador from Egypt. Does such excess serve the demand for peace which Israel says it is working for? Or is Yasir 'Arafat's acceptance of the logic of dialogue what serves the cause of Israeli peace?

As for the Palestinian rejectionist position within Fatah, it has been based on the fact that Yasir 'Arafat made the decision independently and without consulting the members of Fatah Central Committee or of the PLO Executive Committee.

This type of rejection is different from the rejection expressed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command) or Dr George Habash, by the Popular Struggle Front, by the Palestinian Liberation Front, by the Damascus Palestinians and by the insurgency movement leaders. The rejection of these parties is founded on raising radical slogans and is characterized by a large degree of demagoguery. It is no secret in this regard that Palestinian disunity existed, in fact, before the Cairo meeting and must not be tied to 'Arafat's

visit to Egypt. It must be stressed here that the Palestinians at home /in the occupied territories/ have received 'Arafat's meeting with President Mubarak with optimism and confidence and have welcomed it. These Palestinians are the cornerstone in any future settlement, and their opinion must be taken into consideration before that of any other party.

As for the Arab rejection, embodied in the Syrian and Libyan positions, it can be described as political rejection seeking to achieve the local interest of the regimes in these countries, with disregard for, and even at the expense of, the supreme Arab interest. It is my belief that the new situation under which the Arab world is now living in the wake of all these dramatic developments in the Palestinian and Syrian arena requires the Syrian and Libyan regimes to rise to the level of the events and to put the pan-Arab interest above all political, partisan or sectarian interests. Otherwise, the people's and history's judgment of these regimes will be very harsh.

/Question/ What is your vision of the Egyptian diplomatic strategy in the next phase and of the efforts to perpetuate the momentum of the Palestinian cause?

/Answer/ To start, I would like to make it indubitably clear that Egypt has never harassed the /Palestine Liberation/ Organization, has never imposed an opinion on it and has never appropriated any of its decisions. Egypt, to the exclusion of all the Arab countries, has never tried to impose a custodianship on the Palestinians and has always played the role of older brother and loyal adviser, in addition to accepting whatever decision the Palestinians reach, because the Palestinians are the people concerned with the issue and because nobody else has the right to see /decide/ the opposite of what they themselves see.

Generally, Egyptian diplomacy follows a firm strategy vis-a-vis the Palestinian cause. This strategy is embodied in the following four mainstays by which Egypt will continue to abide in the next phase:

First, persistent and ceaseless efforts to keep the Palestinian issue alive and dynamic and to prevent its disappearance from the focus of international light and attention.

Second, efforts to encourage the moderate wing of the PLO and all the elements that believe in dialogue and negotiation.

Third, resistance to the rejection and radicalism that lead to freezing the issue and to the loss of one opportunity after another.

Finally, the fourth mainstay is embodied in Egyptian diplomacy's interest in the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in defending their rights, in strengthening their position in the face of the occupation's difficult challenges and circumstances and in doing this by resorting to various means and contacting various influential circles.

## France's Attitude Toward Visit

/Question/ Your Excellency, can you review for us the international reactions displayed in the wake of the Cairo meeting and tell us what course are the subsequent events on the international arena and between the various parties with influence on such events expected to take?

/Answer/ I am eager to laud in this regard the French position, which has been the first positive reaction supporting the Cairo meeting between Yasir 'Arafat and President Mubarak. A statement has been issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing full understanding and the welcoming the meeting. Moreover, U.S. President Reagan's statements on the meeting have been characterized by support, as we have already pointed out. President Reagan has said that he believes that what President Mubarak is doing is to talk to 'Arafat about returning to the point reached previously, thus allowing contacts with King Husayn, the peace negotiations and the U.S. peace proposal to be resumed.

In fact, there is renewed hope now in the possibility of resuming the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue and of taking advantage of an opportunity that has presented itself. I wish to point out that Egypt is eager to play a role in bringing success to this dialogue and to any subsequent Jordanian-Palestinian-U.S. negotiations which we hope will take place between Jordan, representing the Palestinians, and the United States to reach an acceptable settlement that guarantees the Palestinians' rights.

The moderation voiced by some Israeli leaders perhaps carries in its folds cause for some optimism. We should note in this respect the statements made by Peres, the leader of the Israeli Labor Party, who said that the Mubarak-'Arafat meeting does not undermine the Camp David accords and who reminded in this regard of the demand made by President al-Sadat as of 1977 urging the PLO to participate in the negotiations.

## No Coordination between Washington and Cairo

/Question/ Your Excellency, do you believe that the Cairo meeting was arranged through coordination between Egypt and the United States?

/Answer/ There was no coordination whatsoever in this regard. Rather, 'Arafat's arrival on Egypt's coast was a surprise that astonished everybody, including the United States. Moreover, we need no coordination with the Americans to make an Egyptian decision concerning a meeting with the Arab brothers. Egypt's doors and heart have always been open to the Arabs. They are brothers, and Cairo is the home of each of them. They come to it any time they want and at any moment and under any circumstances they wish. What is required is to coordinate with the United States so that it may proceed to revitalize its diplomacy in this period a more positivity direction, especially so that there is a time margin that is diminishing with the passage of every day and that is retreating in the face of the concerns of the U.S. presidency in the imminent presidential elections campaign, because the next 10 months are the period which will witness the objective predominance of other concerns with varying degrees of priority. This is why the element of time is of special significance at present.

## CURRENT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY VIEWED AS FUTILE IN SOLVING PROBLEMS

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 779, 19 Dec 83 pp 26-29

/Article by Dr Ahmad 'Abd-al-Jawad: "Public Money Wasted in Scientific Research"/

/Text/ No one working in the field of university education in Egypt disagrees over the failure of scientific research to solve Egyptian society's pressing problems. In the article by Dr Mustafa al-Rifa'i, published in No 772 of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, we see clearly the separation between the research link and the industrial production problems in the Egyptian model. We see the opposite in the Western model, where the research link is tied to the production plan and to the management structure. The issue is not confined to the industrial sphere but goes beyond to all spheres, including the sphere of biology. Here again we see, for example, problems concerning the spread of endemic diseases in both man and animal, such as bilharzia, encleostoma, rheumatic fever and liver worms, which have been in existence for thousands of year, so far with no cure.

What really draws attention, and I note this by virtue of my working in the sphere of biological research, is the presence of the following two fundamental phenomena: First, the large increase in the number of people working in research from the early 1960's to the present, with the increase resulting from the system of free education that has led to the expanded appointment of people to the faculties of universities, along with the expanded foundation of new universities, and, second, increased government investment in scientific research--an increase embodied in the dispatch of scholars to the outside world--and the founding of research centers covering all the branches of science, led by the National Research Center. It can be said that there is no ministry that does not have a research center now.

But if we compare the above-mentioned phenomena with the benefit desired from them and if we express them statistically, we find that the graph line tends to rise insofar as the number of people working in research and the investment spending are concerned, while it tends to decline insofar as the economic yield

resulting from this expansion is concerned. This is evident in the failure of the research centers and teaching institutes to solve the problems encountered by Egyptian society in all fields. Matters become more surprising when we learn that the advanced countries get an obvious benefit from allocating funds for research. According to well-known statistics, every dollar allocated for research produces 120 times the original investment insofar as the yield of the final cost account is concerned. The United States allocates four percent of its total funds for projects for research and production development. This percentage rises to 8 percent in Sweden and reaches a maximum of 14 percent in the Benelux countries, which are specialized in certain industries. Belgium is specialized in the manufacture of small weapons and Holland in optics and electrical equipment. The benefit produced by scientific research in these countries reaches such a peak that even the invention patents constitute a source of guaranteed profitability for a project. It is thus evident that spending on research in Egypt contradicts the ABC's of economic science. This leads us to say that this spending becomes a drain on national resources because it produces no real benefit. In view of the fact that scientific research now enters all the modern systems of production, we will touch in this study on the causes of the failure of this sphere and shed light on new causes dealing with the intellectual aspects of research.

#### Old Opinions on Issue

Many present and former research workers and university men have discussed this problem, and it may be said that they attribute the problem to two groups of causes, the first group pertaining to material shortages and the second pertaining to organizational failure. As for those who attribute the problem to first group of causes, they believe that the universities and research centers entrusted fundamentally with solving society's problems suffer from a severe shortage of laboratory equipment and modern apparatus, thus making them less effective than similar research centers abroad. This is one view. On the other hand, the poor material standard of the workers in this field is considered one of the most significant obstacles. To start with, the researchers fall under the pressure of daily problems. So how can those who have fundamental problems solve the problems of others? As for those who adopt the other opinion and say that organizational failure is one of the reason for the lagging productivity of scientific research, they believe that the increase in the number of students--an increase that exceeds the educational resources available--constitutes an obstacle that weakens control over learning and performance standards and leads ultimately to a drop in the standard of graduates. When these graduates work in the universities and research centers, they do not represent the capable but rather the best available. With the succession of generations of this kind of researchers, the scientific research process gradually weakens. Those who adopt this opinion also believe that the educational curricula are inadequate, with the stress being put on instruction and memorization instead of on development of the gift of comprehending, working through and solving problems. The student subjected to the latter educational method should be the one who works in the field of research in the future.



## Rebuttal of These Opinions

From an objective viewpoint, it can be said that the shortage of modern equipment and laboratory equipment is not the root of the problem. Our problems are still within the framework of lack of data about them, i.e., they have not been surveyed and categorized. This is why we need at present the simple apparatus and equipment available in all the research centers. As a result of the failure to adapt technology to Egyptian society's circumstances, all those who return from scholarships abroad, who worked according to the trends and problems of the advanced Western societies and who specialized in precise branches not urgently needed by Egypt have come to constitute a problem in themselves because upon their return, they either do not encounter the same problems or, if they encounter them, they cannot find the precision and highly expensive equipment with which they had learned. Here is where the conviction that the cause of the problem is the unavailability of precision equipment and advanced instruments has arisen. On the other hand, we believe that there are numerous faculty members and researchers who enjoy easy material circumstances, especially those who have attained the rank of professor. Despite this, we find that their scientific activity is very limited, almost nonexistent. I can assert that they do not even engage in the hobby of reading what is new in their field of specialization. We wonder, is the obstacle here material poverty or something else? The practical problems, such as the problem of educational methods and curricula and the method of formulating tests, are the essential activities of faculty members. Regrettably, and by virtue of the compatibility of this trend with the prevalent intellectual pattern, we find that these members are not at all trying to change these methods. For example, Cairo University, where I work, organizes a special course for its instructors to familiarize them with modern educational systems. But we find that upon completing the course and trying to put what is new in the systems into practice, they are confronted with the mentality and ideas of the veteran members of the faculty who plan the educational process. Thus, the curricula and the teaching systems remain unchanged. What obstructs changes in these curricula, despite the presence of the desire to change them?

## Roots of Problem

It can be said that each of the two above-mentioned interpretations of the failure of scientific research reflects one aspect of the truth. Together, the two fail to reach the roots of the problem. Both deal with the descriptive or confirmative aspects, which are essentially the results of causes preceding them and which can be called primary or intellectual causes. It is well known that intellectual beliefs produce a pattern of behavior reflected in the activity and conduct of individuals. They also result in the building of various systems and institutions, including scientific institutions. If we abide by the analytical approach, we must--if we wish to familiarize ourselves with any problem, including the problem we are discussing--distinguish two kinds of causes that operate in unison. The first is defined as the primary or intellectual causes and the second as the secondary causes which are considered the tangible results of the group of primary causes. Peoples vary in their view of the problems and in their method and criteria of judging these problems. In Egypt, the tendency to deal with the problems from the descriptive or confirmative viewpoint has always

prevailed. This always leads to disregarding the group of primary causes, which are indispensable for a complete and objective view of any problem. As a consequence of this tendency, a belief has prevailed that Egyptian society's problems can be overcome by importing technology and the relevant laboratory research systems from abroad. Viewing technology as divorced from the intellectual pattern tied to it is one of the biggest illusions perpetrated among us. Technology is the use of scientific facts to meet the material and spiritual needs of a certain society. Thus, technology is not divorced from the values of societies, from their view of life and of the universe and man's role in this universe and, finally, from the method of learning and the pattern of judgment prevalent in societies. Without settling these three issues, the issue of scientific research in Egypt cannot be put in its right place. We will reiterate tirelessly that there is an illusion to which we have become accustomed, namely the illusion that any problem needs no more than allocations for the importation of modern equipment, new systems or foreign expertise. We must keep in mind that all the evidence confirms that what we import from abroad is incompatible with our society's circumstances. Instead of looking for the intellectual obstacles facing scientific research--obstacles that are the primary cause of the backwardness of this research--we look for the material obstacles. Instead of introducing qualitative change through new intellectual and educational values, we resort solely to quantitative expansion. This view is not new to Egyptian society, and it represents a historical current as old as the history of contact with Europe.

#### Return to Starting Point

It is indubitable that the modernization process in Egypt started with Egyptian society's contact with Europe by way of the first French campaign against Egypt in 1798. Muhammad 'Ali was the first Egyptian ruler to rely on European accomplishments to achieve his aspirations. He established numerous schools and institutions along the European pattern, brought in European experts, sent scholars abroad and built an Egyptian Army relying on the European arts of war. But what draws attention is that this immense edifice of material systems and institutions collapsed when England, with the participation of the other European countries, struck a tight blockade around Muhammad 'Ali in 1840. This era represents the first experience in the history of Egyptian modernization in which the modernization process was believed to entail no more than a transfer of Western technology and its technical aspects. Then followed the era of Khedive Isma'il, which represented another experience of admiration for Europe. Isma'il expanded on what Muhammad 'Ali had already accomplished in transferring many of the aspects of the European civilization, building more schools and educational institutes and devoting attention to translation activity. This period also witnessed expansion in railroads, telegraph networks, barrages, dams and land reclamation. Again we find that the second modernization period represented by Isma'il ended with the British occupation of Egypt. The third modernization period, begun with the 1919 revolution, saw a profounder approach toward the modernization issue. The class of agricultural landlords grew by a large degree, and Egypt chose the concept of democratic liberalism as a political framework, basing the choice on the concept that people are the source of authority and on the concept of equality and free elections. In this atmosphere, a deeper awareness of the problems of change in Egyptian society developed as a



result of an examination of the previous experiences. The circumstances became ripe for the first time to discuss the European intellectual aspects and beliefs as one of the means that must be adopted if Egypt were to adopt science as a way of life. That was the period which witnessed ideas which called for separation of the state from the church and for secularism as well as the ideas which stressed man's strength and competence in this universe and called for the elevation of reason as a source of knowledge. This last idea was one of the most important ideas reflected by two different currents in Egyptian life. One was the liberal democratic current, represented by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Taha Husayn, al-'Aqqad and 'Ali 'Abd-al-Raziq, and the other was the socialist current reflected in the writings of Shibli Shumayl, Salamah Musa, Mahmud al-Mansuri and Niqula Haddad. The ideas of these pioneers were received with utmost violence by the current of Egyptian reformists /Islamic Reform Movement, led by Muhammad 'Abduh/ with all its factions. The reformists did not at all accept these liberal ideas, which are the basis of the scientific approach. This is why Taha Husayn's book "Pre-Islamic Poetry" and 'Ali 'Abd-al-Razziq's book "Islam and the Rules of Government" were attacked so violently. Because the issue of secularism was not settled in this period and because the call for elevating the role of reason as the basis of knowledge and the criterion of judging the true nature of things was suppressed strongly, the modernization tragedy came to its end, and its intensity was blunted by the political chaos which followed the 1936 treaty.

The fourth modernization period extended from 1952 to the present. This period has seen expansion in the foundation of universities and research centers. The number of people from all of Egyptian society's classes working in these universities and centers has increased as a result of the revolution's emphasis on eliminating class distinctions. Despite this quantitative growth, there is still a serious deficiency in the concepts of those working in the sphere of scientific research and higher education.

A general look at the period from 1805 to the present--a span of almost 180 years of influence by the West--enables us to notice a general characteristic of this influence, namely that it has occurred at the quantitative level but absolutely not at the qualitative level. Viewing modernization as the adoption of technical or technological developments only while disregarding the absorption of the intellectual and cultural patterns tied to this development is an indication of a superficial and one-dimensional view. For us, it has always been easier to imitate all material aspects of European technical applications. As for the intellectual value of these applications, their view of man and his purpose in this life and their elevation of the role of reason, these are the Western aspects that have not been accepted at all, and Egyptian society has planted all kinds of obstacles in their face, keeping in mind that the intellectual aspect has been the basis of scientific development from the Greek era to the present. This is the very special and distinguishing aspect of the present scientific civilization. Arnold Toynbee has best expressed this problem which arises when backward societies are influenced by European civilization when he said that the preeminent strength of any element of cultural radiation (technology, politics, language and religion) is inversely proportional to the cultural value of this element. The trivial /tafiḥ/ part (technology) evokes in the assaulted society less resistance than the vital part because the trivial does not pose the threat of a violent or painful strike at the traditional system of this society's life.

## Rise of Science

The pre-Hellenic era saw all aspects of life subjected to a supernatural force responsible for all those aspects--a force that influences life's aspects and that is solely entitled to interpret them. We can call this era the era of the metaphysical phase of human development. That metaphysical era saw in the gods a source of knowledge and wisdom--gods responsible for managing the natural forces such as the winds, rains, sun and moon. Egypt had (Tammuz), the god of wisdom, and Ra', the sun god. Babylon had (Aya), the god of wisdom, and Enlil, the god of storms and winds. Greece had Zeus, the god of natural forces, and Athena, the goddess of wisdom. Man in that era believed that there were invisible forces represented by the gods and goddesses. Those forces were responsible for order in the world. They kept the law governing that order to themselves, and no man had the right to find out what those laws and rules were, or else he would be the subject of revenge for overreaching.

The myth of Prometheus exemplifies the wrath of the gods and their revenge upon whoever tries to find the secrets of the world of the gods, who alone possess the keys to the unknown.

The biggest organized development in the history of mankind toward an explanation of this world by relying on man's intrinsic power came in the Hellenistic era with the natural philosophers who emerged in the Ionian cities in the 6th century BC. Thales was the first philosopher to say that water was the source of all things. Anaximenes attributed the universe and nature to the contrast between the force of rarefaction and the force of condensation. Heraclitus said that fire is the source of things, whereas Democritus was the initiator of the largest effort to explain the world on the basis of two elements, namely substance and vacuum. This was the era of the most daring endeavor to remove the gods as the sole explanation of the universe and from monopolizing the credit for its emergence. The entire universe is governed by strict laws that are the cause of its motion and origins, and these laws are latent in the universe and necessary for it. This was the beginning of the scientific explanation of the universe and, consequently, of all things. This is why we have the right to call that era the era of science. That era also witnessed a serious development in the direction of the emergence of the scientific method--a method whose beginnings came with the Sophists in the 5th century BC. The Sophists were the ones who said that man is the source of all things. This is a serious statement befitting this unique discovery in man's history--the discovery that man, with his natural gifts and talents, is capable of interpreting this universe. In the 4th century BC, the belief that reason is the basis of virtue became acceptable with Plato and Aristotle, and the proof that the intellect is fit as a criterion for judging the nature of things was finally established. We thus can reach the conclusion that there is no knowledge without belief in two essential facts, namely the belief that there is a law that governs things, that this law is latent in things and inseparable from them and that there is no force that can violate this law, not even a god himself and, second, the belief in action as a source of knowledge and a criterion for judging things.

The development of science has depended on the expansion of the interpretation of these two principles or on additions to them. The Renaissance in Italy,

the era of progress in scientific research in the 17th century, relied on reviving these two principles. Galileo's endeavors to develop a new explanation for the solar system to replace the Ptolemaic theory was no more than a revival of Plato's and Pythagoras's view of the world as a system and as a pattern of mathematical projections. The scientific method reached maturity in the 17th century with Descartes and Francis Bacon, who established the foundation of the experimental method in science, which is an important addition to the two above-mentioned principles.

#### Our Position toward Principles of Science

If we wonder about our position as a society toward the two above-mentioned principles as a criterion of belief in the scientific method in life, and if we want to observe the extent of the spread of these two principles in the essence of our ethical and intellectual life to see if they could be a code of behavior among individuals and a rule for judging things, we will certainly not look for the answer among the common people, as we have not looked for it among the educated. Rather, we will look for the answer among the intellectual elite, namely those engaged in scientific research in the universities and research centers because this category, to the exclusion of others, is entrusted fundamentally with abiding by this method so that there may be a tangible outcome for our scientific problems. Scientifically, there are no published criteria regarding the intellectual patterns prevalent among those engaged in scientific research. This is why I have personally selected some questions fit for measuring opinion regarding these two principles and phrased two questions as follows: Is there a law that governs the universe or things and that is impossible to obstruct by any force, even if it were a miracle? Do you believe in intellect as a means for the discovery of such laws, if they exist? I have chosen a research sample from among people I have met by virtue of work or friendship, with this sample comprised of 100 people of various ages and representing the various job grades, namely tutor, assistant instructor, instructor, assistant professor and professor. These grades begin with the 25-year-old age group, since 25 is the age at which a tutor begins his job, with the span between one grade and the other being 5 years. I asked the questions verbally, not in writing. I also asked the questions indirectly, not directly, during a dialogue. After checking the yes and no answers, I found that all those who answered the first question negatively also answered the second question negatively and all those who answered the first question positively also answered the second question positively, meaning that whoever said yes approved both questions and whoever said no rejected both questions. After transferring the figures to a graph, it became evident that 96 percent of the research sample answered negatively. It is also evidently clear that there are no noteworthy differences in belief between the various teaching grades. Moreover, there is no difference in the answer insofar as age groups are concerned, meaning that the practical experience of those who reach the grade of professor, i.e., 20 years of experience, leads to no noteworthy difference in the level of belief in the presence of a regulating law to which matters are subject from the similar level of belief at the beginning of practical life. It is certain that the four percent of those working in scientific research who answered positively are a very small group that represents no distinct or prevalent tendency in this regard. This group cannot put forth projections for the urgent priorities needed by society, nor can it

formulate solutions for them as long as the prevalent tendency among those working in this field is belief in the invisible. If the problems facing us are God-made and if God controls their appearance and disappearance, then scientific research becomes essentially a blasphemy against God and an act of idolatry. This is the major dilemma facing the scientific view of things. Therefore, it is not surprising that al-Ghazali denied the cause-effect relationship in the 25th issue of his book "The Fall of the Philosophers," and I can say that this belief denying the cause-effect relationship at the philosophical or comprehensive level is the prevalent characteristic among those presently working in the field of scientific research.

Al-Ghazali's attack on intellectuals and his slighting of the weight of the intellect is not the only incident of its sort in the Middle Ages. Taha Husayn and 'Ali 'Abd-al-Raziq have recently dealt with this attack. The aim of the campaign has always been that of destroying the scientific method. Unless the issue of belief in the presence of a law that is latent in things and that is the cause of their existence and the issue of belief in the role of reason as an instrument of knowledge and a criterion of judgment are settled among the elite in Egypt at the intellectual and emotional levels, there will be no scientific research, and we cannot expect solutions from researchers because in their hearts they are waiting for somebody to solve their problems. Thus, the spending on these scientific centers is a waste of public monies unless the educational systems are developed. Finally, we thus reach the conviction that adopting technology as the sole basis for overcoming the crisis of progress is nothing but a myth.

8494

CSO: 4504/129

## REASONS FOR DECLINE OF SMALL TRADES EXPLORED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 779, 19 Dec 83 pp 13-16

/Article by Nu'man al-Zayyati: "Lost Role of Small Industries"

/Text/ Small industries hold the top place in the industrial economic activity of many countries in the world. In the United States, the small industrial establishments employing no more than 100 workers represent nearly 91 percent of the total number of industrial establishments there. In West Germany, small industrial establishments make up 89 percent of industry, in Britain 95 percent and in Japan nearly 99 percent. In Egypt, the number of small industrial establishments is estimated at nearly 96 percent of the total number of industrial establishments.

The above statistics can correct the misconception that the small industries sector is confined to the developing countries and that the efforts exerted in some developing countries to enhance the small industries have not produced satisfactory results because those who adopt the measures for this development have failed to comprehend completely the problems facing the small industries. So what are the most significant problems and obstacles facing the development of small industries in Egypt? What are the spheres for the development of small industries?

#### Importance of Small Industries:

Regarding the importance of small industries, engineer Najib Musaylihi, the general director of the Ministry of Planning, said that by disseminating the small industries, the developing countries can achieve intrinsic economic growth through use of available national capabilities and resources including manpower, raw materials and local production requirements. They can also achieve balanced development between the rural areas and the cities. Through distribution of the small industrial projects between the small towns and the rural areas, the housing difficulties can be overcome. What is more important, the small industries are most capable of increasing production and employment because they employ the system of relatively labor-intensive production, whereas the capital invested is small in comparison with the big industrial establishments which employ the

system of capital-intensive production. Moreover, small industries are considered training arenas for the major industrial operations. Through working in the sphere of small industries initially, elementary technological systems can be applied, thus making it possible to absorb technology in its less complex phase to pave the way for the widespread use of technology in industry. Consequently, small industries are the cornerstone on which industrial development in most countries depends. Moreover, small industries are characterized by being more flexible than the major industries in terms of location. This is why they can be used to spread industry at the national level, considering that small industries can utilize limited raw materials and local markets and can, as well, utilize low-cost labor to manufacture components and parts on subcontracts with major establishments set up in urban areas. This means that through setting up small industrial projects, industrial development can be channeled toward areas beyond the major cities. Moreover, these industries help diversify production and, consequently, diversify the industrial structure. Small industries make it possible to replace imports with local products, especially when the demand for a certain commodity is limited. Therefore, we find that the trend of setting up small industries befits the circumstances of Egypt and of the developing countries suffering from a severe shortage of capital because of their constant need for vast investments to implement projects in the basic and vital sectors such as education, irrigation and communications.

#### Obstacles Facing Development of Small Industries:

The shortage of financing is one of the main obstacles obstructing the development of small industries in the developing countries. The difficulty of getting the necessary credit is perhaps the main obstacle curtailing the ability of those operating small industrial establishments, considering that these people need the money necessary for the plant buildings and for the purchase of machinery and equipment, in addition to operation capital to manage current operations. This credit is needed at soft terms because small industries, unlike the big industries, are frequently unable to get long-term loans. The high interest rates prevent the owners of small industrial projects from borrowing from commercial banks. The gap existing between the money supply and demand has made evident the need to set up specialized financial establishments. The Industrial Development Bank has played a role in the credit activities of the public, private and cooperative industrial sectors and in supplying these sectors with the needed credit.

Regarding the bank's role in encouraging small industrial projects, 'Abd-al-Hamid Qabudan, chairman of the Industrial Development Bank's Board of Directors, said:

The sum of the total credit advanced by the bank in the period from 1 August 1976 to the end of 1978 amounted to 70.5 million pounds, including 23.5 million pounds in foreign currencies. A total of 1,439 projects benefited from this credit, including 1,428 small industrial projects which obtained credits amounting to 60.5 million pounds or 56 percent [as published] of the total credits advanced by the bank in the form of short-, medium- and long-term loans. In 1979, the small industrial projects benefiting from the credits advanced by the bank rose to 2,588 projects, amounting to 85 percent of the total number of projects financed by the bank in that year, with the total loans and credits advanced to the small industrial projects reaching 40 million pounds. The bank's



accomplishments until the end of last June show that the total value of the loans approved amounted to 570 million pounds disbursed to 8,378 projects with an investment cost of 1.94 billion Egyptian pounds. These projects provide additional employment for nearly 235,510 workers. Of the 8,378 projects, 7,040 projects were small industrial projects which obtained nearly 180 million Egyptian pounds /in credit and loans/. The share of the food industries amounted to 102 million pounds, of the construction and building industries 90 million pounds, of the metal and engineering industries 91 million pounds, of tourism and hotels 48 million pounds and of the other projects 145 million pounds. The International Reconstruction and Development Bank has agreed to advance to the Industrial Development Bank a loan of \$400 millions, of which \$100 million will be allocated for the small industries.

#### How to Obtain Loan:

As to how to obtain a loan, 'Abd-al-Hamid Qabudan said:

If the project is not subject to the industry regulation law, the bank examines it on the basis of its importance to the national economy, such as in the case of tourism and food security projects.

But if the project is subject to the law governing the investment of Arab and foreign capital and the free zones, namely Law No 43 of 1974, as amended by Law No 32 of 1977, then the approval of the Public Investment Authority must be obtained. If the project is subject to the industry regulation law, then the approval of the Public Industrialization Authority is required.

'Abd-al-Hamid Qabudan added that there are short-term, 12-month loans in local currency intended to supply the raw materials needed by industry, to make up for shortages and to finance the clients' vertical export activities, beginning with production and ending with shipping, as well as to finance the local import orders. There are also medium- and long-term loans, with the medium-term loans extending from 1 to 5 years and the long-term loans extending from 5 to 15 years. These loans are intended for the expansion of existing industrial projects, the replacement /of old systems and technologies/ by modern means and technological systems and the foundation of new projects. As for loans in foreign currency, they are intended for the importation of equipment, machinery and production requirements from abroad. The bank recoups these loans in local currency. These loans are also intended for the replacement of old machinery by new machinery in order to develop production. As for the sureties demanded by the bank, he said that they include real estate (land and buildings), commercial mortgages (project's material and nonmaterial components) and ownership mortgage (including raw materials, production requirements, fully manufactured and semi-processed goods, relinquishment of dues payable in contracts, supply activities, deductible bonds and money orders and possession mortgage of securities and bank credit letters).

Despite all these facilities, the problem of financing small industries in Egypt is still present because of the lack of special facilities concerning the sureties needed to get the loans for the small industries and because of the high interest rate demanded for loans advanced by the commercial banks and by the Industrial Development Bank.

## Failure to Supply Raw Materials

Engineer Na'im Qudays, technical director of the (Fuzmitia) Engineering Industries Company, said that the most significant problems obstructing the development of small industries are the marketing problems, especially the problem of securing the raw materials and the production requirements. It is often difficult for the small establishments to purchase the raw materials, production requirements, machinery and equipment. The small establishments are frequently compelled to purchase some raw materials at high prices because of their unavailability and because of the restrictions imposed at times on the importation of needed materials. This could compel the establishments to reduce their production. It leads at the same time to higher production costs whose impact is reflected on the consumers. Another problem facing the small industries is their difficulty in marketing goods produced by both big and small plants because the small plants cannot compete with the goods produced by the big plants, especially in terms of quality. But some small plants have recently been able to attract the market to their products and have surpassed the big plants with old and established reputations.

## Administrative Problems behind Deterioration of Small Industries

Engineer Na'im Qudays believes that the most significant obstacle facing the development of the small industries sector is that this sector is not under the control of a specific authority that tends and strengthens it. The plurality of authorities engaged in or supervising the small industries activities, especially the rural industries and crafts, and the absence of coordination between the numerous authorities has led to a failure to develop these industries. Moreover, the people managing these small projects lack the experience needed to manage them. What is more, many of the people managing small establishments lack managerial capability, especially financial and marketing capability. Furthermore, small industry projects cannot afford the costs of management consultants that big industries can. Besides, the inadequate technical capability of workers in the small industries leads to a drop in the technical standard of labor. This drop is caused by the instability of skilled labor and the tendency of skilled workers to emigrate to the outside world and by the failure to expand the training activities in an adequate manner. There is also the decline in the quality of some goods produced by the small industries because the small industrial plants cannot produce standard goods of a high quality. This is due to the fact that the owners of small industrial establishments disregard the importance of quality as well as lack awareness on their part of the data concerning standards. Most often, they also lack the technical capabilities because they do not possess the equipment necessary for quality control or the instruments for testing.

Regarding the most important spheres in which the efforts can be focused to enhance the small industries, engineer Najib Musaylihi said that the consumer industries, the assembling and packaging industries, the industries assisting or complementing the major industries and the service and maintenance industries are the most significant industries expected to be successful in Egypt. Emphasis can be put on the agroindustries as one of the important consumer industries, considering that the needed raw materials are available and that encouraging these industries to spread in the rural areas will help eliminate the masked



unemployment in the countryside. This is in addition to the industries that require certain skill and precision, such as Khan al-Khalili crafts and numerous traditional crafts. With the expanded electrification of the countryside, it will be easy to introduce mechanical work into many of the small industry units such as mechanical spinning mills to replace manual mills.

The small industries can play a role through the application of the system of contracts between the big industries and the assisting or complementary small industrial projects, with the small industry units processing and converting the raw materials supplied to them by the major industrial plants into parts and components that are then delivered to the big plants to assemble and put out the finished product. Such contracting provides the small industries with a broad market and supplies them at times with the operational capital as well as technical assistance. This system has been successfully applied to numerous industries in Japan such as the motorcycle, sewing machine, car and watch industries.

In Japan, the degree of reliance by the major industry on the small industrial units with which they conclude contracts amounts to 40 percent of the cost in the sewing machines industry, 31 percent in the motorcycle industry and 28 percent in the car industry. The U.S. policy in the sphere of expanding and encouraging the spread of complementary industries is an indication of the importance of developing these industries. For example, 50-80 percent of the components of the goods turned out by the (International Machinery Union) are produced through contracts with small industry units. This policy has led to the construction of towns for the complementary industries next to the major plants.

Engineer Musaylihi added that guidance can be gained from India's experience in the sphere of the assembly and packaging industry. In India, the small industrial plants have begun to import and assemble radio and watch parts whereas they manufactured only the external box locally in the past. Gradually, these units have been able to produce some parts locally.

The big plants must familiarize themselves with the technical level of the existing small engineering industries so that they may guide these small industries, used as subcontractors, to enable them to meet the big plants' needs for spare parts, components, machinery parts and semiprocessed goods.

#### Promulgation of New Legislation:

Dr 'Atif Dabbur, the head of the Central Industries Branch, said:

The Egyptian People's Assembly must issue a complete and precise law for the Egyptian small industries--a law founded on definite and tangible criteria so that it may become possible through such a law to determine the industries capable of growing and those requiring assistance. There should also be a specialized government agency that possesses all the details and data concerning the small industries in their entirety, not just the small crafts or rural industries. This proposed agency can coordinate between the numerous authorities involved in this sphere and can take charge of this sector. Moreover, the interest rate on loans advanced to small industrial projects should not exceed eight percent.

The Industrial Development Bank officials believe that to eliminate the problems encountered by the small industrial establishments in Egypt, especially by the small crafts and home industries, in dealing with the commercial banks because of lack of the sureties needed, the system of insurance agencies in operation in Japan can be adopted. The state has set up insurance agencies to insure that credit is advanced to the small industries. These agencies guarantee the small industries for loans from banks and financial institutions in return for a small commission. The insurance agency conducts a comprehensive study on the small industry concerned and then offers the banks involved the guarantee required for the establishment to get the financing it needs. These agencies undertake to repay the loans for the small establishments in case they stop repayment, provided that the small establishments resume payment as soon as their circumstances permit. On their part, the insurance agencies also conduct the necessary studies to find out the reasons for a delay in payment and to help the small establishment. In return, the state subsidizes these agencies.

#### Building Industrial Towns:

Engineer Musaylihi believes that the policy of building industrial towns in Egypt is one of the most important means to develop the small industries, with the state providing the money necessary to build small workshops and plants within the industrial town, thus making available to the small industries complete installations equipped with the needed machinery and equipment and leased for suitable rent or offered to craftsmen for ownership at cost price, with the cost divided over reasonable annual installments. The services that the industrial towns can offer the small plants include water, firefighting equipment, parking spaces and a general service and maintenance workshop fitted with the latest equipment and machinery. The industrial complexes can thus be an effective means for developing the small industries in Egypt. Industrial complexes can take various forms such as governmental industrial complexes. The state shoulders the entire construction cost, including land, buildings, various utilities, machinery and equipment, and then leases the complexes, as in the case of the 10 Ramadan--al-Sadat Town--Complex and al-'Amiriyah Complex, each of which cost 21 million pounds, and the complex in 6 October City, which cost 24 million pounds and is designed to accommodate the small industries for the production of house appliances and workshop equipment and where the production unit is to be delivered to the beneficiaries with all the utilities.

The other type of complexes is embodied in the industrial complexes specialized in one type of small industries such as the leather, chemical or wood industries.

#### Pioneer Role of Ministry of Defense:

The unavailability of craftsmen trained in the small industries and trades has motivated the Ministry of Defense and War Production to devote attention to vocational training. The ministry is presently training the conscripts in the armed forces in the small crafts and trades which it needs at its vocational training centers. The ministry is also contributing to supplying the civilian production sectors with skilled craftsmen and tradesmen discharged from the military service at the annual rate of 45,000 workers, in addition to 1,500 skilled bakery workers. The Armed Forces Central Agency for Major Projects also

contributes to supplying the civilian sector with technical and skilled cadres in the sphere of the prefabricated construction industry. The total number of trained technicians discharged in 1980 was 11,600 workers trained in the construction industry. The Central Organization and Management Agency also issued regulations to train office boys and convert them into skilled workers to make up for the shortage in this sphere. These regulations call on all the state's administrative units to convert 10 percent of their office boys to skilled workers. This is to be done on agreement with the training centers of the ministries of reconstruction, industry and social affairs. So far, more than 160,000 persons have been converted into craftsmen trained in construction metalworking and electrical-work activities.

This is why the small industries must be developed within the framework of comprehensive economic development so that a kind of continuous development may be achieved. Meanwhile, the efforts must be focused on developing those industries in the most important spheres expected to be successful, namely the small consumer industries.

8494

CSO: 4504/129

# NEGATIVE TRENDS IN FARMING IN RECENT YEARS DECRIED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 4 Jan 84 p 5

/Article by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Fudayl: "A New Look at the Future of Farming and the Agricultural Question in Egypt: New Developments in the Rural Areas in the Seventies and Eighties"/

/Text/ Perhaps the essential difference between the countryside of Egypt in the fifties and sixties, on the one hand, and that of the eighties, on the other, is that landownership or landholding no longer plays such a decisive or dominant role in determining economic and social conditions and relations in the Egyptian countryside, since the spread of ownership and the use of livestock resources and livestock have become an important source of agricultural income as far as numerous classes of peasants go. In addition, agricultural machinery and equipment (in the form of tractors, irrigation machinery, reapers, threshers and beaters) have become an important source of agricultural income and economic exploitation in the Egyptian countryside.

Some estimates point out that a tractor owner receives a net profit of 1,000 pounds per year for a single tractor on the average and the rental of an irrigator comes to 80 piasters per hour (see the newspaper AL-AHRAR, 7 November 1983).

Therefore, the importance of the rental relationships in Egyptian rural areas is no longer restricted to the renting out of land, but also involves the renting out of the services of agricultural machinery of importance in agricultural operations, such as hoes, tractors, irrigators, threshers and beaters, since because of the high rental of the services of this agricultural machinery, in some cases many peasants have been forced to refrain from harvesting cotton and performing the activities of beating after the threshing (see AL-AHRAR, 7 November 1983, and the newspaper AL-AHALI, study by the Central Peasants' Bureau, published in the issue of 31 August 1983).

Thus it is clear that the regulation of the rental relationship between the owner of agricultural machinery and small peasants using the services of this agricultural machinery constitutes a legislative necessity which is of no less importance than the regulation of the legislative relationship between the landowner and tenant. In addition, the legislators must act to set out deterrent penalties for the acts of deliberate sabotage that take

place in cooperative societies to incapacitate society tractors (and other agricultural machines) and deprive small farmers of their services, so that they merely become the victims of people who own and operate agricultural machinery for their own account. It has been observed that many board members of cooperative societies own their own tractors, thus violating the provisions of the law on cooperative activity, not to speak of the poor, indeed nonexistent, maintenance activities on the cooperative societies' tractors and machinery.

#### What Has Happened to the Crop Structure in the Area Farmed?

There has been much talk in recent years about the optimum crop structure and the need to review the current crop structure and crop cycle in a manner that will guarantee the proper use of land and water resources and will realize the goals of the society through the agricultural sector. Previously, in 1981, the Agriculture Committee of the People's Assembly demanded a review of the existing crop structure on agricultural lands, in accordance with changes in local consumption and export requirements.

The crop structure means determining the area set aside for the production of all various crops (grain, fodder, fiber products, legumes, vegetables, fruit and oil crops), from which one can determine the amounts of agricultural commodities produced. The early part of the sixties witnessed the start of government intervention in tangible form in the field of determining the area set aside for the production of all major crops that are of concern to the persons drawing up economic policy (supply and export commodities, especially cotton, wheat, rice, onion, peanut and sesame crops). In addition, the sixties witnessed the government monopolization of the marketing of cotton and sugar cane crops and the adoption of the system of the compulsory delivery of a stipulated share of production of the rice, fava bean, peanut, sesame and onion crop by landholders to government collection centers in accordance with delivery prices announced in advance, in the context of the "cooperative marketing" system.

Because of the accumulated policies and practices in the sixties and seventies, we find that the crop structure of the area farmed in Egypt today is characterized by a number of disruptions and discrepancies, the most important of which we might sum up as follows:

##### A. The struggle for crop acreage between food for humans and food for animals.

All agricultural experts agree that there is a serious disruption in the use of crop acreage in Egypt between fodder crops, which take up about 30 percent of the crop area, to feed about 4 million head of livestock, and food crops, which take up about 55 percent of the crop area, to feed a population which will come to about 50 million by 1985.

This disruption is reflected in the fact that Egypt has become an intensive wheat and vegetable oil importing country, is almost an importer of sugar,

fava beans and lentils, and is not an exporter of rice. All evidence indicates that farmers are vying with one another to avoid producing the main crops that are subject to the compulsory landholder delivery system, whose marketing is a monopoly of the government. It has been noted that farmers evade and avoid farming cotton, rice, lentils, fava beans, peanuts and sesame. Conversely, it is noted that they are expanding the production of vegetable and fruit plants and fodder plants (permanent bersim and Syrian corn).

Cotton heads the list of crops that farmers hastened to avoid producing in the seventies. In accordance with the statement in the report on agricultural development strategy, the areas set aside for production of cotton declined from 1.6 million feddans in 1970 to 1.2 million feddans in 1980 (that is, the annual rate of decline in the area of cotton planted came to 28,200 feddans). That has of course been reflected on the area where bersim coverage was established, which dropped from 1.2 million feddans in 1970 to 990,000 feddans in 1980.

After that comes rice. The areas farmed with rice declined from 1.14 million feddans in 1980 to 956,000 feddans in 1980 (that is, the rate of decline was 18,600 feddans per year). In addition, the area farmed with fava beans shrank from 330,000 feddans in 1970 to 276,000 feddans in 1980, and the area farmed with lentils from 47,000 feddans in 1970 to just 15,000 feddans in 1980.

Conversely, the areas farmed with permanent bersim increased (from 1.5 million to 1.7 million feddans), with vegetables from 747,000 feddans to 1.1 million feddans, while the area farmed with wheat was more or less constant. One should observe that Syrian corn and wheat have become animal fodder, as will become apparent herewith.

#### B. Disruption and disturbance in pricing policy.

The other concomitant aspect may lie in the disruption and disturbance of crop and livestock production pricing policies in Egypt. Agricultural pricing policy, as stated in the strategy report, has been characterized by a fragmented, noncomprehensive nature, in the sense that it has been confined to specific plants, and decisionmakers have not taken the measure of putting them in general application to include vegetable and fruit crops and livestock products. Therefore, these crops have become more profitable in comparison with those subject to pricing policies and the system of landholder delivery to the government. To that one must add that the prices of basic crops such as cotton, rice, wheat, and corn subject to the crop cycles that are binding on the peasants remain fixed, sometimes, from year to year. If they move, that is in minor fashion, which cannot be compared to the rates of movements of the other plants and crops.

As a result of this pricing policy, a severe contradiction has arisen between considerations of individual profitability (at the level of the peasant or the farm) and considerations of national or social profitability to which the government aspires in setting out the optimum crop structure. ~~The way~~



The crop structure which is most profitable from the viewpoint of the farmer, in the context of this framework, which is disruptive of prices, comes about through expansion in the production of crops with maximum relative profitability, such as vegetable, fruit and fodder crops.

However, producing fruit and vegetables, by the admission of the strategy report issued by the minister of agriculture, is not an easy matter that is accessible to all classes of peasants. While fruit growing requires great financing over waiting periods which only rich and affluent peasants can afford, we find that vegetable production requires technical expertise that is usually available only to a segment of farmers who have previously engaged in it, generation after generation, as is the case in the countryside in the Governorates of Giza and al-Qalyubiyah and other rural areas adjacent to urban centers. In addition, the soil must be fertile and devoid of salt.

Therefore we find that most farmers are oriented to the production of fodder crops which are not subject to government pricing policy, such as bersim and Syrian corn. Indeed, more disastrous than all that, wheat, in the context of the current pricing policy, has now become a fodder crop, where the price per kilogram of straw or bran is greater than that of an equivalent amount of flour, and, in many cases, we find that the price of a ton of straw which prevails in the market is three times that of a ton of wheat. Therefore, we find that the Egyptian peasant, in view of the availability of imported flour in the villages, is more concerned with the hay crop as food for livestock than with the wheat crop as food for humans.

Syrian corn can be used as green fodder and grain is used to feed animals and poultry. Therefore, there was a tremendous expansion of about 400,000 feddans in the area farmed with Syrian corn in the period of the seventies.

All these serious discrepancies and disruptions point clearly to the need radically to review the crop structure of the area farmed by setting out a comprehensive price policy for basic, fodder, vegetable and fruit crops and livestock products (milk, eggs and meat).

From the standpoint of long-term planning for the optimum crop structure of the area farmed, it is worthwhile for us to point out that the real, specific element in expansion in crop concentration and the optimum crop structure mix is the availability of the volume of water necessary for irrigation. This is connected to the degree of ability to modify irrigation cycles and innovate new methods for irrigation and the guidance of irrigation water consumption in Egypt.

11887  
CSO: 4504/126

## EXPERT REVIEWS MISTAKES IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY SINCE NASIR'S TIME

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 28 Dec 83 p 5

/Article by Dr Mahmud 'Abd-al-Fudayl: "The Future of Agriculture and the Agricultural Question in Egypt"/

/Text/ Perhaps it is to be taken for granted that economic and social conditions and relationships in the Egyptian countryside have witnessed a broad change in the seventies in the context of economic liberalization policy, the expanded scope of migration of rural labor to rich Arab oil countries, and the penetration of new patterns of consumption and living into the Egyptian village. Therefore, many economic phenomena and analytical statements which were applied to conditions in the Egyptian countryside in the fifties and sixties require new review and examination, in light of the new economic and social realities that the Egyptian countryside witnessed in the seventies.

Unfortunately, people conducting research in this area do not have accurate, comprehensive data on economic and social transformations in the countryside during the period of the seventies, as an agricultural census has not been conducted for more than 20 years (since 1961). Until detailed data in the new agricultural census for the 1981-82 agricultural year are made available, our discussion will continue to be deficient and our statistical evidence fragmenting and truncated.

In spite of that, we will try to cast a new glance at some important aspects and strategic issues that affect the future of agriculture and the essence of the agricultural question in Egypt.

#### The Map of Agricultural Ownership at the End of the Seventies

The most recent reliable statistical statement on the distribution of agricultural ownership in Egypt is the statistics on the agricultural land and the area farmed in the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1976. That important statistical reference was issued by the Central Agency for General Mobilization and Statistics (April 1980). On the basis of this statement, the number of owners in each class is tabulated on the basis of the number of "tax records." "Tax records" are defined as "records covering the areas of the plots the owner owns within a single village, stating the type of tax, general and special, the name of the domain, and the type of ownership."



It appears, from this statement, that the owners of less than a feddan constitute 70 percent of the total landowners (number of tax records), while owning just 17 percent of the total farmed area (944,000 feddans). If we move over to the class of small landowners who own more than 5 feddans, we will find that they always constitute the overwhelming majority of landowners in the Egyptian countryside (95 percent) while they own just 44 percent of the total area cultivated, that is, less than half the agricultural land in Egypt.

Conversely, we find that landowners in the intermediate group (5 to 20 feddans), who are 134,000 in number, control 21.3 percent of the farmed area.

As regards the upper class of landowners, who own from 20 to 50 feddans, we find that they number 23,000 and that they own 12.2 percent of the farmed area.

However, the change in the map of agricultural ownership is not enough by itself to understand the development in Egyptian agricultural conditions and the development of production relations in them: the importance of "rented acreage," as far as the total cultivated area and its distribution in the various forms of rent go, plays an important role in the redistribution of land in the form of properties that have an extreme effect on the economic and social conditions of the users and owners in the Egyptian countryside.

According to Ministry of Agriculture data for the agricultural year 1977-78, the total area rented out comes to 2.24 million feddans, that is, about 40 percent of the total farmed area (which is 5.65 million feddans). This is indeed a large percentage, and makes the rented areas and rental relations a distinctive element which is of special significance and extreme importance when one discusses the developments in the agricultural question in Egypt. Ministry of Agriculture data shows that the overwhelming majority of these rented areas (81.5) is rented out in accordance with the cash rent system. However, in spite of that, we find that the areas rented out on the basis of the participation system occupy major importance in some governorates such as Kafr al-Shaykh (57 percent), al-Fayyum (58 percent), al-Sharqiyah (41 percent), Aswan (34.5 percent), al-Daqahliyah (26 percent) and Dumyat (25 percent).

These statistics of course do not include the land that is rented out on a seasonal basis (rent by the planting), for instance when the landowner rents out bersim cultivation for a period of 3 or 4 months.

Unfortunately, there is no reliable recent official statement on the structure of agricultural holdings in Egypt, except for a theoretical essay on the structure of the distribution of holdings in the mid-seventies (agricultural year 1974-75) which appeared in the publication AL-IQTISAD AL-ZIRA'I issued by the Ministry of Agriculture.

On the basis of this statement, we find that the number of people holding 5 feddans and less comes to 92.5 percent of the total landholders, and they farm about two-thirds of the farmed area (66 percent). If this statement is

correct, it means that small holders (those working 5 feddans and less) are renting additional land that comes to 22 percent of the farmed area, that is, about 1.2 million feddans. However, we have great doubt about the veracity of this statement, because, in our estimation, it exaggerates the amount of additional area that the small holders are renting.

Therefore, we state that it is necessary that an up-to-date, reliable map on the renting of agricultural land in Egypt be made available, so that we can realize who is renting out to whom in the Egyptian countryside.

However, the phenomenon that draws one's attention in this regard is that the land area subject to rental is constantly declining, since the agricultural area subject to rental declined from 3.7 million feddans (60 percent of the farmed area) in 1952 to 3 million feddans (51 percent of the farmed area) in 1961, then to 2.2 million feddans (40 percent of the total farmed area) at the end of the seventies.

The question that arises here is, how did this decline in rented area take place and how was it converted to farming "for one's own" in the seventies, even though the laws on rents which permit rental agreements to be transferred by will and resist the expulsion of peasants from the land were in effect, and the land subject to rent is considered to be classified as "land that is frozen from transaction," that is, lies outside the scope of land that is subject to sale and purchase?

We can refer to two major channels that have resulted in the shift of a portion of the areas subject to rental to "farming on one's own" in the seventies.

The first channel: The payment by landowners of "key money" to tenants to take the land back in order to farm on one's own or to sell to other people who will "farm it on their own," without tenants. The "key money" ranges from a quarter to half the value of the land sold. This situation generally occurs when the original farmer is on the verge of retiring from the occupation of farming because of old age (or because he is moving over to some other activity) and the children have occupations or educations which do not encourage them to farm the land.

The second channel: The purchase by farmers who themselves are tenants of the land rented from the original owner for below market price (ranging from 50 to 75 percent of the market price), when the original landowner decides to get rid of the farmland and its burdens and problems. This is a praiseworthy tendency, from the standpoint of agricultural development and social justice, because this sort of practice is very close to the principle "the land to those who work it," is connected to the market mechanism, and consequently will gradually lead to the elimination of the conditions of absentee ownership in the Egyptian countryside.

## Rental Relations in the Countryside

In the period from 1952 to 1966, the legislators tried to amend the laws governing the relationship between owners and tenants of agricultural land in a manner which would create stability in the conditions of the people working the land through rentals and would bring about some social justice and balance in interests between the two parties. Law 17 for 1963 was issued in this context, embodying an essential development in the regulation of the rental relationship by creating new rules, the most important of which were the assertion of the tenant's right to a stable presence on the land he rented and the introduction of the agricultural cooperative society as a party to enable the tenant to do so. Then Law 52 for 1966 was issued, ruling for the first time, among other things, that it was not permitted to vacate properties rented by tenants even when the period agreed upon in the contract had ended, unless the tenant violated an essential commitment required by the law. In the context of rental by temporary sharecropping contract, the law redistributed the commitments to the benefit of the tenant at the expense of the landlord, making the latter participate in defraying the expenses of harvesting the crop and preparing it, in addition to the expenses he had been defraying. This law also included the fact that the rental relationship, whether based on sharecropping or on cash, was not to end with the death of the lessor or tenant, to whose heirs the rental would be conveyed on condition that they included someone who was professionally involved in farming. The legislators made an exception where the lessor could demand that the contract be terminated, and then after that laws supplementary to that were issued; of the new conditions it created, the most important was the system of committees to rule on agricultural disputes in each village, which would review and pass judgment on disputes arising from the rental relationship.

Perhaps the most important legislative amendment in the seventies was the issuance of Law 67 for 1975, which contains essential amendments related to rules setting rental values, stipulating that the rental of farmland should be set at seven times the real property tax in effect and giving the lessor the right to demand a ruling abrogating the rental contract if the tenant continued to be late in making the payment of all or part of the rent by the specified date. The law also abrogated the committees to rule on disputes and assigned their areas of competence to the judiciary.

Thus a tendency emerged in official departments in recent years to press for the need to review the laws governing the relationship between the landowner and the tenant of the land, in order to restore balance in this relationship and prevent the consecration of the interests of one group at the expense of the other. As an example of this new platform in thinking, we can furnish the report the agricultural production branch of the specialized national councils prepared under the chairmanship of Eng Ahmad 'Abdu al-Shurbasi, explicitly calling for the need to review the agrarian reform laws in order to correct the course of affairs.

The report stated, "The humane relationship between the landowner and the tenant has been corrupted by the laws, which have created something

resembling animosity or enmity between them. This has had harmful economic effects, since the tenant has become lax in production, whose average rate has declined in quantitative and qualitative terms." This report also stated that cash rental should be variable, in keeping with local and international prices (see AL-MUSAWWAR magazine, Number 3,048, 11 March 1983, Page 25).

In addition, some members of the People's Assembly ('Ali al-Sayyid al-Hilali and Sa'd Bashir) presented the draft of a law amending laws governing the relationship between the owners of agricultural land and the people renting it. This draft recommended that the rental value be increased to 10 times the tax in effect and that the lessor have the right to terminate the contract in order to farm the land himself or on behalf of his children, or to use it for non-agricultural purposes in accordance with the laws that permit that, provided that the tenant receive compensation of 100 times the tax per feddan (AL-MUSAWWAR, Number 3,048, 11 March 1983).

Regarding the amendment and review of rental relations, a discussion is underway on a number of alternative recommendations, the most important of which are:

- A. Breaking down the rental share equally between the landlord and the tenant, granting the former the right to farm half by himself (on his own).
- B. Increasing the cash rental value to 10 times the stipulated real estate tax, or increasing it periodically by the rate of increase in the prices of the crops.
- C. Expanding the system of "participation rental" at the expense of the system of cash rental, permitting the redistribution of the earnings from farming between the landowner and the tenant, while redistributing the commitments, since some writers consider that the way out of the current predicament in rental relations (calling for justice and fairness in application) is the system of temporary sharecropping, for owners who wish it. The owners will know the magnitude of the real cost of farming, and receive the fair income they deserve.

With respect to the first recommendation, Eng Sa'd Hijris, on the basis of his lengthy expertise, warns against the dangers of adopting this recommendation, since this sort of system had previously been applied in the mid-fifties, and many problems and disputes arose from it, since the landlord allocated areas to tenants which it was hard to exploit economically or lands which had mediocre yields and revenues. In addition, many landowners trafficked extensively in agricultural holdings by re-renting the half which had to be given back, at a high price and by illegal means.

As regards the second recommendation, bearing on increasing the cash rental value in accordance with the tax rate or the prices of crops, this recommendation ignores the constant increases in costs of production accessories and agricultural rents, whose rates of growth, on many occasions, are greater than the rates of growth of crop prices, and the economic effects of that on the economics of the worker-tenant.

Therefore, one cannot discuss this recommendation in isolation from the policy of pricing traditional crops and the policies of pricing production accessories, since the important point is the rates of net income from production per feddan after the deduction of agricultural rents and other expenditures connected to mechanical services and the gathering and preparation of the crop.

With respect to the third recommendation, the return to the system of temporary sharecropping contracts as a successful solution to the conflict in interests between landlord and tenant is also fraught with numerous dangers and risks of a social and political character. When the tenant performs the entire job, throughout the stages of production, from plowing up the land to harvesting and preparing the crop, while the owner of the land contributes the necessary expenses and financing and has a half-share of the crop, this type of rental contract sanctifies specific class and social conditions between the "slaveowner" and the tenant benefiting from the land, who owns only his own power to work and that of his family members.

Thus the system of temporary sharecropping contracts will remind tenant peasants of some of the practices which sanctify the landlord's role as that of slaveowner and basic financier, while the role of the tenant farmer will become that of the wage earner who offers his labor during all the stages of production in exchange for a share in kind of the crop. The basic issue is not related to the equity of the "share in kind" the peasant-tenant obtains in exchange for cultivating the land by himself and the members of his family; rather, the problem lies in the nature of the psychological feelings which are engendered and the type of class relationship that arises from his sense that he is working for the landowner, the owner of the deed of ownership and the essential financier of the production process.

Therefore the second recommendation, which concerns making the cash rental a variable one, is the only recommendation that can be discussed in the context of the careful, equitable calculations of the economics of working the land and the net income from the agricultural exploitation of the feddan according to region, according to the categories of landholding and the crop composition of the land farmed (working of rice, working of wheat, working of cotton and working of vegetables). Here some organizations which express the peasant-tenants' interests, such as the Peasants' Federation (being established), can play an important role in offering alternatives and statistical evidence on the economics of landholdings and variations in those with variations in the crop structure in the various areas.

Perhaps the only case in which we consider that adopting the system of rental through temporary sharecropping may be justified is when an owner who is farming "on his own" considers that the land should be rented out to others in accordance with the temporary sharecropping system in order to cope with some problems of farm labor, and it is not possible to farm it competently; in this case, the contract on temporary sharecropping rental will be mutually satisfactory to the two parties and will not infringe on the areas which are basically involved with the system of cash rental.

There is a fourth recommendation, but it is practicable over the relatively long range. This is related to the deeding of small rented areas (less than 5 feddans) to tenants who work them in accordance with a fair price that is close to the market price, provided that the Agricultural Credit Bank and the Real Estate Bank intervene to establish a fund to support the purchase of the land by the tenants working it. It is recommended that the tenants pay part of the price immediately (20 percent, for example), with the remainder of the price of the land to be paid in annual instalments extending over a period of 10 to 15 years, to be paid into the proposed fund, which will pay the remainder of the price to the original owner when the sales transaction is completed, so that he will be able to invest his money in any project that brings him a reasonable alternative income. This recommendation was included in the statement by Mr Khalid Muhyi-al-Din (chairman of the Grouping Party) in a conversation with AL-MUSAWWAR magazine issued 11 March 1983.

11887

CSO: 4504/126



INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSSES LOCAL GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL PLURALISM, DEMOCRACY

Tunis AL-ANWAR AL-TUNISIYAH in Arabic 1-7 Jan 84 pp 6, 32

[Interview with Driss Guiga, minister of interior, by Salah-al-Din al-'Amiri: "Ninety Minutes with Driss Guiga; Eliminating Loyalty to Persons and Clinging to Programmatic Action Is Duty of Every Tunisian; Democracy Must Not Turn into Dictatorship of Majority; Our Party Must Now Act as Ruling Party and It Is Entitled to Give Responsibilities to Its Supporters Only"]

[Text] An interview with Driss Guiga is different from any other interview, and perhaps more difficult. The man is very intelligent, his cultural background is immense and his thinking contrasts with the patterns that we know. His logic is closer to Kantian than to Cartesian and is, therefore, profounder and more comprehensive.

Moreover, his view of life's issues is similar to its temporal vision to the theory of Martin Heidegger, the paramount philosopher of developmental existence.

To Guiga, the time dimension is a fundamental (ontological) value in work, development and progress.

Thus, whoever approaches Guiga without being aware of this fact and armed for it may be lost in the richness of his thought and expression, despite its clarity.

The matter might be easier if it pertained to purely intellectual theories, but it becomes difficult when it is connected with policy and the future.

It is on policy and the future that my interview with Driss Guiga centered, and an interesting and useful interview it has been.

We brought up the question persistently asked by the man in the street, namely, what is the future vision of local and central government under a political situation characterized by the multiplicity of competing parties, and how can this vision be put into practice? In his reply, Driss Guiga said:

I have dealt with this question before the Chamber of Deputies and have based my answer on a number of firm principles. You can refer to this statement for the purpose.

But let me make it clear now that implementing these principles requires two things:

1. The element of time because for anything to succeed, it requires a reasonable amount of time. We cannot overnight change practices to which the Tunisians in their various levels of responsibility have been accustomed, and it is not right to ask the authorities, beginning with the sector chief and ending with the governor, to turn completely around in 1 day. We thank God that our cadres are not ones that easily change "their colors" because time is needed to comprehend the new practice.

This is why the element of time must take its full share.

2. Our will to care for the country's interest and to put this interest above everything else. The country's interest requires that local government be strong because Tunisia still needs to implement comprehensive development programs and these programs require in their turn a strong local government. This strong local government is essential even for the party that may succeed us because if it creates a feeble local government or tries to weaken or marginalize local government, it will not be able to implement its programs. Therefore, such a party must establish a strong local government that is tantamount to a strong work apparatus. This is why I believe that any movement seeking to weaken local government is a movement that does not serve the country's interest. Any movement that does not take into consideration the element of time as a requirement for achieving the required maturity is a movement doomed to failure. I now come to the method of implementation and on this I say:

The governor, and the other officials with him, are required to consider the politicians licensed to operate as legitimate officials as having the same duties and rights as those of officials of the Destourian Socialist Party. This is something hard to do because it requires the governor to open his doors and heart to them, to provide them with sites on which to hold meetings, such as popular premises and culture houses, whereas he has been required so far to pursue and lurk for these politicians. The governor is also required to receive them at his office and hear their opinions, protests and demands. This new reality represents in fact a fundamental change in the country's life. Within this framework, the Communist Party has organized a meeting at the culture house in Qabis. But this does not mean that the governor or any other government representative at any level must not be partisan. This is wrong. What is required is that the official cadres be more partisan than ever before. This is legitimate, and all we have to do is to look at the advanced countries to find that local government officials and state officials at the various levels, including the top levels, belong to the party that wins power. Let me cite, as an example, the United States where 16,000 officials resign whenever power is transferred from 1 party to the other. In France, the changes introduced by President Mitterrand include, in addition to the changes in the state agencies and organizations, the banks, the industrial establishments, the broadcasting stations and so forth. Therefore, such action should not be considered dictatorial. It is rather democratic because there have to be officials convinced of the program offered by the party--a program with which the party won power.



The power of decision making must be in the hands of partisan officials who support their party in what is right, not what is unjust. It is the duty of the ruling party to give the leadership positions to its supporters only.

This leads us to say that if we want modern democracy, then the Destourian Socialist Party must appoint Destourians only to the leadership positions. This is a right which the party has not exercised so far because it has been appointing to these positions qualified people, regardless of their political affiliations. In other words, dealings with the new political institutions, and these institutions' dealings with Tunisian life, must be based on the law. Tunisian law is very liberal. When I speak of modern democracy, I do not mean that our democracy must be an exact copy of some other democracies or that we must import foreign structures and frameworks, because democracy is tied to the environment and the special traditions of each people. Therefore, it varies from France to Germany to Sweden and so forth. Tunisia's environment and traditions are different from those of any other country. Therefore, our responsibility dictates to us a certain democratic pattern compatible with our real situation. This is the pattern for which our government is responsible, especially the Ministry of Interior--a pattern developed and sculptured according to the genuine Tunisian vision.

I believe that we have thus revived pluralism in our country without hatred, violence or class struggle. This is the Bourguiba way. Our success or failure will depend on the national pattern we will innovate--a pattern that must be compatible with our character and with our past. This is, in my view, the fundamental problem.

Question What, in your view, are the dangers posing a threat to democratic progress?

Answer I divide these dangers into two kinds and arrange them in three elements, two of which are closely connected with the Tunisian mentality, with its oriental character, and the third of which is a material element. These dangers are the following:

1. The danger that the Tunisian may consider freedom to mean breaking away from all social restrictions and discipline and may imagine that he is no longer tied to any thread in the social fabric. The opposite is what is true. Freedom means new restrictions founded on balance, dialogue and the exchange of opinions. The more democratic societies are the more disciplined and successful ones. They are the societies where there is a strong balance emanating from a strong will.
2. This same danger is present in our oriental traditions. We are always tied to persons, and we embody power and conflicts in persons. I believe that if we want our democracy to succeed, then we must eliminate our loyalty to persons and must cling more strongly to the principles of programmatic action. The official must be courageous enough not to go along with his party members but to tell them the facts and the truth frankly, even if this leads to their criticizing him. This is the most difficult thing in political action because the success of government lies at times in rejecting conformity and appeasement.

3. The material danger is embodied in the need of the parties for funds. This need may lead to two kinds of problems, the first internal and the second external.

The internal problems are embodied in the intervention of opportunists and exploiters, using money for the benefit of this or that party and thus bringing such a party under the influence of a certain group or tendency and making it serve a certain interest. As for the external danger, it comes from those wishing to interfere in our internal affairs and thus resort to material inducement to buy this or that party.

Question Let me return, Your Excellency, to local government to ask you to clarify for us the governor's role in the province and how the governor will be appointed in the future. It has been reported that the Council of Ministers, not the minister of interior, will be the authority to propose the appointment of governors in the future. How will this be?

Answer In the presidential system, the head of state is the one who appoints the top officials. The Council of Ministers may propose the names of the governors, but this cannot be done unless the governor becomes the real head of the local government. At present, the governor is a coordinator between the various local departments and not their head. An employee in the forestry department, for example, does not receive his instructions from the governor but from the ministry concerned. When the governor becomes the immediate head of the local government and when it becomes a requirement that instructions be passed from any minister to the governor so that he may in turn pass them to the agencies concerned, the governor will become the actual head of the local government, and only then will we change from one system to another, i.e., to decentralism. It is not required that we achieve this task quickly but rather that we achieve it in phases over periods long enough for the officials to adapt. We will have thus created in the change the means of success in the Tunisian manner, which considers the human element fundamental for any action and which seeks to achieve its goal both openly and confidentially, in slow steps at times and in modest steps at others and without costs, upheavals or setbacks. We have actually begun this transformation with the Ministry of Planning, and we will continue our dialogue and discussion until we define the background for this major transformation.

Question Your Excellency, I now ask you the next to last question which says: Will you define for us the future vision of the relationship between the ruling party and the government?

Answer From the outset, we must acknowledge very clearly that the constitution has not confused the party with the government, whether in terms of municipal or legislative elections or in terms of laws. Moreover, the party has not dominated the government. The cadres enlisted in the party have reached it by way of exercising the administrative responsibility and on the strength of the full conviction that the party works for the benefit of all Tunisians without exclusion, that the party's efforts are not confined to its group only and that the party may even have fallen short in meeting the dues of its members, especially the fighters veterans and strugglers. A simple

inventory shows us that most of the officials at the level of agency head or in a little higher or lower positions are not all Destourians. At times, we even pardon some of our opponents because the national party's conscience has made the party feel responsible for all the Tunisians, even though it holds power. So far, we have not acted as a ruling party but as officials in a party which has its national responsibilities and historical background. Only now we have to act as a ruling party. Thus, I find that nothing legally new has developed within this framework. All there is to the issue is that previously the political reality did not match the legal reality. Now, they are identical. However, there are some partial problems that have emanated from the arrangements that we made when we were in the arena alone. These problems can be eliminated, not by abolition or cancellation but through expansion. I mean here representation in some organizations and committees, such as the local councils and other organizations. In this manner, we can add to the list of consultative votes by treating the other legitimate parties on an equal footing with the Destourian Party. As for dismissal, marginalization and dictatorship of the majority, they are out of the question because I don't believe that democracy should turn into the dictatorship of the majority.

Question What, in Your Excellency's opinion, is the most important event in Tunisia in 1983?

Answer Without any doubt, it was social peace. This was the prominent event dominating our society last year because it means peace among people and this peace prepares the way for democratic life. With harmony, competition, love and diversity, we can reach a sound democratic society and achieve the desired economic development without violence. This has been the most distinguishing mark of our society throughout the one-third century of independence, except at one time. This is why social peace means everything to me and this is why it was the most distinguishing mark of 1983.

Question They say that you have very advanced projections which probably exceed the level of a developing country like ours. What is your opinion?

Answer I don't believe that I am advanced and others are not. All that there is to the issue is that I put the development of society and of the structures within a time framework. (I don't believe that the structures can be changed quickly or that they can change society.) Not at all. What I believe is that there is a correlation between the development of society and the development of structures. If one precedes the other by a long stride, a catastrophe occurs. Society develops the structures and the structures develop society.

Within this philosophical concept of society's development, the interview with Driss Guiga ended. In the wake of the interview, I understood why a number of university professors and opposition leaders whom I had contacted long ago to hold a round-table discussion on the means and possibilities of moving from a one-party society to a multiparty democratic society refused to take part in the discussion when I told them that the ruling party's representative in the discussion would be Driss Guiga.

I remember that one of those contacted told me verbatim, and I thought he was joking at the time: "Leave him alone. He is very highly educated and his ideas are sky-high."

# RAMADAN OPENS IRRIGATION PROJECT IN AL-TA'MIM GOVERNORATE

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 5 Nov 83 p 6

[Article: "Under Patronage of President and Leader Saddam Husayn, First Deputy Prime Minister Inaugurates First Phase of Saddam Irrigation Projects; 1984 Will Witness Announcement of New Projects in Fields of Irrigation, Oil and Gas"]

[Text] Under the patronage of His Excellency President and Leader Saddam Husayn, First Deputy Prime Minister and Revolution Command Council member Taha Yasin Ramadan inaugurated yesterday morning the first phase of the Saddam irrigation project in al-Ta'min Governorate.

On the occasion, Taha Yasin Ramadan delivered an address describing the project as one of the major projects in the development plan that continues to be implemented despite the war conditions imposed on our country.

The first deputy prime minister asserted that the fundamental objectives of the 1980-1985 5-year plan will be accomplished with the definite resolution of our unique leadership and of the sons of our great people so that the development and building movement may continue.

He said that we believe that in this phase, as Leader and President Saddam Husayn has asserted repeatedly, the economic confrontation parallels and complements the military confrontation because we have been certain from the first moment that the aggression was imposed on our struggling country to obstruct the development process.

He added that our struggling people have created for the first time ever a unique and unprecedented situation. Despite the conditions of the war we have been waging for more than 3 years along a 1,180-km front, we have been able, to achieve at the same time high rates of project implementation on the one hand and to increase the capacity of the existence projects on the other.

Taha Yasin Ramadan noted that 1981, the 2d year of the war, recorded the highest figure in allocations for development investment--a figure that exceeded all the figures allocated in the pre-war phases.

He also said that the major part of the allocations was connected with the infrastructures of the national economy, such as roads and communications in addition to the future-oriented strategic projects seeking to transform this economy from a one-dimensional one relying on oil as a sole source to a many-sided economy ranging from the processing of most oil byproducts, to the development of the agricultural situation and to the setting up of advanced industries relying on national technology.

The Revolution Command Council member also pointed out that despite the war conditions and the difficulties emanating from them, work has continued in the strategic projects being implemented, especially agricultural, irrigation and industrial projects.

Ramadan asserted that 1984 will witness the announcement of new projects in the fields of irrigation, land reclamation, oil and gas and of a number of export projects so that our struggling country's development activity may continue.

Taha Yasin Ramadan further said that if we want to continue implementing our development projects even under the conditions of the war in which we have scored crushing defeats against the rulers of Tehran, the enemies of our people and of our people's progress--if we want to continue implementing our development projects, we must work more seriously and must work with our minds and hands in every position in which we exist.

Concluding his address, Ramadan asserted that the future belongs to Iraq and said that this is the conviction of all the other countries and not just our conviction as Iraqis. Were it not for this certainty regarding our country's future, there would not be all this international demand to implement our development projects and to increase our economic and commercial cooperation with the world.

'Abd-al-Wahhab Mahmud, the minister of irrigation, delivered an address at the outset of the inauguration ceremony in which he said that this project was completed 6 months ahead of schedule and that it is one of the world's enormous irrigation projects--a project in whose implementation of the latest scientific and technological methods have been employed.

The minister also reviewed the major irrigation projects currently being undertaken by the ministry, noting that the allocations for the ministry rose from 120 million dinars in 1978 to 465 million dinars in 1983 in order to construct the immense irrigation projects and to achieve food security for Iraq and for the Arab nation.

He said further that these projects will lead to the ideal utilization of water, will transform the deserts into green fields and will secure an honorable life for our people and for future generations.

The inauguration ceremony was attended by Comrade Sa'di Mahdi Salih, the Regional Command member and the secretary of the Northern Organization Bureau of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party; a number of ministers; the governors of al-Ta'mim, Salah al-Din and Diyala Governorates; the comrade secretaries and members of the leaderships of the party branches in the three governorates; and a number of officials of the Ministry of Irrigation.

The project's general director also delivered an address in which he reviewed the project specifications and the technical methods employed in implementing it, noting the volume of the main activities in the first phase--activities embodied in the removal of 47 million cubic meters of earth, 500,000 cubic meters of concrete work and 950,000 meters of asbestos piping.

The first phase of the project includes a main canal with a length of 67 km, 4 main regulators, 56 small regulators, 4 siphons pumps, 72 culverts and 25,000 donums irrigated by sprinkling.

The Saddam irrigation project, considered the biggest of its kind in Iraq and one of the biggest in the world, will irrigate 1 million donums, including 350,000 donums in the first phase.

The project also contains 7 complete modern villages with a total of 577 houses, major road networks, 4 experimental farms for research, a beet farm which is about to be completed and an automatic control system for operating the main canal and the regulators.

8494

CSO: 4404/249

## BRIEFS

WEST BANK CROP RESTRICTIONS--Jerusalem--The Israeli Supreme Court will make a decision in the next few days on the issue of tomato cultivation in the Jordan Valley. This issue has been the subject of months-long litigation. It has been learned that the court will examine the request submitted by a large number of Arab farmers demanding the abolition of two military decrees restricting the cultivation of some fruits and vegetables, especially tomatoes, in the West Bank. These two decrees prohibit the cultivation of more fruit trees and grape vines in the West Bank and make it mandatory that a permit be obtained from the Israeli military authorities for the cultivation of tomatoes and eggplants. Ibrahim Matar, an expert on agricultural affairs, has noted that these two decrees were issued in the wake of the efforts exerted by the Israeli settlers in the Jordan Valley who are concerned by the competition these crops pose to their own crops. The appeal presented by the farmers says that these two decrees issued by the Israeli military authorities violate Article 49 of the Geneva Treaty which concerns territories under foreign occupation and which states that the occupation authorities may not amend the laws in force in such territories except for security reasons. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 9 Dec 83 p 3] 8494

CSO: 4404/233

## MINERAL RESOURCES PLAY MAJOR ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 202, 24-30 Dec 83 p 47

[Article: "Jordan: Industrial Sector to Increase Income by 1 Billion Dollars by Beginning of 1985"]

[Text] The Jordanian 5-year plan seeks to increase the country's income from mining and manufacturing to 1 billion dollars with the onset of 1985. So far, potassium mining is one of the most important industries in Jordan. Potassium is considered almost the sole mineral resource in Jordan, contributing 20 percent of the value of exported products and 60 percent of the mining sector's revenues.

Jordan produces nearly 50,000 tons annually at present. However, its annual production capacity is expected to reach 1.2 million tons.

The success Jordan has achieved in mining and exporting potassium has encouraged the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority in Amman to accelerate the search and prospecting for two minerals likely to be present in Jordanian territory, namely copper and oil.

### Copper Ores

A study conducted by the Natural Resources Authority in the Kingdom of Jordan confirms that a large volume of copper ore has been found in the southern part of the kingdom, especially in several areas within a strip extending 70 km along the east side of Wadi 'Arabah.

The exploration studies conducted in the area indicate that the volume of copper deposits found in Wadi Abu Khushaybah is small and that these deposits, estimated at nearly 8 million tons, do not encourage utilization. But in the area of Faynan, the copper deposits are found mixed with manganese, with the copper amounting to 1.4 percent.

The geological studies conducted on the copper ores show that the volume of copper in the Faynan area is economically promising and justifies further exploration efforts and, consequently, the completion of economic feasibility studies prior to building a miniature copper plant that will produce 3,500 tons annually.



The studies conducted so far confirm that the construction of such a plant will be economically beneficial, especially since it will provide an opportunity for training Jordanian manpower at copper mining operations and will enable this manpower to gain experience and utilize the copper resources in Jordan if world copper prices begin to rise. These studies show that building a plant to utilize the copper in Wadi 'Arabah area is capable of contributing to the development of the area and to bolstering its agricultural development.

#### Will It Become Oil Country?

As for oil exploration, an issue which has aroused a lot of clamor and questions in recent years, the director of the Geological Research Department of the Natural Resources Authority has recently revealed that it is possible to produce oil in several parts of Jordan, the most important being Jurf al-Darawish, al-Sultanah, al-Lajun and al-Hasa where shale rock, from which very large quantities of oil can be extracted, has been found.

The Geological Research Department director has noted that the quantity of oil that can be extracted from shale rock in Jurf al-Darawish area, for example, is estimated at 800 million tons. He has also said that the initial geological estimate for the shale rock in the area amounts to 14 billion tons containing an average of 5.7 percent oil. The shale rock in al-Sultanah is estimated at 1 billion tons, which can yield 9 million tons [of oil].

The director further pointed out that the consortium of German firms entrusted with studying the economic and technical feasibility of utilizing the shale rock in al-Lajun area recommended that 55 wells be drilled in the area as a main requirement for the economic feasibility study. The consortium also recommended that hydrological studies and a topographic survey be conducted in the area. So far, 15 wells with a total depth of 545 meters have been drilled in the area. As for central Jordan, the drilling activity in the areas of al-Sultanah and al-Hasa, where 20 wells with a total depth of 1,909 meters have already been drilled, continues.

8494

CSO: 4404/233

LEFTIST JOURNAL OFFERS DETAILED CRITIQUE OF AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, AMERICA

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 28, 29, 30 Nov 83

[Article by Dr Ilyas Saba: "A Comprehensive Study of the 17 May Agreement: The Agreement and the Dilemma"]

[28 Nov 83 p 11]

[Text] Dr Ilyas Saba, former minister of defense and finance, has set out a detailed study of the 17 May agreement which is perhaps the first in terms of its comprehensiveness, at least from the perspective of the opposition to the agreement.

AL-SAFIR is publishing the study in three instalments. The first deals with the extent to which the agreement has succeeded, as a political means for attaining a specific objective within specific political circumstances, conditions and settings. The second and third instalments proceed from the burdens the agreement is imposing on Lebanon and deal with the agreement's sections and stipulations, its annexes, and the alternatives to it.

Herewith is the first installment:

Our basic opposition, and our opposition in principle, to the Lebanese-Israeli agreement appeared the morning of 17 May, when the daily press published its provisions and we consequently were able to read and study it. However, we refrained from declaring our opposition at the time, preferring to wait until today, for a number of reasons. We all remember the campaign of media obfuscation which accompanied the signing of the agreement and its discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, and the statements made at that time, to the effect that that agreement was the sole solution available to Lebanon to achieve the end of Israel's withdrawal and the liberation of Lebanon, that it did not go beyond the red lines that the government had sketched out in its negotiations with Israel, that the United States would be the guarantor of its execution and had put its weight and reputation as a great power on the line for that purpose, and that the overwhelming majority of the Arab countries and the countries of the world were on our side and supported us over the rightness and correctness of the conclusion we had reached. In this sort of atmosphere redolent with jubilant propaganda, in the flood of tumult

arising from the initiative of signing the agreement, and in the context of the sincere longing of the majority of the Lebanese, especially the southerners among us, to get rid of the Israeli occupation, criticism of the agreement, and criticism of the political strategy which had brought us to it, and casting doubts about the possibility that that would lead to the termination of the Israeli presence, would all make us seem like people who said that they were against Israel's withdrawal and in favor of its continued occupation of Lebanon, above and beyond the fact that very few Lebanese were ready to swim against the raging current. As for us, we always had faith and confidence from the first moment that this agreement could not lead to the liberation of Lebanon from the Israeli occupation, indeed that it would provide a legitimate pretext for the Israeli military presence on its territory, and that it would not observe any red line that it did not fragment, destroy and violate, in the context of Lebanese rights and national sovereignty or in the context of Lebanon's Arab affiliation. We preferred to wait until the clouds of deceptive propaganda manifested themselves, the perceptible facts became conspicuous in actual conditions, the motive force for the emotional enthusiasm which accompanied its signing declined and the scope was furnished once again for the language of intelligence and cool logical argument, in order to present our point of view, discuss it, and convince or be convinced. We were confident that such a circumstance would arise. Now the day has come, after more than 6 months have elapsed since the signing of the agreement, and Israel has not withdrawn. The agreement has also started to be transformed, gradually, in the eyes of the Lebanese, from an opportunity for salvation and a life raft to an imbroglio which Lebanon does not know how to extricate itself from. Everyone today is looking for an alternative to the agreement, whereas it had been portrayed as admitting of no alternative. Therefore this detailed study of ours: we hope that it will help create an alternative to a situation from which only harm and a predicament which we ourselves have chosen to insert ourselves into have come.

We have many objections to the agreement. These can be broken down into two sections: the first is related to the extent to which the agreement is a success as a political means for reaching a specific goal, within specific political circumstances, conditions and settings, and the second focuses on the headings and provisions of the agreement and its supplements. We will review each of these two types of objection in detail, starting with the first section.

We hear and read repeatedly today that the basic obstacle to the conclusion of the agreement is that Israel has linked its withdrawal from Lebanon to the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and the Palestinian forces from it, and the handing over of the Israeli prisoners in the hands of the Syrians and Palestinians, and that Israel is stating and reminding everyone, without letup, that it signed an agreement with Lebanon and that it is prepared to carry it out and withdraw from Lebanon in accordance with it, but that the Syrians (and the Palestinians) "refuse to carry out the sections of the agreement that concern them." It is true that the agreement and the supplements to it, and the booklet (that is, the agreement, the annex, the appendix, the explanatory minutes and the map) in no way mention the withdrawal of the Syrians or the Palestinians, or the exchange of prisoners, while the agreement explicitly stipulates (in its supplement) that Israel will

withdraw within a period ranging from 8 to 12 weeks from the date it goes into effect. The condition of linking the Israeli withdrawal to the Syrian and Palestinian withdrawal and the handing over of prisoners was stated in a letter independent of the agreement which Israel sent to the United States of America which the United States apparently answered by accepting the condition of a simultaneity of withdrawals. The Lebanese government has not published the text of the letters that were exchanged so that it would be feasible for us to address ourselves to them closely. However, it is certain that the agreement and the supplements to it published by the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, which the government presented to the Chamber of Deputies, in no way link Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon to the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and or the Palestinians. Thus, it appears that Lebanon is in no way concerned with such a linkage, unless secret letters or documents have been exchanged between Lebanon and the United States and or Israel stipulating such a linkage. However, according to what has been published and what has been presented to the Chamber of Deputies, Lebanon has nothing to do with such linkage and has not committed itself to it or accepted it.

At this point we must wonder, if Lebanon has not committed itself to, and has no relationship to, the linkage between the Israeli withdrawal and the Syrian and Palestinian withdrawal, and if it is just the United States of America that has accepted and committed itself to that, vis-a-vis Israel, why hasn't the agreement been carried out and why consequently hasn't Israel been compelled to withdraw? It is clear that the Lebanese government cannot be refusing to carry out an agreement which it has signed, and which it has defended, along with its "benefits," because of the Lebanese opposition to it. We also doubt that that is because of a sudden awakening of conscience which has afflicted it and caused it to look on gains as losses. Nor, assuredly, is it because of Syria's opposition to the agreement, because it expressed its opposition to it to the Lebanese government before it was signed and approved by the Chamber of Deputies. We suppose that one of two things could be behind the Lebanese government's abstention from carrying out the agreement. First, after the United States agreed that Israel should link its withdrawal to the other withdrawals (on the basis of letters exchanged by the two), it tried to convince Syria to withdraw, but did not succeed. Therefore, if Lebanon carried out the agreement, it would cause embarrassment to the United States, which was not able to fulfil its commitments toward Israel by guaranteeing a simultaneous Syrian-Palestinian withdrawal, and toward Lebanon by guaranteeing an Israeli withdrawal in execution of the sections of the 17 May agreement. Second, Lebanon may have become implicated in accepting the linkage of Israel's withdrawal to the withdrawal of others by virtue of exchanged letters or other documents which have remained secret and the Council of Deputies and public opinion have not read. This interpretation is closer to truth and reality, and our proof of that is the following:

1. In his statement before the Chamber of Deputies on 16 May 1983 (that is, before the agreement was signed on 17 May 1983 and before the Chamber of Deputies permitted the government to carry it out, on 14 June 1983), the foreign minister said, in these words:

"Israel, on the basis of the supplement, undertakes to withdraw totally from Lebanese territory in a period ranging from 8 to 12 weeks, but in a memorandum it has presented to the United States, it has set forth other conditions for its withdrawal from Lebanon."

The minister then enumerated the well-known Israeli conditions and went on to state,

"Therefore this agreement will not be considered to be in effect, even after it is concluded, until Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization decide to withdraw their forces from Lebanon."

(The White Paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Information, May 1983, page 54; emphasis [sic] supplied.)

Doesn't this constitute an acceptance of linkage of the Israeli withdrawal to the Syrian and Palestinian withdrawal, agreement to the substance of the letters exchanged in this regard between Israel and the United States and a commitment to their contents, especially since the minister of foreign affairs of Lebanon said so in his own words, in the course of his explanation of the sections, conditions and circumstances of the 17 May agreement before the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies prior to the signing of the agreement, and especially since the Chamber of Deputies, after hearing the view of the government on this subject, did not object to or reject it, but rather proceeded, on 14 June 1983, to permit the Lebanese government to carry out the 17 May agreement?

2. The abovementioned statement by the minister of foreign affairs is not a position which the minister alone has exclusively adopted, nor is it a slip of the tongue by a minister or an unintended mistake (although that would not remove Lebanon from the predicament it has succumbed to). Rather, we imagine that it is a correct, truthful expression of the policy of the Lebanese government and its view and strategy bearing on the negotiations with Israel and the 17 May agreement, which is founded on linkage of the withdrawal of Israel to that of Syria and the Palestinians, proceeding from its conviction that this sort of linkage will guarantee an overall withdrawal. There are numerous items of evidence that Lebanon entered the negotiations with Israel and signed the agreement with it as part of a comprehensive, interconnected plan which was aimed at guaranteeing a comprehensive withdrawal and that it did not view the 17 May agreement as merely an agreement on the withdrawal of the Israeli forces:

A. Ambassador Fattal, at the session inaugurating the negotiations in Khal-dah on 28 December 1982, stated, in these words:

"Therefore Lebanon is requesting the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese armies and forces present on its territory against its will, in accordance with a comprehensive, careful, rapid, programmed plan.

"What we would like to discuss in these negotiations is the procedural means for meeting these basic requirements, taking into consideration the security concerns of each one of us." (Emphasis supplied [sic].)

B. Ambassador Fattal also said, at the session of the signing of the agreement on 17 May 1983, in these words,

"The basic objective of the agreement that I have the honor of signing today in the name of the government of the Republic of Lebanon is to put an end to 8 years of war and chaos. It has the goal of ensuring the withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces which entered our land in various crises and circumstances." (Emphasis supplied [sic].)

C. The foreign minister of Lebanon, at the discussion session the Chamber of Deputies held on 2 August 1983, stated the following:

"We now intend to discuss total withdrawal from Lebanon. For 2 months we have discussed the Lebanese-Israeli agreement for a number of reasons, most of them outside Lebanese policy. The problem is not the Lebanese-Israeli agreement; the problem is the removal of the non-Lebanese armies from Lebanon. This is Lebanon's policy, and this is the problem" (AL-NAHAR, 7 August 1983, page 3; emphasis supplied [sic]).

3. In addition, it is clear that the United States holds to the same view, policy and strategy, that of linking the withdrawal of all forces, and it refuses to have one withdrawal take place without the other. Most probably it is the one that persuaded the Lebanese government to hold to this policy. Herewith is some evidence for that:

A. The exchange of letters on this subject between Israel and the United States; although we have not read them because they have not been published, the statement the foreign minister of Lebanon made to the Gulf media delegation on 30 May 1983 affirms America's commitment to this strategy. The statement was made by the minister of foreign affairs:

"It is America that is guaranteeing the execution of the agreement (the 17 May agreement) and I have a written American commitment on the execution of the agreement after it is concluded and on the simultaneous departure of the Syrian and Palestinian forces" (AL-NAHAR, 31 May 1983, page five; emphasis [sic] and parenthetical material supplied).

B. In addition, Secretary Shultz was explicit in his reply to a question in the press conference he held during his visit to Lebanon in July:

Question: Do you want to bring about the withdrawal of Israel before Syria agrees to withdraw?

Answer: The withdrawal of all foreign forces is alone in keeping with our goals. We are not discussing here a unilateral unconditional withdrawal by the Israelis; we are talking about a complete program for withdrawal which will include all foreign forces from the outset" (AL-SAFIR newspaper, 6 August 1983; emphasis [sic] supplied).

Thus it seems clear that the Lebanese government was won over to the United States' point of view, agreed to link the withdrawal of the three, and focused its policy and strategy on that, relying on the United States'



guarantee to ensure execution, even if the United States clashed with Syria's position of refusing to withdraw before Israel unconditionally withdraws from Lebanon. The Lebanese government succumbed to a dilemma from which it does not know how to extricate itself. Since it knew in advance of this interlinkage (and accepted it), it should not have signed the agreement on 17 May 1983 and should not have demanded and insisted to the Chamber of Deputies to permit it to carry it out on 14 June 1983, thus saving Lebanon the problems, tragedies and difficulties we are facing today.

The time has come for the Chamber of Deputies to address itself to this matter, grasp it totally, and request the government to publish all the documents and letters that have remained secret, especially those exchanged alongside the agreement with Israel and the United States, those which the foreign minister says Lebanon sent to the United States (statement by the foreign minister to the Chamber of Deputies, 16 May 1983), and the written American undertaking to carry out the agreement which the minister says is in his possession.

Thus, it now is clear that since it is a basic pillar of a "unitary" strategy for a trilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, the agreement has failed grievously, as it ought to have. It is also clear that the Lebanese government has sought to obtain everything in an integrated manner (even in terms of timing), and now is in danger of succumbing to the reprehensible phenomenon of losing everything. Therefore, our first objection to the agreement is that it does not bring about the purpose intended of it, since it is not leading to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces because of the geopolitical circumstances, conditions and setting that have surrounded it and are interconnected with it.

[29 Nov 83 p 11]

[Text] Dr Ilyas Saba, former minister of defense and finance, has set out a detailed study of the 17 May agreement which is perhaps the first in terms of its comprehensiveness, at least from the perspective of the opposition to the agreement.

AL-SAFIR is publishing the study in three instalments. The first deals with the extent to which the agreement has succeeded, as a political means for attaining a specific objective within specific political circumstances, conditions and settings. The second and third instalments proceed from the burdens the agreement is imposing on Lebanon and deal with the agreement's sections and stipulations, its annexes, and the alternatives to it.

Herewith is the second installment:

Let us now proceed to the second section of the objections we have to the 17 May agreement, those related to the exorbitant, unacceptable price imposed on Lebanon by virtue of it, which are based on the stipulations and sections of the agreement and the annexes to it. We have considered it appropriate to break them down among five chapters, according to their subjects.

## Lebanon's Abandonment of Its Arab Commitments

### One: Article Four of the Agreement

1. Paragraph One of Article Four is not restricted to prohibiting terrorist activity against Israel only. Rather, it goes beyond that, prohibiting any activity of any kind whatever that could be considered hostile to Israel, its territory or its people. The danger of such a stipulation lies in the word "hostile," and in the word "its territory," which appears in the English text but does not exist in the Arabic text, as is clear by comparing the two texts:

(The Arabic text) "The territory of each party will not be used as a base for antagonistic or terrorist activity against the other party or its people."

(The English text) "The territory of each party will not be used as a base for hostile or terrorist activity against the other party, its territory, or its people."

The danger, of course, lies in the fact that Israel's internationally recognized borders have not been definitively determined. The Arabs (including Lebanon) have not accepted the 1967 annexation of Arab lands. Doesn't Lebanon's demand for the return of the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem and Golan constitute activity hostile to Israel, its territory and its people?

In addition, the word "hostile," that is, "mu'adin" (as it has been translated in Article Five and Article Six of the agreement) is so broad that it can include any activity that entails the demand for Palestinian rights, especially if that is directed against Israel, its territory or its people. What meaning and content is left to Lebanon's Arab commitments in the context of such a comprehensive, obscure text?

2. Paragraph Two of Article Three makes it mandatory that the Lebanese government prohibit the presence or establishment of organizations, offices or infrastructures whose purposes and objectives include any other activity aimed at threatening Israel's security or the safety of its people, or subjecting them to danger. The same paragraph continues: "For this purpose, all agreements and arrangements which will permit the presence and activity of elements hostile (not antagonistic) to the other party on the territory of either of the two parties will become void and unenforceable."

It is clear, from the stipulation of this paragraph, that the Lebanese government has committed itself to prohibiting the activity of any organization, party, body, office or other infrastructure (an intellectual club, for instance) if one of its objectives or activities is to demand, whether politically, intellectually or in scholarly fashion, Arab rights in the occupied territories or the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This is an obvious abandonment of the resolutions of the summits, most recently the Fez summit conference in 1982, on this subject.



In addition, it is clear that this paragraph compels Lebanon to shut down the Israel boycott offices and abandon the boycott, because it constitutes activity that has the aim of threatening the security of Israel and the safety of its people or exposing them to danger.

3. In addition, Paragraph Three (A) of Article Four prohibits Lebanon from pursuing the economic boycott of Israel because that would be considered a disruption of Lebanon's undertaking to refrain from "carrying out, urging, aiding or participating in threats, activities of war or destructive, provocative or hostile activities or inciting them against the other party or against its inhabitants or property" (emphasis supplied). Doesn't the boycotting of companies dealing with Israel and the refusal to buy their products or deal with their banks and institutions mean a threat to Israel and the inhabitants and property of Israel?

4. As for Paragraph Three (C), that is very broad in its comprehensiveness and obscurity, and in this manner will always subject Lebanon to the charge of disrupting the sections of the agreement. It stipulates that Lebanon is to refrain from "interfering in the domestic or foreign activities" of Israel. Doesn't that mean that Lebanon's participation in any joint Arab action (even if that is non-military) would give Israel the opportunity to consider it interference in its domestic or foreign affairs, especially since it has not definitively determined its internationally recognized boundaries? How can anyone say that Lebanon has not abandoned its Arab commitments which have arisen from the Arab-Israeli struggle by signing the 17 May agreement in the context of the existence of a stipulation as comprehensive and obscure as this one?

5. As for Paragraph Four, that stipulated Lebanon's undertaking to adopt "preventive arrangements and legal measures against persons and groups which commit acts in violation of the provisions of this article" (emphasis supplied). That is, the Lebanese government commits itself to preventing and prosecuting persons and groups whose objectives or goals include any activity that has the goal of threatening the security of Israel or the safety of its people or exposing them to danger.

It would not be inappropriate to point out here that in the degree of the comprehensiveness of its application Paragraph Four of Article Four overrides the Lebanese government's interpretation of Article Five (study by the Lebanese Foreign Ministry), and Paragraph One and Paragraph Three (C) of Article Four make the Lebanese government's interpretation of Article Five irrelevant. Neither is the Lebanese government permitted to conduct propaganda hostile to Israel (Article Five) nor is any person or other body, whoever or whatever that might be, permitted to do so. The Lebanese government must prohibit that and prosecute persons committing violations (Article Four, Paragraphs One, Two, Three (A), Three (C) and Four).

#### Two: Article Six of the Agreement

Article Six of the agreement constitutes an obvious abandonment by Lebanon of its Arab commitments, particularly the commitments of the Joint Arab Defense Charter. In this regard we need only cite the text of Article Six of

the 17 May agreement and the text of Article Two of the Joint Arab Defense Charter:

Article Six of the 17 May agreement:

"Except for overland transport rights based on international law, each party will prohibit the entry onto its territory, including its air space and its territorial waters, or the deployment on it or transit over it by military forces or military equipment or materiel belonging to any country hostile to the other party."

Article Two of the Joint Arab Defense Charter:

"The signatory countries will consider any armed aggression committed against any country or more, or against its forces, to be an aggression against them all.

"In addition, in execution of the legitimate right of individual or collective defense of their existence, they will commit themselves to take the initiative of aiding the country or countries against which aggression has been committed, and immediately, individually and collectively, take all measures and use all means at their disposal, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and safety."

We do not need to explain these two texts in order to show the contradiction between Article Six of the May agreement and Article Two of the joint Arab defense agreement. What is at the same time noteworthy and unfortunate is that the Lebanese government, in its study (a comparative analytic study), does not find that any abandonment of the commitments of joint Arab defense on Lebanon's part exists. To state that the Arabs did not carry out the headings of this agreement when Israel committed aggression against Lebanon is correct, but that in no way means that Lebanon, by signing the 17 May agreement, has not abandoned its Arab commitments and its commitments in accordance with the Joint Arab Defense Charter.

Three: Article Eight of the Agreement and the Explanatory Minutes to Article Eight (Two)

Article Eight, Paragraph One (B) and Paragraph Two, and the explanatory minutes to Article Eight (Two), all stipulate economic relations between Lebanon and Israel, and they thereby violate the stipulations of the Arab boycott of Israel, which Lebanon is committed to. We will explain the sections of that in detail later under the heading of normalization.

Four: Article Nine of the Agreement

It is clear that Lebanon's commitments in accordance with the 17 May agreement take precedence over all other commitments which conflict with them. Therefore, it is obvious that all Lebanon's Arab commitments which conflict with the sections of the 17 May agreement are void. The stipulation of Article Nine makes it mandatory that Lebanon, within a period not to exceed 1 year from the time the 17 May agreement goes into effect, adopt "all

necessary measures to abrogate treaties, laws and statutes which are considered to be in conflict with this agreement" (Paragraph One -- emphasis supplied). More than that, Lebanon has also undertaken "not to carry out any existing commitments which are in conflict with this agreement and not to commit itself to any exigency of or dependence on laws or statutes which are in conflict with this agreement" (Paragraph Two).

How can anyone, in the context of this sort of explicit stipulation, continue to assert that the 17 May agreement does not alienate Lebanon from its Arab commitments, does not suspend the economic boycott and make it illegal, and does not remove Lebanon from the Joint Arab Defense Charter? How can anyone continue to insist on this and be flagrant in insisting on it, without hesitation or qualms about truth or knowledge? The matter escapes me totally.

#### Economic and Political Normalization

One: Article Eight, Paragraph One (B) of the Agreement and Paragraph Two and Explanatory Minutes of Article Eight (Two)

Article Eight, Paragraph One (B) of the agreement stipulates "A joint communication committee will concern itself in continuous fashion with the development of mutual relations between Lebanon and Israel, including the regulation (and not, as stated in the text of the agreement in Arabic, control, because the English word used is "regulation," translated "tanzim," and not "control") of the movement of goods, products, and persons, including communications, and so forth."

It is clear from the text of the above paragraph that Lebanon, by signing the 17 May agreement, accepted mutual relations with Israel, including the exchange of goods, products and persons, as well as communications (over land, sea and air, telecommunications and so forth) and also relations between the two countries that resemble both the former and the latter. That is, the rule is the current process of exchange, and the fact that economic normalization is an acceptable principle. However, this paragraph stipulates the regulation of these mutual relations so that they will not remain haphazard and unregulated, and it also proceeds to stipulate the development, that is, "inma'," of these relations in continuous form. The acceptance of mutual relations will not admit of any delay in time, as some people might imagine, but will legally go into effect from the date the agreement goes into execution, that is, when it is concluded. The state of mutual relations which Lebanon has accepted as a basis which it will seek to develop in constant fashion and to regulate is the state of mutual relations at the time the agreement is signed and concluded. This is the accepted basis which is used as a point of departure toward development and regulation.

The framework within which Lebanon has agreed that the task of developing and regulating its mutual relations with Israel is to take place is the joint communication committee, which is composed of Lebanon, Israel and the United States of America (Article Eight, Paragraph One (A)), and is to adopt its decisions unanimously. Thus we see that Lebanon, on the subject of mutual relations with Israel, has as a starting point accepted the relations

that were in being on the date of the conclusion of the agreement. These relations were based on the principle of totally open borders under the pressure and burden of occupation. The development and regulation of these relations which were based on the principle of open borders were then assigned to the tripartite committee. Israel, and also the United States (and Lebanon, of course), have the right to contest them. Since the withdrawal of the Israeli armies by virtue of the agreement will take place only "in a period ranging from 8 to 12 weeks from the time the agreement goes into effect" (supplement on security arrangements, Paragraph Six (A)), Lebanon will not be able to close its borders with Israel at the time the agreement is concluded, unless Israel so wishes. Thus, if Lebanon subsequently wishes totally to change the status of the open borders, which are the initial premise [on which the agreement is to be executed], Israel then can refuse to do so under the right of contestation granted to it, and Lebanon will have no means of appeal for changing its position of rejection.

Likewise, Article Eight, Paragraph Two, stipulates that "within the period of the 6 months following the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon, the two parties will, in the context of the joint communication committee, explain [sic] to negotiate in good will in the desire to conduct agreements on the movement of goods, products and services and carry them out in nondiscriminatory fashion" (emphasis supplied).

This paragraph, of course, refers to the provisions of Article One (B) of the same article, which has assigned the joint communication committee the task of developing mutual relations in continuous fashion and regulating these relations within agreements. What concerns us here is the reference to the fact that Lebanon has committed itself to entering into these negotiations, which have the objective of developing, in continuous form, and regulating mutual relations with Israel on a basis of good will: that is, it has committed itself to enter into these negotiations and has the intention of arriving at positive results related to the continuous development and regulation of mutual relations, not the obstruction of these relations by devising excuses and failing to sign agreements. We are also concerned to draw attention here to Lebanon's commitment, whenever these agreements are signed, to carry them out on a non-discriminatory basis; that is, Lebanon has committed itself not to discriminate against Israel in carrying out the agreements it concludes with Israel which are related to mutual relations between the two countries.

Finally, by virtue of the stipulations of Article Eight (Two) of the explanatory minutes, Lebanon has agreed that the negotiations to conclude these agreements "will be held with all possible speed" ( not "will start") -- that is, it has committed itself not to procrastinate over the negotiations.

Thus, Lebanon has agreed:

1. To accept the existing situation, which is based on the fact of open borders between the two countries imposed by the will of the power occupying Lebanon, that is, accept the principle of mutual relations, as a basis and point of departure.

2. To commit itself to developing these relations (which have been imposed on Lebanon) in constant fashion and to regulate them within agreements to be concluded to this end within the framework of a joint committee in which Israel and the United States will have the right of contestation (the veto).
3. To commit itself to entering into negotiations to conclude these agreements on a basis of good will.
4. To commit itself to conclude these negotiations with all possible speed.
5. To commit itself to have the execution of these agreements, whenever they are concluded, carried out on a nondiscriminatory basis, that is, not to give Israel less, in accordance with these agreements, than it gives to other countries.

Two: Article Nine of the Agreement, Paragraphs One and Two, and Article Nine of the Explanatory Minutes

To underline what was stated above, and the fact that Lebanon, by virtue of the 17 May agreement, has committed itself to relinquishing the economic boycott of Israel and to establishing normal, non-discriminatory relations with Israel which will develop in continuous manner, we again refer here to Article Nine, Paragraphs One and Two, which we have quoted above (Section One, Four), on the basis of which Israel undertakes not to carry out existing commitments which conflict with the 17 May agreement and to abrogate anything that conflicts with the sections of this agreement. We also refer to Article Nine of the explanatory minutes, which stipulate that the provisions of Article Nine, in its two paragraphs, "will be applied with changes that have to be made to the agreements concluded between the two parties in accordance with Article Eight, Paragraph Two," that is, the agreements which are supposed to develop and regulate Lebanon's mutual relations with Israel.

Three: Article Eight, Paragraphs One (F), (G), and (H) of the Agreement

Lebanon has agreed to allow Israel to establish, on Lebanese territory, a communication office which will perform tasks similar in terms of content and basis to those embassies and consular departments subsidiary to them perform (except for protocol missions), in addition to missions related to the execution of the security, political and economic sections of the 17 May agreement. This office will be headed by a "high-level government official" (Article Eight, Paragraph One (F) and (G)). It is true that Lebanon has not given a full diplomatic character to this office and its employees, but it is also true that it has given them forms of immunity which are similar to diplomatic forms of immunity but differ from them in that they are temporary (Paragraph H). When we remember that these forms of immunity will remain in effect as long as the two parties do not agree to change the existing legal situation, and that this change will require Israel's agreement, because it has the right of the veto in the joint communication committee in whose framework the Israeli communication office is established, it is apparent to us that the only difference between the forms of immunity given to the employees of the Israeli communication office and diplomatic forms of immunity (that is, the fact that they are temporary) is not relevant in this

area, and it is clear to us that Lebanon has in practice granted diplomatic forms of immunity and a political character to the Israeli communication office and consequently has accepted the normalization of its political relations with Israel.

#### The Violation of Lebanese Sovereignty

It is obvious that by virtue of any agreement a country concludes with another country, it relinquishes a certain degree of absolute sovereignty and subjects that to the stipulations of the agreement concerned, in exchange for other benefits it obtains in accordance with the agreement which are at least equal to and for the most part exceed the formal relinquishment of complete freedom to act or absolute sovereignty. It is normal that this sort of matter is not the object of our discussion and our objection here. Rather, we will restrict our discussion in this area to the stipulations of the agreement which constitute an unacceptable violation of Lebanese sovereignty and in most cases will not increase the security guarantees or other benefits of the other party in a manner sufficient to guarantee that they are adhered to even by that party, and which we have seen for the most part are there for belittlement and to impose the will of the dominant power, and nothing else.

One: The Appendix on Security Arrangements, Paragraph Two (D), and the Explanatory Minutes, Appendix, Paragraph Two (D)

Lebanon, on the basis of Paragraph Two (D) of the appendix on security arrangements, has committed itself to merge "the local units that now exist, as they are, into the Lebanese army, in accordance with army statutes" (emphasis supplied). It has also committed itself "to have the local civil guard which now exists merged into the partisans and given a suitable character, in accordance with Lebanese laws, to enable it to follow up on guarding the villages in the security area" (emphasis supplied). Thus Israel will have imposed on the Lebanese army specific personnel which are not necessarily those the Lebanese army would have chosen, including personnel subordinate to Israel, which it has chosen, as is well-known, especially the members of the civil guard. Although the agreement avoids referring to the officer Sa'd Haddad by name, it forces the Lebanese army to take him back.

In addition, the explanatory minutes (Appendix, Paragraph Two (D)), stipulate that a regional brigade whose components will be the abovementioned local units in being, in addition to "a number of people from the Lebanese army drawn from the inhabitants of the security region," will be concentrated in the security region located south of the al-Zahrani River. One of the odd things about this provision is that it is in Israel's power to object to the presence of the current army commander in the security region located south of the al-Zahrani River, on grounds that the current commander is not an inhabitant of the security region and does not of course belong to the local units which exist now.



Two: The Appendix to the Security Arrangements, Paragraphs Two (E), (F) and (I) and the Appendix to the Agreement

There are a number of restrictions in the agreement which do not greatly add to the circumstances of the state of security in northern Israel but are to be considered humiliating to Lebanon and violate its sovereignty in an unreasonable manner.

The Lebanese army may keep air defense weapons of a caliber of no more than 40 millimeters within the security region (that is, south of the al-Awwali River and in the al-Baruk area) on condition that they not be directed by radar. It is well-known that this sort of weapon today is very old and of no use as a means of air defense; that is, the security region will indeed be without any means of air defense and will be totally open by air, especially since Lebanon is prohibited from having an air force, military aircraft or patrol craft in the security area.

In addition, Lebanon is prohibited from keeping ground to air or ground to sea missiles in the security area. Outside the security area, on the rest of Lebanese territory, Lebanon is permitted to deploy short- and medium-range shoulder borne air defense missiles only, while it is prohibited from having long-range air defense missiles, within 3 years of the date on which the agreement starts to go into effect, and "the committee on security arrangements may, after the conclusion of 3 years from the date on which this agreement goes into effect, review the arrangements involving the terrain situated outside the security area, on the basis of a request by either of the two parties" (Paragraph E). However, the fact that Israel has the right of the veto in the committee on security arrangements deprives this provision of any practical utility for Lebanon, even after the conclusion of the 3-year period.

In addition to all that, Lebanon is prohibited from having ground radar whose coverage extends beyond the Lebanese-Israeli borders, except for radar equipment involved in the surveillance of civil aircraft or air transport. The deployment of ground radar within 10 kilometers of the Lebanese-Israeli borders will be subject to the agreement of the security arrangements committee and therefore to the Israeli right of contestation.

Finally, the agreement prohibits Lebanon from establishing a military airport (for airplanes and patrols) and also "establishing or keeping auxiliary installations, equipment or structures which will have the effect of helping in the preparation of weapons which are not permitted by virtue of this appendix or the annex to it," that is to say, any type of air force (appendix to the security arrangements, Paragraph Two (I) (Two)). This prohibition also applies to that part of al-Baruk Mountain that has been included in the security region for this purpose (appendix, Paragraph Two (I) (Two), and explanatory minutes, appendix, Paragraph One (B)).

Three: The Joint Committees of Inspection (Appendix on Security Arrangements and Explanatory Minutes, Appendix, Paragraph Three (F))

The appendix on security arrangements (Paragraph Three (F)) stipulates that the committee on security arrangements is to create joint committees of



inspection in the proper execution of the sections in the agreement comprising an equal number of representatives for Lebanon and Israel, provided that "the maximum number of joint committees operating at one time not exceed eight" (explanatory minutes, appendix, Paragraph Three (F) (Nine)). Even though the leadership of each committee has been assigned to a Lebanese officer, and even though the number of Israeli overseers will be in the vicinity of 50 (statement by the Lebanese foreign minister before the Chamber of Deputies, 16 May 1983), that cannot conceal the blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty. The statement that "the period of the application committees is limited" (that is, 2 years, as noted in the statement by the foreign minister mentioned here) is disproved by the provision which states "the mission of the joint committees of inspection will end in a period of 90 days following notification to that effect by either of the two groups at any time it chooses after 2 years have elapsed since the execution of this agreement starts. Before this termination, alternative inspection arrangements will be set out by the joint communication committee" (appendix on security arrangements, committee on security arrangements, Paragraph Three (F) (Seven), emphasis supplied). Since Israel has the right of contestation in the joint communication committee as in the committee on security arrangements, this time limitation is only theoretical and has no actual value, in the event Israel refuses to respond. The objection here is of course not to the principle of oversight committees but to the fact that the basic party to the conflict is included in them. It would be better if the task of overseeing the execution of the agreement were assigned to a neutral party, such as the United Nations, for instance, or, in the least case, to a third country which is not a party to the dispute. Even if the task were to be assigned to the United States of America, on grounds that it is an intermediary and a third party to the agreement, that would be better for Lebanon, and this is what other separation of forces agreements stipulate.

We cannot conclude the discussion of the joint inspection committees without an issue which might be considered secondary but must be referred to. We previously mentioned that the leadership of each of these committees will be assumed by a Lebanese officer. In addition, the appendix stipulates that "the joint investigation committees will possess the freedom to move about by land, air and sea according to the necessary requirements for carrying out their missions within the security region (appendix to the security arrangements, the committee on security arrangements, Paragraph F (Four)). The explanatory minutes have also stipulated that "the inspection activities will take place on land, sea and air" (explanatory minutes, appendix, Paragraph Three (F) (Four)). However, since the concentration or passage of Lebanese military airplanes or even military patrols in the security region is absolutely prohibited, that means one of two things: either the committees cannot perform their work by air or they must use airplanes that are not Lebanese, in which case, if the committees are on non-Lebanese airplanes, the command will be under the non-Lebanese commander of the airplane.

Four: Inspection Centers (Explanatory Minutes, Appendix, Paragraph Three (F) (Five))

The objection mentioned in the paragraph before last assumes special importance because the agreement specifies the creation of two centers for

inspecting security arrangements, on the proviso that "the security arrangements committee determine the specific site of the two centers, while observing the principle that the two centers should be near Hasbiya and Mifdun." In spite of the stipulation that the two centers will be under the command of an officer of the Lebanese army (explanatory minutes, personnel arrangements, Paragraph A), and that "the Israelis will be concentrated in two centers on Israeli territory outside their working hours" (personnel arrangements, Paragraph D), these two centers will be centers of a permanent Israeli presence on Lebanese territory, because Paragraph B of the personnel arrangements has stipulated that "the two centers are to operate 24 hours a day, without interruption," Paragraph F has stipulated that "the joint committees of investigation will normally set out from the two centers for their missions after receiving the appropriate instructions, and their missions will end when their report is submitted to the two centers," and the nature of work of the two centers requires a permanent presence of observers from the two countries, as stated in the definition of the goal of each of the two centers:

"A. The oversight, guidance and supervision of the joint inspection committees.

"B. Use as a center of communications connected to the investigation committees and the specific command centers.

"C. Use as a meeting place in Lebanon for the committee on security arrangements.

"D. Receipt, analysis and concrete formulation of all information needed for the work of the joint inspection committees, by proxy for the committee on security arrangements" (explanatory minutes, appendix, Paragraph Three (F) (Five) (Two)).

It is clear from the purpose behind the establishment of the two centers, the broad, multifaceted nature of their work, and the explicit provision that they are to operate 24 hours a day without interruption that the Israelis will be present in continuous fashion on Lebanese territory.

#### Five: Articles Four, Six and Seven of the Agreement

In concluding our discussion of the provisions that violate Lebanon's sovereignty, it is necessary to point to some sections in the agreement which were previously discussed under other headings, such as the abandonment of Arab commitments. In this area, we cite Article Four of the agreement, which constitutes a blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty, with the conditions and prohibitions it sets forth, which no one can accept. To a lesser degree, Article Six of the agreement constitutes an unacceptable violation of Lebanese sovereignty because it compels Lebanon to prevent military forces, equipment or materiel belonging to any hostile country to enter its territory, be deployed in it or pass over it, including its air space and territorial waters. In the event a dispute arises over that, any country that does not have diplomatic relations with the two parties will be considered a hostile country (explanatory minutes, Article Six). In addition, Article

Seven of the agreement constitutes an unacceptable violation of Lebanese sovereignty when, in the event Lebanon requests international forces to deploy themselves on its territory to establish its authority, it imposes the condition that "the choice of the new countries participating in these forces be made from among countries which have diplomatic relations between the two parties." It is clear that this condition rules out a large number of countries, foremost among them Arab and African ones.

[30 Nov 83 p 11]

[Text] Dr Ilyas Saba, former minister of defense and finance, has set out a detailed study of the 17 May agreement which is perhaps the first in terms of its comprehensiveness, at least from the perspective of the opposition to the agreement.

AL-SAFIR is publishing the study in three instalments. The first deals with the extent to which the agreement has succeeded, as a political means for attaining a specific objective within specific political circumstances, conditions and settings. The second and third instalments proceed from the burdens the agreement is imposing on Lebanon and deal with the agreement's sections and stipulations, its annexes, and the alternatives to it.

Herewith is the third installment:

#### The Injustice Inflicted on Lebanon as a Result of Structural Disequilibrium in the Agreement

##### One: The Right of Contestation (Veto) Given to Israel and the United States of America

The agreement stipulates that all relations between Lebanon and Israel, whether political, economic or of a security nature, are to be confined to the framework of the joint communication committee composed of Lebanon, Israel and the United States of America. It also stipulates that the committee's decrees are to be adopted unanimously (Article Eight of the agreement, Paragraph One (A)).

Thus, Israel, like the United States (and Lebanon), will have the right of the veto on this committee, which is considered to be the final point of reference and the apex of the pyramid of the structure of the interrelationship between Lebanon and Israel. Here is where the importance of the situation in the actual conditions which will prevail when the agreement is carried out lies, because any change in this situation will require the agreement of Israel (and the United States), if Lebanon seeks a change, and here is where the importance of the fact of open borders as a condition that actually prevails when the agreement goes into effect lies. In addition, if Lebanon at a subsequent time wants to amend or change some of the sections imposed upon it in accordance with the agreement, it will not be able to do so in the event Israel rejects such a change.

The appendix on the security arrangements (Paragraph Three) stipulates the establishment of the committee on security arrangements in the context of

the joint communication committee and defines its task as supervising "the execution of the security arrangements as well as the schedule, formats, and other measures related to the withdrawal processes." It may also establish and operate the joint investigation committees: "The committee on security arrangements will be composed of Lebanese and Israeli delegates of equal numbers, under the chairmanship of commanding officers. The delegate of the United States of America will take part in the committee's meetings in accordance with the request of either of the two parties." "The decrees of the committee on security arrangements will be taken by agreement of the parties," that is, unanimously. Thus we see that Israel also has the right of the veto in the context of the highest point of reference of security relations between the two countries. If Lebanon complains of numerous restrictions in the area of security arrangements, any change or shift in them will be subject to Israel's agreement.

## Two: The Obscurity Regarding the Mechanism for Resolving Disputes Arising from the Interpretation or Application of the Agreement

It is obvious that when unanimity is imposed on the work of any structure whatever, no matter what its type or the purpose for which it was established might be, anxiety over the orderly progress of its work becomes relevant and apposite. The mechanism for resolving disputes between the parties also assumes a special importance which is no secret to anyone. This is the source of our objection to the lack of clarity regarding the mechanism for settling the disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the agreement and to the lack of clarity of the role of the United States of America, which possesses the right of veto as a basic party to the structure and at the same time plays a conciliatory role as a third party between Lebanon and Israel. This is a structural flaw in the agreement which will inevitably implicate Lebanon in problems and attention ought to have been directed to it.

Article 11 of the agreement stipulates the method for resolving disputes arising from the interpretation and application of the agreement. (By the way, the Arabic text of Article 11 contains just one paragraph (white paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Information, May 1983), while the English text and the French text of the same article contain two paragraphs.) Disputes arising in the joint communication committee or the committee on security arrangements will be resolved in the context of the joint communication committee through negotiation. If negotiation among the parties in the joint communication committee (including the United States of America) does not lead to a solution, this dispute will then be submitted for conciliation. The principles, stages and elements of the stipulated "conciliation" have not been defined in any way. However, if we go back to the explanatory minutes, Article 11 (first paragraph), it will be apparent to us that the two parties, that is, Lebanon and Israel, have agreed to request "the United States of America to help rapidly resolve the disputes." As for what its role in this, and in the stage of conciliation, is, and how it is possible to combine its role as a party to the decisionmaking (within the committees) with its role as an intermediary helping rapidly to resolve the disputes, the matter remains unexplained and open to interpretation and individual judgment. Article 11 of the agreement then goes on to say:

"If it is not solved (by conciliation), it will then be subjected to the agreed-upon measures for ruling on it in definitive fashion" (emphasis and parenthetical remarks supplied). As for the exact meaning of this expression, the explanatory minutes (Article 11, second paragraph) stipulate that it is "the agreed-upon role which will be assumed by a third party which will lead to a resolution of the dispute that will be binding on the two parties." In our opinion, this "explanation" has added to the obscurity of the first provision, rather than explaining it. In addition, in no event will it furnish a mechanism for resolving the disputes; rather, it will preserve the opportunity for a deadlock. If that means arbitration or an international body, such as the Court of Justice or the International Arbitration Council (as the study of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the statement of the minister of foreign affairs mentioned previously claim), that ought to be stipulated explicitly rather than having the provision remain obscure. In reality, the stipulated mechanism will not lead the dispute to a final approach to a solution but rather will offer broad scope for the possibility of a total deadlock in the joint communication committee's activity, because that will continue to require unanimity even regarding the choice of the third party or the choice of arbitration as a solution. In the event one of the parties refuses, the work of the communication committee will be afflicted with paralysis, and on top of that, if it is agreed that the United States will have the right to choose the third party whose opinion will be binding on the two parties, either the United States will have this role (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects this sort of interpretation when it says that "that is based on a mistaken understanding of the text") or the mechanism for settling the disputes will not be fully rounded out and will always remain subjected to the agreement of all the parties.

It is worth pointing out here that the authorized settlement mechanism suffers from obvious disequilibrium as a result of its lack of accuracy and the meaningless language with which some of its stipulations are characterized. What does it mean to say that the two parties (that is, Lebanon and Israel) agree to ask the United States of American to help in the rapid solution to disputes, when it is basically an original member of the joint communication committee, since when a dispute occurs within the context of the committee, that means that the United States has basically failed to arrive at a resolution of the dispute? Therefore, what is the meaning of our once again asking it to help in a rapid resolution to the dispute?

### Three: The Disequilibrium in Israel's Favor That Has Arisen in the Security Arrangements

It might have been understandable that the conditions of the security arrangements should be restricted to Lebanese territory, were the agreement just a separation of forces agreement or security agreement giving Israel adequate guarantees to affirm that Lebanese territory would not once again be the source of threats to the security of northern Israel. However, since the agreement is much broader than a security agreement, and is broader than an armistice or separation of forces agreement, and indeed is much closer to a complete peace agreement and a treaty of peace and recognition, the absence of inspection committees [in Israel] constitutes an unacceptable



injustice against Lebanon. The agreement stipulates that Lebanon and Israel have acknowledged "their right and duty to live in peace with one another" (the foreword). In addition, they have agreed to establish "permanent security" between themselves, to "eliminate threats and the use of force between themselves," and to "end the state of war between themselves" (the foreword). As was stated in Article One of the agreement, each party undertakes "to respect the sovereignty and political independence of the other party and its territorial integrity," and "to settle disputes between themselves by peaceful means" (Article Two). In addition, we might refer again here to the stipulations of Articles Four, Five, Six and Seven of the agreement which were referred to above and state that the 17 May agreement binds the two parties to conditions and restrictions which the two parties are supposed to be restricted to and consequently that are supposed to be met by, and not disrupted by, both parties, and not just one of them.

Nonetheless, we find that the security conditions have been imposed just on the Lebanese side of the borders, and that the rule governing the work of the inspection committees is their permanent operation within Lebanese territory, while their operation in Israel is the exception to the rule (appendix on security arrangements, committee on security arrangements, Paragraph Three (F) (Three)).

Since the sites of the inspection centers are in Lebanon, rather than there being one in Lebanon and one in Israel, it is as if Israel has been exonerated in advance from possible violation of the sections of the agreement, while Lebanon is the unquestioned guilty party.

#### The 17 May Agreement in Comparison with Other Arab-Israeli Agreements

The 17 May agreement cannot be considered an evacuation of forces agreement or just an ordinary security agreement. It is in effect a complete peace treaty which lacks only the official recognition of Israel. It permits Israel to establish a communication office for itself in Lebanon and gives its employees the necessary forms of immunity. It stipulates economic normalization and the development of mutual relations between the two countries on a non-discriminatory basis. It removes Lebanon from the arena of struggle of the Middle East issue, and indeed even alienates Lebanon from the effort to create a peaceful solution to that (which not even the Camp David agreements themselves stipulate). How can we consider it just a mere security agreement when Israel, on the basis of it, obtains political and economic gains, in addition to the security and military ones? How can there not be "a single step toward the attainment of the final official peace treaty" (as David Kimche said at the session inaugurating the negotiations in Khaldah on 28 December 1982; emphasis supplied), when it stipulates the termination of the state of war and the acknowledgment by the two countries of their right and duty to live in peace, establish permanent security between themselves, have each of them honor the sovereignty of the other party, its political independence, and the safety of its territory, and undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means?

In addition, it is not permissible to say that the 17 May agreement is an improvement on the 1949 armistice agreement between Lebanon and Israel and

that "the principles of the armistice (agreement) are also those of the draft of the agreement" (statement by the foreign minister before the Chamber of Deputies, 16 May 1983; emphasis and parenthetical remarks supplied).

This is because the provisions of the armistice agreement are "based on military considerations alone" (1949 armistice agreement, Article Two (2)), while we find that the 17 May agreement also addresses itself to political, economic and informational issues in addition to security issues. As regards the military and security stipulations, it is worth pointing out that the armistice agreement (and also the 1974 separation of forces agreement with Syria) are characterized by a balance in the restrictions imposed on the two countries and the 17 May agreement suffers from the lack of this by concentrating the burden of the restrictions on Lebanon. The armistice agreement specified the armed forces personnel and arms that it is permitted to deploy on both sides of the Lebanese-Israeli borders, and not just on the Lebanese side. In addition, the third party in the armistice agreement (and the 1974 separation of forces agreement) is the United Nations, and the headquarters of the meetings of the joint armistice committee are alternately in Israel and in Lebanon both. If this is an "improvement," it is without a doubt an improvement in reverse.

At this point we must draw attention to the provisions of Article Eight, Paragraph Two, of the armistice agreement: "Since the negotiation over this agreement has taken place, and it has been concluded in response to the Security Council resolution issued on 16 November 1948, it will remain in effect until a peaceful settlement is reached between the two parties" (emphasis supplied), and to the stipulations of Article 10 of the 17 May agreement, where it says "this agreement will take the place of previous agreements between Lebanon and Israel" (emphasis supplied).

This prompts us to ask whether the 17 May agreement is thus to be considered a "peaceful settlement" between Lebanon and Israel.

Although Ambassador Fattal insisted on using the armistice agreement as a point of departure in the discussions, stating that the objective in doing so was to establish an executive mechanism for carrying out the withdrawal of foreign forces while taking into account the security concerns of both Lebanon and Israel (Fattal's statement at the session inaugurating the negotiations in Khaldah), Ambassador Kimche replied "The new relations which we want to see established through the negotiations that are starting today will from all standpoints go beyond the armistice agreements" (Kimche's statement on the same occasion; emphasis supplied). In reality, the Israeli party's view prevailed merely with the approval, on 18 January 1983, of the negotiation committee's agenda, which included the "end of the state of war" and "the framework of mutual relations, including the following issues: communications, termination of hostile propaganda attacks, the movement of goods and persons, transportation, and so forth," in addition to the security arrangements and the issue of the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Increasing our conviction in the truth of our opinion was the statement by the American delegate, Ambassador Draper, at the session of the signing of the agreement on 17 May 1983:



"Both the parties represented in the negotiations have given priority to national policy objectives. The Lebanese, for their part, have sought through the agreement to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces from their territory so that Lebanon will once again be able to regain its independence, sovereignty, national unity and institutions.

"The Israelis, for their part, have sought, in practice and through carefully studied arrangements, with full cooperation with Lebanon, to achieve security from any threat which an invasion in the future from Lebanese territory might constitute.

"In this complicated context of combining the important objectives in a mutual understanding, other objectives have been attained (emphasis supplied).

"One effective result of these negotiations has been the laying of the basis for permanent friendly relations between the two neighboring countries" (emphasis supplied).

Although the Camp David agreements of 1978 explicitly stipulated full recognition and the elimination of the economic boycott, they concentrated on Security Council resolution 242 "in all its parts;" this stipulates the withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories it occupied in 1967. (In this regard the statement the minister of foreign affairs made in the Chamber of Deputies on 16 May 1983, while linking the 17 May agreement to Security Council resolution 242, is noteworthy: he recited the principles of resolution 242 without at all mentioning the need for Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories it occupied -- white paper, May 1983, Page 49.) In addition, the Camp David agreements stipulate the details on autonomy for the Palestinian people on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as Egypt had resolved (exchange of letters, fifth letter, from al-Sadat to Carter, 17 September 1978), by asserting "Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank and historic legitimate Arab rights must be restored to the city and respected.... Arab Jerusalem must be under Arab sovereignty.... The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem have the right to exercise their legitimate national rights."

Where are Arab rights in the 17 May agreement? After all of the foregoing, can anyone consider that the 17 May agreement is an agreement for the evacuation of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and nothing more, and that "we have not given Israel anything which we did not give it in the armistice agreement and other Arab countries have not given it in even less?" (statement by the foreign minister to the Gulf media delegation, AL-NAHAR, 31 May 1983).

What is to be done? What is the way out? What is the alternative?

These are questions which must have started to surge up in front of us, after all this description, detail and comparison. However, before trying to answer them, we must establish some firm beliefs, so that we can put matters in their proper perspective.

First, the obvious answer to the question "what is the alternative?" is that the 17 May agreement has not offered a solution to the problem of the Israeli occupation so that one could ask about an alternative. Indeed, it has implicated Lebanon in an imbroglio from which it does not know how to extricate itself. Therefore the question should be reformulated to read: "How do you consider Lebanon should be liberated and how can we extricate ourselves from the dilemma of the agreement?"

Second, Lebanon, prior to the agreement, was faced with the problem of removing the Israeli forces.

After the 17 May agreement, in addition to that, it then was faced with the problem of extricating itself from the dilemma of the agreement in which it had enmired itself as a result of the organic error in government policy toward the occupation and the grievous failure of this policy.

Third, the talk about the price which Lebanon must pay Israel in order for it to withdraw is to be rejected. Israel is the aggressor, and Lebanon is the victim of the aggression. Israel did not wage a war against Lebanon and win it against Lebanon in order to demand a price from Lebanon which Lebanon would pay. David Kimche said:

"We certainly do not harbor any feeling of enmity toward Lebanon, and the goal in these negotiations is not to end any dispute between Lebanon and Israel, because there is no such dispute between us. Our military operations in the course of this past year were never directed against Lebanon and its citizens; rather, they were directed against the 'saboteurs' who had turned Lebanon into a base of aggression against us, against the will of the Lebanese.

"We did not attack Lebanon or its people; rather, we were compelled to eliminate the danger which the presence of 'saboteurs' on its soil constituted for us.

"This presence turned Lebanon's independence and sovereignty into a farce. The political structure and military structure which the 'terrorists' had established constituted a threat to both Lebanon and Israel, and that required that it be eliminated, in the interests of our two peoples."

(Kimche's statement at the session of the inauguration of negotiations on 28 December 1982.

Thus it is clear that the Israeli war in Lebanon in the summer of 1982 was a war that was unique of its kind, because it was a war against non-Lebanese, caused by a struggle that existed with non-Lebanese against the will of the Lebanese, but was on the territory of Lebanon. One may also deduce from this that Israel's goal in waging war on the territory of Lebanon was to keep the threat to its security by an invasion set off anew from the territory of Lebanon from arising again.

Thus the agreement between Lebanon and Israel ought to have been restricted to security issues alone, so that the necessary circumstances and conditions

could thereby be guaranteed, to prevent the repetition of the attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory. Thus the alternative to the 17 May agreement is another agreement which will be restricted to security issues alone and will be balanced and fair in its restrictions and conditions and not address itself to any political, economic or information issues or the like. There is nothing to prevent the United States from guaranteeing the proper execution of the chapters of such an agreement, if that will provide Israel with adequate guarantees and security and will provide Lebanon with additional restrictions in exchange.

As to how Lebanon could relinquish the 17 May agreement and obtain a security agreement only which would guarantee the withdrawal of Israel, that would be through renewed negotiation or by recourse to the Security Council; in any case, it is not possible for the two parties to the 1949 armistice agreement to modify Articles One and Three of that agreement before going back to it. We are convinced that Israel and America must be convinced of the change that is desired by Lebanon, because that ultimately will guarantee them a better result than the dead agreement is guaranteeing them today. Israel, at that point, will obtain security, which is its basic demand, for whose sake it launched war on the territory of Lebanon in 1982, but which it has not achieved and will not achieve in the context of the 17 May agreement, as the repeated losses it is still sustaining in Lebanon attest.

The United States of America will be able to achieve in Lebanon what others have failed to achieve, which is national reconciliation, and thereby will have given Lebanon great assistance after which it will make it easy for it to emerge from its ordeal, which has gone on at length. Therefore, we must succeed in convincing them, when they are faced with unanimity among the Lebanese and stubborn Lebanese insistence, and when it becomes apparent to them that an agreement which can be carried out, which guarantees the security of Israel and the sovereignty, dignity and unity of Lebanon, is much more feasible and preferable than an agreement which is stillborn and is not worth the paper it is written on.

Beirut, November 1983.

11887  
CSO: 4404/255

# ECONOMIC, POLITICAL CHANGES IN SOUTH DISCUSSED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 40, 14 Jan 84 pp 12-13

[Article: "South Is Big Detention Camp, and Catastrophe Is Threatening Its Future; 15,000 Citizens Are Threatened with Loss of Their Sources of Livelihood; Inability to Sell Threatens Crops, and Israel Is Invading Markets with Its Products"]

[Excerpts] It is no secret that the big question at present over all of Lebanon, especially over South Lebanon, is: Will Israel withdraw from its present military line overlooking al-Awwali River to a new line overlooking al-Zahrani River, thus leaving the area open to all possibilities, including the possibility of a "bitter experience" similar to that of al-Shuf and 'Alayh in the wake of its withdrawal from these two areas to al-Awwali River at the end of last summer?

In Beirut, a number of southern politicians and leaders agree with the Western "expectations" and want the State of Lebanon to prepare to send its armed forces, including its army and internal security forces, to replace the withdrawing forces so that the "tragedy of al-Shuf and 'Alayh may not recur," as a veteran southern leader put it. Lawyer Nabih Barri, chairman of Amal Movement, believes that it is almost certain that Israel will withdraw to al-Zahrani. He even believes that there is a remote possibility that it will withdraw to al-Litani. This is why Barri and his movement have demanded that the state send the army to fill the security void that will develop in order to prevent this void from being filled by the numerous illegitimate hands that are playing with the fate of the south and the southerners.

The Israeli answer to the same question is different, with Israel saying neither yes nor no but being content with noting that what is regarded of the State of Lebanon is to prepare the territorial brigade mentioned in the suspended 17 May agreement to take charge of security after the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the south.

The "ambiguity" in the Israeli answer seems to have been planned at a time when the Israelis continue to impose their temperamental restrictions on those moving through the southern crossings at al-Awwali bridge in Sidon and Basri bridge to the east and when the south continues to be turned into

a "big detention camp" where Israel acts as it wishes, raids, arrests and confiscates man, stone and tree in retaliation for the general southern rejection of its occupation.

Some Lebanese politicians believe that Israel itself released the balloon of its withdrawal to al-Zahrani, engulfed this balloon with ambiguity and then proceeded to use it as a form of pressure against the Lebanese administration to conclude the 17 May agreement and against the southerners themselves to dampen their enthusiasm in fighting the occupation and in harassing its presence among them.

While waiting for the decisive answer to whether there will be a withdrawal, the southerners, under the shadow of the Israeli isolation of their provinces from the rest of Lebanon, are living in the worst political, social and economic situation they have experienced since the mid-1970's. The screen set up by the Israelis at the crossing points permits only a small number of people to cross to the south daily in comparison to the pre-isolation period when the number of people entering and departing from this densely populated Lebanese governorate was estimated at tens of thousands, most of them southerners working outside the south and some of them businessmen, merchants and farmers tied to the south by business, commercial or tourist relations.

This difficult situation is reflected in the major damage afflicting various levels of the south's sources of livelihood. This damage is intensifying daily and is posing the threat of an economic catastrophe, according to the Industry and Commerce Chamber of Sidon, the capital of the south, which recently presented to the authorities concerned a report exposing some aspects of the southern crisis emanating from the obstruction of movement at al-Awwali River crossing points. The report states that this obstruction has led to a 200-percent increase in shipping costs and has created fuel shortages; the report also warns that the fuel reserves will not last more than 2 months. The report further states that the south is living in a "real economic crisis" that is intensified by the presence of more than 100,000 evacuees who have taken refuge in the south as a result of the "mountain war" and the tense situation in al-Kharrub District, which is adjacent to the 2 southern districts of Jazzin and al-Zahrani. The report further reveals that the extent of the damage inflicted on commerce and exports is no less than that inflicted on the seasonal southern crops because pesticides and agricultural equipment have not been delivered. Israel also resorts to destroying the orchards and nurseries in the areas where its military forces are stationed and in the areas on the Tyre-Sidon coastal highway where its forces are subjected to ambushes and attacks. Agricultural sources estimate that nearly 15,000 agricultural workers face the threat of losing their sources of livelihood because of the barren [scorched] land policy adopted by Israel.

As a result of this tragic situation, the prices of crops which constitute the backbone of the southerners' income have dropped 30-50 percent because it is impossible to market the entire crop in the south due to invasion of the markets by similar Israeli crops.

The industrial sector is in no better condition, according to the report. This sector is also threatened with a catastrophe because obstruction of the crossing points leads to delays in the delivery of raw materials to the area's factories, in addition to the impossibility of marketing the goods produced. This industrial situation has resulted in reduced work opportunities and has caused 2,000 workers to be faced with the threat of being laid off. In the wake of the measures taken at the crossing points, the monthly value of the exports has dropped from 2 million Lebanese pounds to 1 million pounds, and this figure is likely to decrease continually.

The security and political difficulties and dangers resulting from the Israeli isolation of the south are no less serious than the economic and living difficulties and dangers in light of the absence of the legitimate government from the area where influence is shared by a mosaic of forces and parties with varying political and sectarian inclinations, tendencies and affiliations. But all these forces and parties collaborate in one way or another with the Israelis, who hold all the threads and move these forces when they wish, however they wish and whenever their interest dictates it. In this regard, the Israelis enjoy a superior ability to move and plant conflicts of interest, operating within the framework of the slogan of "no lasting friendships but lasting interests." They have been doing this even with their historical friends, such as in the case of Maj Sa'd Haddad, whose influence has declined to a large degree after the vast expansion in this influence following the Israeli invasion of June 1982.

Haddad used to control the second biggest military force in the south after the Israeli army, especially in the Christian areas of the south. This was before the Lebanese Forces gained a presence in the south, especially in Jazzin, al-Zahrani and Sidon Districts. Amal Movement also has an invisible military presence in a number of Shi'ite areas as well as an influential and effective political presence.

There are other military organizations. Meanwhile, the National Guard force is concentrated in the Druze areas, especially in Hasbayya and Rashayya. There are other small armed groupings planted by Israel in a number of areas, such as the Shi'ite Army and other groupings. But these groupings are still in the founding phase and have not yet gained any noteworthy influence on the ground.

At a time when the popular movement rejecting the Israeli occupation is growing and when an active civil and armed resistance movement is intensifying, the Israelis are trying to penetrate southern immunity by polishing up these "supporters" and pushing them to the forefront in this or that area. It is no coincidence that the leaders of these groupings are usually people with a past who carried the rifle of the Palestinian organizations when the south was dominated by those organizations. The Israelis are not content with attempts to penetrate the ranks of the southerners but have extended these attempts to the Palestinian camps and have been arming some people in these camps under the guise of setting up guards.

Amidst this multitude of attempts at containment, which take at times the form of inducement and at others the form of intimidation, the southerner is standing firmly and resolutely, rejecting containment and normalization. He is resisting and fighting the Israeli needle with his defenseless and exposed eye. Yet, the southerner is foiling here, obstructing there and stopping somewhere else the momentum of the Jewish onrush to tighten the grip on man, tree and stone. As a result, the daily confrontation operations carried out by the southerners against the Israeli army's centers, patrols and gatherings are intensifying, and Israel has not been able to put an end to these operations despite the oppressive measures taken at al-Awwali crossing points, the blockades imposed on the southern villages and municipalities and the tyrannical arrests of the citizens.

8494

CSO: 4404/243



VIEWS ON FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE POLLED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 40, 14 Jan 84 pp 73-75

[Article: "AL-TADAMUN Polls Lebanese on First Round of Geneva National Reconciliation Conference: If They Want, They Can; Army Is Only Power; 53.1 Percent Believe That Dialogue Committee Can Find Solution to Lebanese Issue, and 30.9 Percent Believe That It Will Abolish Political Sectarianism; 37 Percent Support Army's Use of Force to Spread to All of Lebanon, and 19.1 Percent Support Military Rule"]

[Excerpt] When we decided to poll the Lebanese citizens anew, we encountered the same problem [as before], namely how to reach them. The difficulties facing this process are numerous, including the question of selecting the "sample." The thin lines separating the categories of the same class from each other are very fine, thus making it difficult to make a distinction between the "industrialist" and the landowner because the landowner can be an industrialist at the same time, and between the "businessman" and the "banker," "employee" and "student." All or most of these people are engaged in two or more professions.

The other issue we encountered is the issue of moving from area to area and of finding the means to poll the citizen without being confronted by this "party" or that "military force" controlling one area or another. There was another problem in phrasing the poll questions, namely the problem of who really represents the Lebanese people. Are they the workers, the students, the merchants or all of them? Then, which category has an influence on the future of the political, economic and social decision?

Fundamentally, who holds the future of this homeland?

And what does he want?

We did not select the samples on the basis of the numerical percentage of each class or category. Rather, we selected the samples on the basis of political, economic and social influence. This is why the answers have come from the people's various categories and sectors: the students, workers, intellectuals, industrialists, doctors, cab drivers, members of the military corps, chewing-gum vendors and newspaper vendors. The polling form differed from area to area, penetrating barriers and obstacles. The

question was not just one of filling out 200 forms but also of conducting 200 personal interviews during which we met with citizens from the various classes who responded spontaneously to the requirements of the poll whereas we had expected some sort of reluctance to cooperate, especially since the tragedy has been going on for 9 years, since the homeland is still saddled with the yoke of the Israeli occupation of the south and since Mount Lebanon, al-Biqa' and the north are still areas with special circumstances.

The polling form contained numerous questions phrased in such a manner as to exclude suggestion and to elicit specific answers. Let us now turn to the people, to their answers to our questions and to their discussion with those who have conveyed their answers to the polling forms to find out what conclusions the poll has reached.

#### Chart No 1

Question: Will the conferees who have met in Geneva in the Lebanese national reconciliation conference reach a solution to the Lebanese problem?

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Likely</u>	<u>Otherwise</u>
Workers	15	6	7	2	-
Students	25	19	6	-	-
Businessmen	15	1	10	4	-
Employees	20	14	5	-	1 no opinion
Intellectuals	20	13	5	-	2 no opinion
Politicians	15	9	1	5	-
Security forces	15	29	15	-	- [Figures as published]
Industrialists	15	-	13	2	-
Free trades	30	-	1	-	- [Figures as published]
Various groups	24	12	10	1	1 no opinion
Total	194	103	73	14	4 no opinion
Percentage		53.1	53.1	7.2	-

It is evident from these answers that the majority (53.1 percent) still hopes that the Lebanese National Dialogue Committee will reach a solution to the Lebanese problem by virtue of its representing (in the opinion of the majority) all the Lebanese people's factions with their various sectarian and ideological inclinations and tendencies. Meanwhile, others (37.1 percent) believe that this committee is no better than the previous committees and that it is doomed to the same fate of its predecessors, i.e., failure. The third group, representing 7.2 percent, believes that it is likely to achieve a certain result, but with a lot of patience and deliberation, awaiting meanwhile the outcome of the second round of negotiations.

It seems that the Lebanese still trust the traditional "leaders" and are confident they will pull them out of the cruel tragedy they are experiencing. This conclusion confirms the [conclusion of the] previous poll conducted by AL-TADAMUN during the first round of the Geneva conference.

## Chart No 2

Question: Will the Geneva dialogue lead to abolishing political sectarianism?

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Otherwise</u>
Workers	15	8	7	[Figures as published]
Students	20	3	22	
Businessmen	15	10	5	
Employees	20	2	18	
Intellectuals	20	-	20	
Politicians	15	6	9	
Security forces	15	2	13	
Industrialists	15	8	7	
Free trades	30	9	21	
Various groups	24	12	12	
Total	194	60	134	
Percentage		30.9	69.1	

According to the intimations of some and the opinion of the majority (69.1 percent), it seems that the Geneva dialogue will not lead to abolishing political sectarianism by virtue of the gains it represents for certain groups. Meanwhile, 30.9 percent of those polled are wagering that the National Dialogue Committee will accomplish this step by bringing the viewpoints of the warring parties closer to each other.

It seems from the answers to this question that the "political" meaning of "political sectarianism" is not clear because of the conflicting statements, interpretations and explanations given by the warring parties regarding this phrase throughout the war years and because of the new interpretations introduced by a large group of Lebanese who have entered the tumultuous arena of interpretation. Meanwhile, other groups react emotionally and contribute answers, of which the least that can be said is that they are biased, as in the case of one polled person who completely refused to acknowledge that his sect is enjoying privileges at the expense of other sects and of another polled person who described the money spent by the state on a certain religious sect as part of what may be spent on other sects.

It is not surprising then that the ordinary citizen is confused. Political phrases stick to his mind, and he uses them without analyzing them. These phrases are always reflected in the citizen's actions and positions, and this is another catastrophe that has befallen Lebanon.

## Chart No 3

Question: How do you see future Lebanese-Arab relations after the negotiations of the Dialogue Committee in Geneva?

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Bad</u>	<u>Not Bad</u>	<u>Otherwise</u>
Workers	15	1	12	2	
Students	25	11	8	6	
Businessmen	15	10	1	4	
Employees	20	18	1	-	1 no opinion
Intellectuals	20	12	-	8	
Politicians	15	4	9	2	
Security forces	15	1	1	10	3 no opinion
Industrialists	15	3	5	7	
Free trades	30	18	9	3	
Various groups	24	6	8	8	2 no opinion
Total	194	84	54	50	6 no opinion
Percentage		43.3	27.8	25.7	3.2

A segment consisting of 43.3 percent of the Lebanese people, with all their classes and factions, believe that relations with the Arab countries will be good, wagering in this regard on the addresses and speeches delivered by the participants in the Dialogue Committee including the speeches and addresses delivered by President Amin al-Jumayyil in Lebanon and in the Arab and international circles he has visited. Meanwhile, 25.7 percent believe that Lebanon will continue its previous relations, which have not been bad.

Moreover, 27.8 percent believe that relations with the Arab countries will be bad because of the Israeli occupation of part of Lebanon, in addition to the pressures exerted by some illegitimate military factions on the president of the republic to sever relations with the Arabs.

#### Chart No 4

Question: What means can the Lebanese army in its present condition use, in your opinion, to spread its control over all the Lebanese territories?

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>By Force</u>	<u>By Negotiation</u>	<u>By Military Rule</u>	<u>Otherwise</u>
Workers	15	8	3	4	
Students	25	2	6	1	16 no opinion
Businessmen	15	5	1	9	
Employees	20	17	2	-	1 no opinion
Intellectuals	20	3	16	1	
Politicians	15	6	8	1	
Security forces	15	2	9	4	
Industrialists	15	14	-	1	5 no opinion
					[figures as published]
Free trades	30	-	16	9	
Various groups	24	15	2	7	
Total	194	72	63	37	22 no opinion
Percentage		37.1	32.4	19.1	11.4

A total of 37.1 percent believes that the Lebanese army cannot establish its control over all the Lebanese territories. This percentage believes that

the army's present condition qualifies it to perform its role of protecting the country's borders, its independence and the safety of the country's citizens and of those legally residing in the country and of protecting the individual from all the kinds of violence he is facing. A total of 32.4 percent believes that the army can establish its control through negotiations with the parties concerned. There is also the 19.1 percent which hopes that military rule will emerge to enable the army to establish its control over all of Lebanon's territories and to restore security and reassurance to the country.

These four charts together form a real wager on what the National Dialogue Committee can accomplish in Geneva. The degree of mutual trust between the citizen and the official is what a citizen wagers on. Here we find that the majority has lost trust even in those closest to it as a result of the practices and actions it has seen from this or that official from the dawn of independence to the present. So is it true that this Dialogue Committee will reach a solution to the Lebanese problem?

Can it solve all of the country's political, economic, social and other problems?

Should it shoulder solely the burdens of the historical responsibility?

These are questions looking for answers, and these may perhaps come from the second round of the Geneva Conference, if this round is held.

8494

CSO: 4404/244

KARIM MARUWAH DISCUSSES CRISIS OF ARAB COMMUNISTS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 35, 10 Dec 83 pp 65-67

[Article by Karim Maruwah: "The Crisis of Arab Communists Lies in a False Understanding of Marxism"]

[Text] In previous issues, Comrade 'Isa Bin Hisham has summarized the views of Karim Maruwah on the crisis of the Marxists in the Arab countries as set forth in "Initial Remarks," which is the introduction to "Papers." It seems that Professor Maruwah believes that what Hisham wrote and we published did not faithfully represent his opinion. We are retracing our steps here and publishing his views concerning the crisis of Marxism and Marxists in the Arab world. However, this time he himself is offering his opinion, with all his long and respectable experience in the field of doctrinal understanding and theorization.

How difficult it is in the very complex circumstances which pertain in Lebanon and the Arab world to devote oneself to literary activity from a position of intellectual and political responsibility, in order to contribute to interpreting a phenomenon, analyzing an event, clarifying an idea or determining a position. The continuous and congested stream of events moving in numerous directions, the intensity and increasing gravity of the various conflicts, which are based on the divergence of class and political interests and positions, the division and disunity of the revolutionary forces, and the absence of a united program and centers of unified decision-making for their factions all make it difficult for a party or a thinker to assume individual responsibility for analyzing or drawing conclusions, let alone formulating a position. This can only be done on the basis of contributing to the creation of circumstances more favorable to laying down a revolutionary program in which revolutionary practice is mixed with the revolutionary line in a vital and continuous manner which is as correct as possible and as far as can be from error.

With regard to the Lebanese issue, the Palestinian issue, and everything related to the Arab national liberation movement, the revolutionary position is confronted by complexities which are not all due to objective circumstances by any means. Rather, most of them can be ascribed to autonomous circumstances. That is, they are the product of conditions which exist within the revolutionary

movement. among its factions, and within these factions simultaneously. By setting forth these ideas and observations, we hope to do nothing more than to try to define a correct relationship between the issues which are raised by events and assume prominence during the daily struggle and the revolutionary program which the revolutionary forces are supposed to adopt as their line and mode of practical action. By means of this relationship and a dialogue with the views current among the great masses and the average people concerning current events and the issues of the daily struggle, we hope to contribute to the definition of some positions, not to mention correcting some distortions which have accrued to various concepts as a result of ignorance, neglect, or a particular political and intellectual position.

This dialogue is important because it is based on experiential, daily reality and on the simple, uncomplicated comparison which the masses and the average people in the Arab societies make between two programs used by the revolutionary movement to deal with the struggle in progress in every country and on the level of the countries of the region. One is a revolutionary program and the other is an exploitative one. This dialogue is also based on a simple, uncomplicated comparison made in the minds of these masses and average people between the liberation and progress they desire and the difficulties and numerous varieties of subjugation, tragedy and pain which they face in their daily lives. This is not to speak of the darkened horizons they can see by virtue of their quick and easy reading of developments and their humble visual faculties. Why do I make all these reservations before beginning to speak? Why do I lay down all these conditions in order to enter into the adventure of discussion, within its suggested, nearer limits?

We are called to do this because as Marxists we are committed to the party of the working class. That is, we have a responsibility to offer an accounting to those to whom our party is obliged to present a line. On the basis of this line, it is supposed to call them to devote themselves to the struggle. This line is "the line of desirable social and political change which leads to socialism." However, the Marxism to which we are practically and intellectually committed is facing a harsh crisis in our Arab world. The basic cause of this crisis is that Arab Marxists in general, including those who belong to working class parties, those who do not, those who work in the field of scientific research, and those who occupy positions of party responsibility, have not contributed sufficiently to founding an Arab school of Marxist thought based on Marxism itself which could analyze our Arab situation. Our situation is complex not merely in terms of its social and economic structure, but in particular because of its historic roots. Thus, a state of disunity and disarray exists between the scattered parts of the Arab world, which have attained different stages of development. The development of our situation is subordinate to these parts. By and large, Arab Marxists have been satisfied to carry out the easy part of their mission: They have translated into Arabic Marxist texts which have played a big role. However, there has been no serious, scientific effort to analyze and Arabize them. The classical Marxist texts must be dissected, analyzed, and even criticized in light of the scientific program which Marxism itself has provided us with, so we can obtain a deeper understanding of the general laws of the development of nature and society which Marxism gives us. This understanding will make it possible for us to achieve a more precise knowledge of the societies



which we are studying and analyzing, and for which we are working out laws and plans of change. It will also enable us to make better contact with the masses of the people who are interested in understanding these laws. I mean the working class in our countries in particular, no matter what its structure, development or size. We will have to take into consideration the role it is qualified to play in the revolutionary process. Of course, very little translation of Marxist texts into Arabic has been done. Most of them are distorted. This distortion is sometimes due to a disgraceful failure to be faithful to a particular text and its contents. There has been a lack of Arabization and of effort exerted in order to Arabicize. There has been weak participation in transforming Marxism in our countries in a concrete way into a scientific instrument for analyzing and changing our situation. It has become neither a guide to action nor a revolutionary theory capable of founding a revolutionary program and accompanying it. Moreover, distortions have occurred in Marxism as a result of the fact that many people have accepted it. They have joined communist worker parties and other organizations which have adopted or are adopting Marxism and have linked or are linking their struggle to the working class and its class-based and political interests. They came from various class roots, sources and origins. These distortions were also caused by intellectual concepts, theories, doctrines, and various philosophical and social schools. The cause of all these distortions was a failure to understand, faulty understanding, selective understanding, or a confusion of concepts. All aforementioned could have been a rich source for Marxism. We believe that all these factors have contributed and are still contributing in a fundamental way to the internal crisis which confronts Marxism in our Arab countries and to the aggravation of this crisis. The crisis is clearly and prominently expressed in a special, concrete manner by some crisis phenomena from which the Arab revolutionary movement is suffering. If our belief in Marxism is based on our conviction that the laws of societal development which it discovered are objective, general laws which can be applied as well to our Arab countries, then we have the right to hold that this universality, which we consider to be an essential characteristic of Marxism, has not been demonstrated in a sufficient, unique and concrete way in our actions as Arab Marxists. This is true with respect to the analysis of our situation, the determination of the line of march to be followed in the development of our societies, and the continuous renewal of the political program of the revolutionary party, which is the party of the working class. I refer to the program of change according to the path of socialism. More important, this universality has not been demonstrated by making this program and the class forces linked to it by class interest and their consciousness of this interest a real instrument for change with which to achieve a continuous, gradual transition along the path of real, fundamental change. However, the bourgeoisie's awareness of its interests, which has intensified and expressed itself in the heightened level of direct and veiled oppression, is the other side of the crisis of Marxism in our countries. In the shadow of the changes being witnessed by the political, economic and social situation, and as events hurry along, all the factions of the bourgeoisie, especially the superior, hegemonistic ones, are rising to the defense of their general interests as a class and the particular interests of each section. They are calling upon every variety of ideological effort, including that aspect whereby they aim to mislead the working class. For this reason, they are investing entire intellectual schools and working to distort the thought of the working class. That is, they are distorting Marxism itself, which is the revolutionary ideology

of change not merely in the eyes of the working class, but in the eyes of the bourgeoisie as well. It is the source of the real danger facing the class interests of the bourgeoisie, since it amounts to an injection of class consciousness into the ranks of the working class. Marxism entrenches the working class with revolutionary thought and drafts it into the political and social struggle to overturn the system of exploitation and replace it with a system of true justice and real equality. I mean the socialist system. Therefore, we think that belonging to Marxism should not be an intellectual luxury, as it is in many instances. Neither can it be the honor of being connected to a historically inevitable process. Rather, it ought to become a qualitatively new state in which thought and practice join to form a truly revolutionary path which interacts with large, small, basic and accidental phenomena, as well as with both large and small incidents and events. Such a path interacts with both tactics and strategy, as well as with all the tasks involved in the struggle, in a responsible way. It does so on the highest levels, plains and plateaus of responsibility in order to realize the goals set forth in the revolutionary program and achieve pan-Arab and social liberation for our countries, as well as for the sake of socialism.

In the same context, bourgeois pan-Arab thought contributes in a certain sense to the crisis of Marxist thought. Sections of the anti-imperialist forces embrace or are influenced by this pan-Arab thought. These sections currently occupy leadership positions in the Arab national liberation movement. Partly as a result of their bourgeois, backward, archaic thought, the movement is in the grip of a serious crisis in the current stage of its development.

In drawing this conclusion which we are propounding about the crisis of Marxism in the Arab countries among Marxist thinkers, workers' parties and organizations which have embraced Marxism, we rely on the historical record of the development of Marxism. I refer to the record from Marx to Lenin, not to mention current experiences. In this context, I would like to quote some paragraphs from an article by Lenin called: "Some Historical Features of the Development of Marxism." He published it in the newspaper Zvezda on 23 January 1910. Here is the text:

"In speaking about himself and his noted friend, Engels used to say that their school was not an inflexible one. Rather, it was a guide to action. This classic formulation makes clear with wonderful force and in a captivating fashion this aspect of Marxism, which often escapes attention. Since this aspect escapes our attention, we make of Marxism something one-sided, formless, rigid and lifeless. We empty Marxism of its spirit and destroy its essential theoretical foundations. By Marxism we mean the dialectic, which is the school of manifold historic development bearing contradictions. We weaken Marxism's connection with the practical and precise issues of the day, which change with every new turn history takes." The text continues: "Precisely because Marxism is not a rigid, dead dogma or an unchanging, fixed, ready-made complete school, but rather a living guide to action, it has been essential for it to reflect the uniquely rapid change which has occurred in the circumstances of social life. This change has caused deep fragmentation, anxiety, and various fluctuations. In a word, it has led to a serious internal crisis in Marxism. Therefore, it is once again time to work decisively against this fragmentation. It is time for a solemn, severe struggle

in defense of the foundations of Marxism. The broadest sections of the classes which have not been able to avoid Marxism in formulating their tasks absorbed Marxism at an earlier stage in its most distorted and rigid forms. They have preserved some slogans and answers to tactical problems without understanding the Marxist standards behind these answers. The re-examination of all values in the various areas of social life has led to a re-examination of the most general and abstract philosophical foundations of Marxism."

The text continues: "Certainly the scope of this article is not broad enough to include a discussion of these legal proceedings. It is enough to refer to them, so that we can clarify what was said above about the depth of the crisis Marxism is passing through and the connection which binds it to the entire social and economic situation in the current stage. We cannot turn our backs to the questions raised by this crisis. Nothing is more harmful or inconsistent with principle than an attempt to flee from them with empty prattle. Nothing is more important than the unity of all Marxists who understand the depth of the crisis and the need to confront it in order to defend the theoretical foundations and basic principles of Marxism, some aspects of which have been distorted by the spreading of bourgeois influence among Marxism's various 'fellow travelers.'"

Thus, by seeking guidance from Marxism as a program for discussion and a guide for action, we can take a new look at what we have chosen to refer to as the escalating internal crisis of Marxism in the Arab countries. As Lebanese Communists, we are certain that our party has given a great deal and contributed much effort to the Arab revolutionary struggles and the formulation of the outlines of these struggles by means of its revolutionary line and practice since the second party congress was held in 1968. We feel the weight of our responsibility when we find ourselves faced with a task requiring deeper study and analysis, greater effort at forecasting and drawing conclusions, and greater decisiveness and flexibility in choosing a strategic line, alliances, the tactic or tactics most closely tied to changing, variable daily events, the most appropriate form of struggle for a certain time and place, and the most realistic form of organization for the aforementioned time and place. However, this great feeling of responsibility does not and cannot exempt us from responding, for any reason at all, to a question asked by a certain event, imposed by a certain state of affairs, or raised by a particular phenomenon. Rather, we are obligated to saying the entire truth, even if we are not able to do so for certain tactical reasons. We are obligated to determine the desired position, whether it is convincing or unconvincing, right or wrong. At any rate, this is a price the party must pay. The important thing is for the revolutionary party to be completely present in daily life. It should not register in its positions a mere principled opinion adopted for history. No matter what the consequences, it cannot just say its piece and be gone. Rather, it must carefully and responsibly determine the position which will contribute to advancing the process of revolutionary struggle at a given moment in time or in the historical confluence of events. The revolutionary positions themselves possess this quality of confluence, which will be transformed in the future to a qualitatively new state.

The questions which life raises and to which the various different struggles within the Arab societies give birth are confirmed by the complexity which accompanies the development of these societies. This is also true of the distortions which

characterize their economic and social structure. This includes the internal division of these societies into sects and nationalities. The bourgeois class has not been able to find a proper solution to the question of the relationships among these groups. Rather, it has rendered them most complex and created a kind of artificial, suicidal contradiction among them. The Marxist thinkers and the entire Arab worker movement, of which we are a part, have found no practical, revolutionary and correct answers to the questions raised by all these matters. As a result, the diagnosis of the illnesses, symptoms, maladies, problems and difficulties has been backward, as has been the diagnosis of the crisis! As a result of the backwardness in finding solutions to all these dilemmas, all these many negative phenomena have deepened, the crisis has grown more complex, and intellectual and political currents have appeared which the bourgeois class has spurred on and encouraged, so that the revolutionary movement might drown in difficulties, crises, and dilemmas and grow as distant as possible from the desire of the masses for change and their readiness to make a contribution to it.

Was it really just the shock of the emergence in the revolutionary movement of a mass current which considered the return to religion and its intellectual and economic systems a substitute for scientific socialism, that is, for Marxism-Leninism? This current holds religion to be a substitute not merely in the area of proposing solutions, which are miserable indeed, but in particular in the area of leading the revolutionary, anti-imperialist, anti-bourgeoisie struggle and mobilizing the masses in an unprecedented fashion and with exceptional fighting spirit. It is no more than an example. How many such examples could we cite! We must refer to them in our subsequent researches.

This responsibility which, as Marxists, we feel we must honor, has become more burdensome in this year, the centenary of Marx. It forces us not to be satisfied to try by ourselves, in a display of important, modest, sincere, goal-oriented effort. Rather, we have to call out to the Arab Marxists who belong to the working class parties by means of their parties. We must also call out to the revolutionary thinkers who do not embrace Marxism, embrace parts of it, have not become acquainted with it, or disagree with it. We must call them all, especially the Arab communist parties. We are honored by the fact that our party was one of the first Arab communist parties founded. Throughout its long history, it has also been in the forefront of those who have contributed to the revolutionary movement. It has done so through stages of error and correctness in its rich path. We call on all the revolutionary parties, both those that embrace Marxism and those that do not, and even those that disagree with it. We call on all those Arab revolutionaries, as thinkers and as parties, and ask them to take a serious position on what is happening in this Arab world of ours in terms of events and developments. We ask them to take a stand on the continuous retreat we are witnessing in our movement and the continuous advance we see in the opposing movement, as well as the serious, pathological phenomena which are afflicting our Arab societies in swarms. Some of these phenomena arise internally, like a fissure, while others come to us from the outside, from the sick, advanced, international capitalist system. These latter come with the goods of daily consumption. We call on all these people to contribute, each from his own position, to an effort which must become a group venture, so that we can oppose all these pathological conditions and so that the Arab revolutionary movement can advance on the path of achieving the great tasks before it. I refer to the tasks of

change and of pan-Arab and social liberation for our countries. However, the fundamental call in this context, the urgent call which cannot wait is that of unity among all those who truly belong to Marxism and are truly connected to the working class and its interests. It is a call for a kind of unity of thought, organization and work. The unity of the revolutionary movement and the development of its struggle are based on this kind of unity, as is the movement's progress along the path of achieving its tasks.

We realize full well that while we are calling on these forces in order to achieve these tasks, other affairs are progressing in various directions on the ground in front of us. There is even contradiction, not just in terms of the path to be followed, but in terms of the goal and the tasks to be achieved as well. The problem of the Arab revolutionary movement at this time lies not merely in the fact that the interests of its leaders currently are inconsistent with the tasks before the movement. It lies also in the fact that many revolutionary forces only look at the process of revolution from the point of view of their narrow factional interests. These are not always necessarily the interests of the opposing bourgeois class or a section of that class. It also lies in the fact that many of the revolutionary forces which are the most radical in terms of their representation of the interests of the working class and their embrace of revolutionary theory and Marxism-Leninism do not investigate its entire program and all the affairs and questions which confront the revolutionary movement on the daily level of its struggle. This is true even of the strategic aspect of this struggle: the necessary consistency between the class position and revolutionary practice. That is, we realize that it is extremely difficult and complex to exert and unify our efforts in a renewed Arab revolutionary movement which has been freed from its crisis. It is a task requiring time. At the same time, we realize that some of the attempts to rise to the great tasks which are being made on the ground day-to-day, as well as the acceptance these attempts are meeting with all throughout the Arab nation, call upon us to believe that the struggle, despite all its forms and directions, remains in its essence a struggle between classes. It will break out in each country in accordance with its circumstances, the level of development of political and class consciousness there, economic, social and political conditions, the maturity of the crisis, and the extent to which it has come to a head. This struggle will sweep along in its path all the forces and necessarily create forces which are qualified to lead the revolution in the right direction. This leadership can come from within the extant forces, if they have the necessary prerequisites, or from outside them. The model which we are offering for such a case is not the only one. We are proud to see it taking place in Lebanon in the form of the Lebanese national opposition to the Israeli occupation. This opposition was set up in imitation of the struggle against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. It was established on the basis of a persistent revolutionary program which the basic revolutionary forces within the national movement have stuck with during all the phases of the struggle, despite their great difficulties and complex circumstances, not to mention the shortcomings and errors which have impeded the progress of these forces at various times, for which they have courageously assumed responsibility and borne the consequences without reservation.

We offer this program in this context merely as an example. We are satisfied to point it out in the hope that the thoughts and observations which we have offered in this article will contribute to clarifying it and to clarifying the intellectual and political foundations on which it rests.



INDUSTRY'S PROBLEMS, ELIMINATION OF FUEL SUBSIDIES DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 7 Dec 83 p 6

[Interview with George Afram, minister of industry and oil, by "Isam al-Jurdi and 'Ali Yusuf; "Thirty-two Special Tasks to Deal with Industry's Problems; Arab Industry Complements Lebanese Industry; Political System Is Plantation That Must Be Changed; Administration Has Not Been Given Opportunity to Make Change; It Is Necessary to Lift Subsidy for Fuels in Order to Avoid Deficit and Save 1 Billion Lebanese Pounds Annually"]

[Text] George Afram, the minister of industry and oil, stated that the ministry is in the process of studying and implementing 32 special tasks for Lebanese industry in order that this industry may be able to deal with the problems it is facing. The minister also stated that more than one work team has been formed in cooperation with the customs authorities and other departments to discuss the customs tariff and to require an advance permit for the importation of a number of commodities.

The minister of industry and oil has expressed the hope that the merchants will understand industry's problems, promising that the advance permit measure will be for a set period.

Afram expressed the belief that the existing "industrial ghetto" has been the result of an ignorant mentality and that the civil planning [authority] is the party responsible mainly for this ghetto. The minister of industry and oil has not spared the political system, describing it as "a plantation but rather plantations with their leaders" but then adding that "the new administration has not been able to make changes because of the regional and international conditions and forces that have shaken the trust of the Lebanese."

The minister expressed the belief that setting up plants in some Arab countries complements Lebanese industry, noting positively the outcome of the emigration of the Lebanese to the Gulf countries while noting negatively their emigration to America, Europe and other areas.

The minister of industry and oil did not deny that the ministry plans to lift the subsidy for fuels "which will result by the end of the current year in a 2.5-billion-pound deficit" and to notify the fuel price structure, including the commissions of the distribution companies, or the plan to enlarge and develop the Tripoli refinery.

AL-SAFIR hosted Minister Afram at its offices and has conducted with him the following interview on industry and oil affairs and concerns, which left no time to deal with communications and telephone concerns, since Afram is also the minister concerned with these affairs.

Text of Interview:

#### Varying Industrial Problems

Question Industry's problems are numerous and well known. But some people exaggerate these problems, also for well-known reasons, to the extent where sight is lost of the existing problem. How do we sum up the industrial situation?

Answer The security problem is very big. For example, the biggest industrial complex, located in al-Shuwayfat-Kfar Shima area, is idle. There is also the situation in the north and in other industrial areas. It is, moreover, practically impossible for the industrialist and the worker to go to the plant.

There is, of course, a difference in the difficulties experienced by the various industrial sectors. But what draws attention is the emergence of a third generation of industrialists who have actually entered the arena and who are distinguished by their experience and flexibility.

In the face of this situation, we have no alternative in the ministry but to adopt a plan, a part of which we have already implemented. At present, we are in the process of formulating a plan to implement in the ministry an industrial strategy based on the special circumstances--a strategy that defines the required tasks in the industrial sectors as well as defines the means of implementation.

Question What part of the plan has been implemented so far?

Answer The ministry has been able to implement the following:

- Approval of the allocation of 200 million pounds in accordance with Legislative Decree No 131. Those harmed directly or indirectly have actually benefited from the allocation.
- an agreement with the National Social Security Fund to break down into installments the debts owned by the industrialists, amounting to 300 million pounds, on soft terms.

Question But the fund's management said that industry's debts amounted to 98 million pounds.

Answer No, this is not correct. I believe that the fund's data are wrong, and the fund can be asked in this regard. In Lebanon, it is easy to give unfounded figures.



Question Has the fund conducted a study of the loans?

Answer I requested the study and I repeat that the figures are different from what the study says. (The minister added)

- The legislative decree concerning modernization of industrial machinery, valued at 350 million pounds. Industry has begun to benefit from this decree.
- The legislative decree to assist industrialists in moving their plants from the cities to the villages.
- The legislative decree providing for exemption of the first plant built in a village from income taxes for 6 years.
- The government's approval of an urgent law to encourage the spread of plants in the various Lebanese areas.

Question Without regard to the industrial classification of the areas?

Answer We will keep the classification but will not restrict the construction of plants to classified zones.

(The minister went on)

- The legislative decree concerning the National Development and Reconstruction Bank, which will play an important role in development.

The National Board for External Economic Relations: There is sensitivity toward this establishment which, as an establishment, is very essential in the free Lebanese system. We must free ourselves of preconceived ideas. The board will play a major role in developing Lebanese exports and improving the chronic deficit in the trade balance.

If we evaluate our efforts over the year, it becomes evident that these plans form a complete program for implementing the clear industrial policy based on the policy adopted by the government in the cabinet statement, especially in terms of encouraging industry and developing the provinces.

#### Thirty-two Special Tasks

Question The measures you have mentioned are necessary for industry even under ordinary circumstances. But what have you done for the special circumstances?

Answer It is true that special measures mean immediate results. But we must not stop working because we suffer from an off-hand and reactive mentality instead of working with a future vision. It is natural for the harvest to be comparable with the seed sown. At present, there are 32 tasks of a special nature with which we are dealing and which the ministry has defined according to the industrialists' problems. We have enlisted for this purpose the help of a sectoral working team to assist the ministry in accelerating implementation. For example, there is a committee to follow up on the issue

of industrial exports to Egypt and Iraq and there is another committee for the textile industry's problems. As a result of this committee's work, the Council of Ministers has adopted the decision to cancel the army's and internal security forces' imports of foreign goods and to confine their purchases of this kind of goods to national industry. Article 52 of the customs law has also been amended to protect the industry. A work team has been formed with the customs office to take quick steps in this regard because there are problems that have been pending for 10 years.

We have also adopted a special measure, despite its sensitivity to exempt the industrialists from clearance by the National Social Security Fund. The ministry is now drafting a bill to require an advance permit for a number of imported goods, and we are making efforts to accelerate implementation of the market flooding law.

Pupil of Eye

Question Don't you think that your measure regarding freezing of the clearance is likely to have a negative impact on the position of the National Social Security Fund, especially since the clearance law came into existence to insure payment of the subscriptions payable by the businessmen for the insured workers? Moreover, the measure is illegal because it suspends a valid law.

Answer We must protect the Social Security Fund as we protect the pupil of the eye in order to safeguard the interest of industry and of the working class. I must point out here that the memorandum concerning suspension of the clearance requirement has confined the suspension to the procedures concerning approval of the export licenses because of the security conditions and of the inability of the fund to issue the clearance with the required speed that insures that the exporters' activities are not obstructed.

I want to stress here that the official in charge must not exclude application of the law and must act with freedom, but in a manner that guarantees the best application of the law.

Question It is well known that the merchants oppose a large number of the measures you have mentioned, especially the measures concerning customs protection and the flooding law. How will you deal with this?

Answer We understand the merchants' demands, and they must understand industry's problems also. Our measures are for a set period of time, they are not permanent.

Arab Markets Are Complementary

Question Considerable industrial expansion occurred in the years preceding the civil war in Lebanon in 1975. In your opinion, was this expansion programmed according to the actual needs of Lebanon and according to the capacity of the importing markets to absorb Lebanese products or did the expansion lack guidance in this regard? Moreover, would Lebanese industry's

current problems have developed had it not been for the events or were some industries sick to start with? How do you view the industries that have emerged in some Arab countries and that are similar to Lebanese industries?

Answer I don't believe that Lebanese industry includes sick industries. There are some industrial establishments that must reconsider the commodity they produce in order to turn it into a commodity that is in stronger demand in the internal and export markets. Here, we must take into consideration the nature of production in Lebanon. The Lebanese factory depends most often on the local market and then on exportations. What is required in the future is to set up industries that rely on the export markets, with their total sales prepared for external consumption. These are industries with advanced technology.

As for the emergence in the Arab countries of industries similar to ours and the competition these industries pose, this is an undeniable fact. It is natural for such a thing to happen. The industrialist must always be prepared for this and must diversify his markets. Here you can see the importance of setting up the Foreign Economic Relations Board to open new markets for Lebanese products in Europe, the socialist countries, Africa and America, making use in this respect of the chronic deficit in the trade balance with the countries with which we deal.

The emergence of industries in the Arab markets is a positive element for Lebanese industry when we realize that these industries need expertise on the one hand and can create new demand for semi-processed goods and other new goods that Lebanese industry can try to supply on the other hand.

I am convinced that industrial development in the Arab countries not only complements Lebanese industry but can also act as a guide for expanding the market. Most often, this development does not eliminate importation from abroad, especially the importation of goods that we can produce at a low cost.

The future of Lebanese industry is prosperous and boundless. It will be difficult to limit this prosperity when the country regains its security and stability because the immunity that the Lebanese has gained in dealing with crisis conditions has made him exert ceaseless efforts to reduce the costs of his production and has strengthened in him the spirit of adventure, of creative thinking and of moving away from the customary approach which often develops in the stable societies.

Question Lebanon may have reaped big benefits from the Lebanese working abroad. However, it is noticed that there will be a very big problem in securing the needed technical skills. Moreover, there are tens of thousands of unemployed workers. How will you deal with these two problems, and what is the fate of vocational training programs?

Answer One of the challenges we have been facing, even before the events, is the manpower drain in Lebanon because we had not planned to provide work opportunities to the Lebanese. It is fortunate that businesses have prospered in the Gulf, which has attracted most of the emigrant Lebanese. But

the catastrophe lies in those who have emigrated and still emigrate to America, Europe and other parts of the world,

If we did not have emigration, the unemployment rate would have reached under the current circumstances dimensions that would threaten Lebanese society. There is no doubt that what has helped obviate the emigration of skilled manpower is the fact that the Lebanese is capable of learning any industrial job in a short time. There are training institutes in Lebanon, and the credit for these institutes goes to what the state did in the 1960's under the administration of late President Fu'ad Shihab. But the productivity of these institutes has been affected by the events. However, they will meet the needs of the expected growth of Lebanese industry.

#### "Industrial Ghetto" and Ignorance

Question The political, economic and social causes and the background of the industrial concentration that has encircled Beirut and which you call the "industrial ghetto" have become well known. But you have a different viewpoint on this issue which you have reiterated on more than one occasion. How do you view this issue?

Answer The "industrial ghetto" is an indication of the ignorant mentality with which we operated. There is no doubt that the civil planning authority is primarily responsible for the emergence of the "industrial ghetto" because the civil planning authorities continued to watch as spectators the emergence of four main industrial concentrations in which plants were built with total disregard for the national interest and without any concern for the appearance of the industrial installation and for the tourism and development conditions.

Consequently, we have seen the emergence of industrial zones on al-Shuwayfat plain, which is a natural extension of Beirut; in al-Mukallas area, which is an extension of al-Ashrafiyah area; and in Nahr al-Kalb area, which contains antiquities dating back 6,000 years.

We were not content with this but even permitted the emergence of first-class industries in these areas without establishing any deterrent to control the equipment and the technical specifications employed by industrialists to eliminate environmental pollution and to avoid pitfalls that may harm the neighboring area.

As a result of this faulty policy, 75 percent of Lebanon's industry has been located within those areas. It seems that the motive for this is the mentality of cornering the market and of monopolization, and the goal is real estate exploitation, since investments in the industrial zones amount to 170 percent as published.

#### Amending Law

Question It is well known that the change in the demographic structure in recent years as a result of the events has had a negative impact on the

productivity of industry, especially since workers have stopped going to the plants in some areas for one reason or another. This would not have happened had....

Answer (Interrupting) Sir, Lebanon's problems are certainly not sectarian but developmental. What is important is not that Beirut lives and the provinces die. Our state is not just a plantation but rather plantations and chiefs. The political system must be modified. The responsibility does not fall on Christianity or on Islam. The existing mentality is a Turko-French mixture.

The truth is that the new administration has been saddled with the political problems and has not been given the opportunity by the regional and international circumstances and forces to make changes. Trust has been shaken, and the Mount Lebanon war has had its grave consequences for Lebanese unity. Trust must be restored because the plot will come to an end when the Lebanese restores his trust in the common interest and in the necessity for coexistence in a single homeland strengthened against the factors affecting it negatively.

#### Economic Relations Board

Question Despite its importance as an establishment, the National Board for Foreign Economic Relations has its major problems with some official ministries and establishments, in addition to its appointments and its relations with the industrialists and the farmers. How will you solve these problems?

Answer Building institutions is a continuous process that takes a long time. There is no doubt that the idea of setting up the National Board for Foreign Economic Relations has filled a big void. This board is the equivalent of the ministries of foreign trade in other countries.

Question But there is a Ministry of Economy and Commerce. When the legislative decree setting up the National Board for Foreign Economic Relations was issued, it was not preceded by or coupled with legislation empowering the board to take away jurisdiction from other establishments or ministries which have also been operating for decades in accordance with valid laws and regulations.

Answer The idea of setting up the National Board for Foreign Economic Relations is a sound idea, and we must draw up the frameworks for coordination between this board and the ministries on the one hand and between it and the government on the other. If this sound idea is not coupled with the foundation of a sound establishment, we will have foiled it, and this is more serious than not setting up the board.

We must build a sound institution. The idea of coordination must be organized and strengthened at the start of the work. We must not permit ourselves to procrastinate in building an institution "compatible" with the board's role, especially in the wake of what we have suffered in Lebanon.

## We Anticipated Fuel Crisis

Question It seems difficult to secure fuel nowadays as a result of the extensive damage suffered by the oil installations in Tripoli and because of the oppressive measures of the Israeli occupation of the south which delay, and at times obstruct, the delivery of fuel from al-Zahrani refinery. What precautions have you taken to supply the market?

Answer The positive results we have achieved, despite the destruction suffered by the Tripoli refinery and the surprise sprung on us when the movement of truck tankers from the south was prevented, reflect the soundness of the decision we adopted 3 months ago in anticipation of these eventualities--a decision which called for increasing the storage capacity in al-Dawrah tanks and which we adopted because of the importance of securing fuel for the consumer and because of the negative effects that a fuel crisis would have on the national economy, which is already straining under its problems.

We have succeeded in overcoming the crisis, thanks to the efforts of the Central Directorate of Oil, headed by the general director, who has worked enthusiastically to perform his duty. I would like to note the efforts of 22 workers in the Tripoli guard and firefighting outfits who risked their lives and were able to confine the flames to prevent their consuming all the refining equipment and machinery. The workers did this in cooperation with the Tripoli civil defense and firefighting department. Thus, the refinery losses have been confined to 600 million pounds.

In any case, we expect to encounter no oil problem by virtue of the program we have drawn up. Moreover, there is a plan to enlarge the Tripoli refinery after carrying out the repair work so that its production may increase.

## Studying Prices and Lifting Subsidy

Question You are preparing a bill to modify the price structure and to lift the subsidy finally, keeping in mind that the estimates indicate that the current price of benzine is equal to or a little less than the cost of crude oil and of refining, considering that the price of crude oil has been reduced from \$34 to \$29 per barrel and that the price of a jerry can of benzine has been raised from 22 pounds to 30 pounds. Have you taken into consideration the question of dealing with the social burdens that will result from a decision to eliminate the subsidy, and will the modification also include the commissions of the distribution companies?

Answer We are studying the question of the companies' commissions. We hope that the decision will be fair and will serve the interest of society and that it will be built on what is right and realistic. As for the prices, we deceive the citizen when we let him believe that this policy of subsidies is in his interest. The subsidy advanced--a subsidy which will result by the end of 1983 in a deficit of 2.5 billion pounds to the treasury--is at the expense of the Lebanese pound, i.e., at the expense of the purchasing power of the wages. There is the problem of a farce, with which we must acquaint the people frankly, so that they may participate in upholding their national responsibilities and in protecting the Lebanese pound out of concern for the toiling classes, since we are a country that imports extensively.

## Why Deficit?

Question Is the deficit you have noted the result of the benzine subsidy? There is the fuel oil subsidy advanced to the cement and electricity companies and the heavy-oil subsidy advanced to Lebanese ships. There is, moreover, the wasted productivity in the two refineries, especially in the Tripoli refinery where the cracker unit was kept intentionally idle so as to reduce the quantities of benzine produced and to increase the production of fuel oil and other heavy products.

Answer I am for saving a sum of no less than 1 billion pounds to finance the construction of roads, bridges and public transportation.

The problem is not a problem of the price of fuels but one of old vehicles, unfit roads and traffic jams.

I don't want just to abolish the fuel subsidy but also want to insure profits that reduce the oil bill and maintain the purchasing power of the Lebanese pound. The best way to do this is to channel the consumption process toward the use of new and small cars that reduce fuel consumption and toward insuring regular traffic and good roads that reduce the consumption of fuel and of spare parts.

8494

CSO: 4404/227.



PRESS SYNDICATE CONDEMNS RECENT LAW

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 16 Dec 83 p 3

[Article: "The General Assembly of the Press Syndicate: Cancel Decrees 1 and 121 and Reform Decree 104. The Freedom of the Press is Essential for Sound Dialogue and Democracy"]

[Text] The general assembly of the Press Syndicate has called for decrees 1 and 121 to be cancelled and decree 104 to be reformed, while emphasizing the idea that the freedom of the press is a basic precondition for a sound national dialogue and the application of the democratic system.

The general assembly of the Lebanese Press Syndicate (the political section) held its usual annual session at 11 am yesterday. After Chairman Muhammad al-Ba'labakki had opened the session with a comprehensive speech, the general assembly listened to a general report read by the secretary of the union, Mr Basim al-Saba'. It dealt with the union's activities last year. The assembly also listened to the financial report.

The Report by the Secretary of the Union

In his report, Comrade al-Saba' dealt with the difficulties which have confronted the work of the union's council because of the dangers facing the country, "which have taken from us a chairman and dozens of martyrs and institutions, but have not been able to keep the union from representing the intellectual, political and cultural forces in Lebanon and acting as the conscience of our people, who are searching for a way out of their difficult crisis."

He made mention of the reverses Lebanon had experienced on the political and security levels, noting that the journalist's trade in particular has been exposed to grave dangers on the material and spiritual levels.

He mentioned the media reversal with which the newspapers had been confronted as a result of the security situation, as well as the pressures to which the press sector was exposed in such circumstances and the threats and warnings media institutions were receiving.

Then he enumerated some matters related to the profession which the union council was able to deal with and dispatch. He focused on decree number 1, which imposes prior government censorship on newspapers. He expressed the view that the decision to apply this decree once again "was a dangerous indicator of the kind of designs being made on the Lebanese press."

He said, "The union council has tried to limit the role of censorship in a way that would provide for a certain responsible limit being set for the practice of press and political freedoms. The council's position, based on principle, is still that this decree must be canceled. This is especially true because it was accompanied by two similar decrees, decree 104 and decree 121. They call for monitoring newspaper revenues and fixing the number of political publications."

At this point, he noted the union council's demand for modern, contemporary, integrated legislation to regulate the affairs of the Lebanese press and its relationship with the concerned authorities. He also mentioned the political activities which the union council undertook as the representative of a national sector which brings together the country's cultural and doctrinal currents. Finally, he announced that the union council would take action with regard to the press building and the construction of its prefabricated floors.

#### The Decisions

After the discussion, in which a number of colleagues took part, the general assembly unanimously made the following decisions:

1. It decided to support the steps taken by the union council, led by Chairman al-Ba'labakki, in keeping with the responsibilities of the press and the active role it plays in the life of the nation. The assembly did this in order to make all Lebanese factions aware of their historic responsibilities and to support the course of the national dialogue which was launched by the Geneva conference. It was also done in cognizance of the need to make progress in this dialogue, which is the only way to achieve Lebanese reconciliation, reinforce the internal front, and mobilize all of Lebanon's energies in order to achieve that national unity which is the best weapon the Lebanese have in their struggle to liberate Lebanon, re-establish its independence, return to it control over all its territory, and allow it to return to playing its positive, constructive role in the Arab world and to serving the Arab world's causes. In this way, Lebanon can also play its role on the general level of humanity. The general assembly affirmed that this responsibility belongs to all Lebanese, especially Lebanon's political leaders, whether they are inside the government or outside it. It affirmed that under no circumstances should the positive achievements realized at the Geneva conference be abandoned. Rather, it said that they ought to be used, under the leadership of the chief of state, as the basis for a renewed attempt to attain the desired goal, thereby realizing the aspirations and hopes of the Lebanese for the attainment of national reconciliation on the soundest of foundations. The general assembly expressed great respect for every internal effort by the government or by extra-governmental actors, as well as for all the Arab and international efforts which have been and are still being exerted in order to support the progress of Lebanon's liberation and salvation.

The general assembly gave the union council the task of continuing its action on the national level in order to achieve these goals.

2. The assembly decided to support the union council's positions as embodied in its continuing call to preserve human beings and their basic rights in the current conflict. This must be done with respect for human freedom, dignity, and safety, and with respect for the sacred human right to be free from fear, sectarian divisiveness and the psychological consequences which ruin life. The general assembly was not satisfied to condemn the deviant practices from whose evils all Lebanese still suffer and the least results of which are killing, destruction, kidnapping, demolition, explosions, and discord, not to mention intellectual terrorism, the threat to freedom of opinion and belief, and aggression against various kinds of houses of worship. Rather, it urged that all necessary steps be taken to eradicate all these evils, impose the harshest punishments on those who commit them, and save human life. In this way, the modicum of security, order and freedom needed by civilized society may be provided.

The general assembly warned in particular against any attempts by any agencies whatsoever to inflict harm on the institutions of the press and journalists, who have dedicated themselves to freedom and the defense of the country and all the citizens without distinction. It warned also of the consequences of such action for anyone who allowed himself to be seduced into committing it, noting that the least of these consequences would be public exposure and legal prosecution.

3. The assembly decided to adopt everything contained in the recent statement issued by the council of the Press Syndicate concerning the resumed application of legislative decree number 1, which provides for the imposition of prior censorship on the newspapers. It also adopted the language voicing opposition to legislative decree 121, as well as the renewed demand for the cancellation of these two decrees and the reform of decree 104. Wishing to record for the Lebanese press the way in which it rises to the level of national responsibility under all circumstances, especially the current, exceptional ones, the assembly affirmed its genuine commitment to the principle of freedom of the press. It considers this responsible freedom to be one of the preconditions for a sound national dialogue and for the application of the democratic system. The general assembly also believes that through its commitment to the principle of self-censorship, it has given clear proof that it best exemplifies the willingness to make any sacrifice which could possibly further the salvation of Lebanon. Though the assembly does not see itself as thereby giving any gift to the country, it does hope that all those responsible for the fate of the country will follow its example by competing to make sacrifices for the sake of the country. The assembly urgently demanded a quick return to the principle of self-censorship, the value of which has been demonstrated by experience. Moreover, self-censorship has shown that it is the method which offers the best assurance of freedom, gives journalism the greatest dignity, and is most worthy of all the values which Lebanon represents.

Moreover, the assembly demanded that the law be applied in order to stop illegal publications and broadcasts, particularly in the areas which are under the authority of the state.

4. The assembly affirmed the need to reform Lebanese legislation dealing with the press, saying it should be reformed in a way consistent with the development of the press, the requirements of keeping pace with the times, and the principles of democratic activity within the framework of public responsibility and the higher interests of the country. The assembly said this reform could be accomplished by issuing a new, comprehensive, modern, and integrated law to take the place of the various previous laws and the recent decrees. Such a law would meet the unionist, spiritual and material needs of the Lebanese press, while agreeing with its mission. It would also be consistent with Lebanon's cultural level and aspirations for a better future. The general assembly called on the competent authorities to draw up this law in cooperation with the press as quickly as possible, thereby removing all the distortion which can be produced by dealing with the press's affairs and concerns in a trivial manner and establishing the press's relationship to the authorities and its rights and duties on the soundest and clearest legal foundations capable of assuring every aspect of the public interest.

The assembly affirmed the press's other professional demands, as well as the necessity for the state to comply with them, especially in the area of developing the legitimate resources of newspapers, so that they can become self-sufficient in a just manner.

The assembly found it had to make others aware of the material difficulties from which the press sector is suffering. These hardships have come to threaten the Lebanese press and the continued performance of its mission in the public life of the country. The assembly also found it necessary to point out the claims the press can consequently make on society and the state, noting that we must honor these claims as quickly as possible. The assembly once again gave the chairman and the union council the task of striving with all due speed to convince the competent authorities to honor the demands of the press, which have so far not met with interest on the part of the state. This must be done to eliminate positions the press thinks ought not to have been adopted.

6. The assembly said it was necessary to strive to construct Press Square and set up a monument to the martyrs on the spot where the dear, late chairman of the Press Syndicate, Mr Riyad Taha, fell as a martyr for freedom.

7. The assembly expressed its admiration of the efforts exerted by the board of directors of the Journalistic Newspaper Owners and Journalists Insurance Fund in assuring up until now that health care payments are made to the colleagues. These payments have amounted to almost 4 million Lebanese pounds. The assembly also gave the board of directors and the union council the task of introducing the reforms which experience has proved to be necessary in the insurance law, thereby plugging some holes and letting the fund see to its other duties, as soon as its material resources allow it to do so.

8. After studying the summary of the engineering reports on the resumption of work on the syndicate building, the general assembly decided to give the chairman and the union council the task of working to assure that the floors built so far are completed.

9. It decided to amend syndicate fees in the following fashion:

- a. The fee for transferring the ownership of a non-political publication's license was raised to 20,000 Lebanese pounds.
- b. The fee for transferring the ownership of a political publication's license was raised to 50,000 Lebanese pounds.
- c. The fee for changing the name of a non-political publication was raised to 5,000 pounds.
- d. The fee for changing languages or adding a new language in both political and non-political publications was raised to 4,000 Lebanese pounds.
- e. A set fee of 25,000 Lebanese pounds was imposed on utilizing the license of a political publication, while a similar fee of 10,000 Lebanese pounds was imposed on utilizing the licenses of non-political publications and news agencies.

At the close of the session, the general assembly thanked Chairman al-Ba'labakki and the members of the union council for their efforts. The financial statement for the past year was read aloud. The general assembly approved it unanimously.

#### "The Non-Political Section"

After that, the non-political section of the general assembly met and studied the annual activities report and the financial statement. It approved both and unanimously adopted the decisions made earlier by the general assembly at the meeting of the political section.

12224

CSO: 4404/223

PUBLICATION, CONSUMPTION OF BOOKS IN OCCUPIED AREAS ANALYZED

Jerusalem AL-'AWDAH in Arabic No 28, 26 Nov 83 pp 18-21

/Article by Ibrahim Du'aybis: "Cultural Movement in Occupied Territories: Do People Read and What Do They Read?"

/Excerpt/ Tell me what you read and I will tell you who you are. This was the customary speculation. But today we ask a different question: Do people read or not? After learning the answer, we can ask: What do people read?

General Observations

Books in the West Bank are divided into two kinds: books printed or written in the Bank and imported books written or translated abroad.

In the West Bank, there has been an active cultural movement rarely paralleled in the Arab countries. More than one research work or book published here has been republished in more than one part of the Arab world. This fact has its significance.

Moreover, many of the books available in the West Bank are not available in numerous Arab countries, and many intellectuals in this Arab world, which is submerged behind a veneer of culture and in videos and 26-inch color televisions, have not even heard of these books. On the other hand, the Israeli authorities are waging a relentless war against books and culture. The discussion about the distinctive cultural activity in the occupied areas could have reached many times its present dimensions if it were not for this war against culture and books. No accurate figures are available on the number of books banned in the West Bank by the military administration because the banning process is continuous. But the estimates put the figure at 3,000 books.

Book distributors and bookshop owners are subjected to numerous acts of harassment, including closure /of business/ for a long time, confiscation of assets and fines levied on the bookshop owner or distributor, thus subjecting them to unbearable losses and to needless harassment. This situation has finally prompted a number of bookshop owners to stop selling both permitted and banned books, especially since nobody knows for sure what books are banned and what books are not. Such knowledge is gained "after the fact."

It must also be noted that the psychological situation in the occupied areas affects the reading and cultural process. The Palestinian man who is preoccupied with the endless "stakes" of the occupation is less prepared to read. A man who sees his land confiscated finds reading to be an unnecessary "luxury." The Palestinian man who is drowned in the search for a source of livelihood for his children and family may not be as ready for reading and culture as when he lives under ordinary and less tense circumstances and developments.

There is an observation concerning authors and the book distribution process. Every local author encounters difficulty in publishing his books because the costs are high and the returns uncertain. Frequently, the author pays the costs of printing his book. When the printing is completed and the money needed for the purpose "secured," there follows the more painful distribution process. The author assumes that his book will reach the largest number of readers, and this requires distributors.

In the process of selling the book in Israeli currency and paying the author or the publisher, the money loses one half its value and the material yield turns out to be meager and negligible. Moreover, the distribution network in the West Bank is small and is managed mostly by unqualified people who deal with books the way they deal with tomatoes and cabbages.

In more than one case, the author has been compelled to distribute his book personally or to confine the distribution to one or two centers so as to avoid the hardship of distribution and of collecting the price of his book after long suffering and doubt, and only at half the value.

It is worth noting that the West Bank witnesses the annual holding of book fairs and shows. These are important occasions for the sale of books and for advertising reading and culture. Despite the negative aspects engulfing such fairs at times and despite the primness of those who supervise them, these fairs continue to be an important point that must be encouraged.

While speaking of reading and culture, we must note posters and paintings, almost all of which are directly or indirectly political. Many paintings have turned into posters that are in demand in the occupied territories, in the Arab world and in the Eastern and Western worlds. These posters have contributed to entrenching (sharply defined) national concepts and broad national and humanitarian concepts. Among the prominent creative artists in this sphere are Sulayman Mansur and Kamil al-Mughanni in particular. Even though we are not discussing the expressionist arts in this place, we have to mention the role of "political art" in the issue of enlightenment and education.

#### Publishing Houses and Distributors

Several publishing houses have emerged in the West Bank. But most of them published one or two books and then went out of business. Others have published a number of "guaranteed books" from which they expected no material loss but rather certain profit. A smaller number of these publishing houses have established themselves in the cultural field and have continued to publish, with the total number of books they have published ranging from 50 to 100. The most prominent publishing houses in the West Bank include the Abu 'Arafah Agency,



owned by Jamil Abu 'Arafah; the Arab Studies Association, headed by Faysal al-Husayni, who is the son of martyr 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni; and the leftist Salah-al-Din Establishment. The Ibn Rushd Publishing House has specialized in printing artistic posters of various shapes and sizes.

Most of the publishing houses not only lack coordination among themselves, but some of them have engaged in dishonest competition with the others, especially insofar as books imported from abroad and reprinted here in the occupied territories by the offset process are concerned.

In the face of this situation, a large number of publishers called for forming the publishers and distributors union on 21 April 1983. The union has actually been formed and now includes 22 publishers and distributors as members.

The distributors have joined the publishers because of the importance of the distributors' role and because their work is inseparable from that of the publishers.

#### Public and Private Libraries

Public libraries in the West Bank are few and are mostly confined to the municipal libraries. Private libraries are relatively few. Excluding a few who own large libraries, the other private libraries are modest in terms of the number and type of books. Children's libraries are even fewer. Whereas any student spends 100 shekels daily on food, candies and soft drinks, we find that the parents are not concerned with getting their children accustomed to buying books, beginning private libraries and developing the habit of reading.

School libraries are somewhat available, but insufficient in number. However, the students make limited use of them because the "library hour" is still considered a free hour or an hour to be wasted or for which getting a "grade" and going to the library are still viewed as something dispensable.

The shortage of public libraries on the one hand and the absence of cultural awareness or of a model on the other hand causes the reading process to be confined within relatively narrow limits in comparison to what we desire the situation to be.

#### Do People Read?

Upon asking a number of publishers and distributors and visiting some public libraries, the answers varied. The publishers assert that the "market has been sluggish" in recent years whereas the reading market was prosperous in the 1970's. Jamil Abu 'Arafah said that Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's book "The Path to the Ramadan War" sold 14,000 copies and was reprinted 3 times after the 1973 war, that 'Abd-al-Nasir's book "The Revolution" sold nearly 12,000 copies immediately after 'Abd-al-Nasir's death and that Fu'ad Matar's interview with Haykal, published in a book entitled "Frankly Speaking About 'Abd-al-Nasir," sold 6,000 copies. Abu 'Arafah added that the book "Layla Khalid and the September War" has been reprinted five times, the first time in 1972 and the fifth in 1983.

Other books making record sales include Salah Khalaf's--alias Abu Iyad--book "Palestinian without Identity," which has been reprinted three times. Martyr Ghassan Kanafani remains a phenomenon. All his books are in demand. The best known of his books is the "1936 Revolution," which has been reprinted repeatedly. This is in addition to Kanafani's other stories, research pieces and novels, each of which sold several thousand copies.

The situation is different today. No publisher prints more than 1,000 copies of a book. If all these copies are sold, the publisher is then sure to regain what he has paid. At the Jerusalem Municipal Library, Ghalib Abu al-Hajj, the official in charge of the library, asserted that there is a good demand for serious reading, and supported his opinion with figures.

Ghalib Abu al-Hajj said that the number of subscribers to the library's main branch on al-Zahra' Street amounted to 14,033 subscribers and that of subscribers to the library's other branches amounted to nearly 10,000. This brings the total number to more than 24,000 subscribers. While talking, Abu al-Hajj produced the membership card of a new subscriber to confirm what he was saying. The number on the card read 14,033.

These subscribers include nearly 4,500 members not exceeding 13 years of age. The ages of the other subscribers range from 15 to 25 years. Abu al-Hajj further said that last October alone, the subscribers took out nearly 2,500 books and that nearly 5,000 persons entered the library to read books in the same month. He is satisfied with the number of readers and subscribers, even though he asserted that the fact that the library is controlled by the municipality lessens the demand for it somewhat.

At the British Cultural Center in Jerusalem, we interviewed Mr al-Sahhar, the center director, who told us that there are nearly 1,000 Arab subscribers to the center. Al-Sahhar also complained of the Arab subscriber's slowness in reading, returning and changing the books.

The main complaint was against the intellectuals. Al-Sahhar said that there is no demand for specialized books, citing as an example medical books. Explaining what he wanted to convey, al-Sahhar said:

"We have been careful to acquire the latest publications on medicine and modern medical research and we have been removing what is no longer acceptable. To put it briefly, we were trying to raise the center's medical section to the most advanced and highest level. But no Arab doctors borrowed any books or frequented the center to read. Consequently, we were compelled to cancel the section altogether, and we presented the books we had as a gift to the Doctors Union in the Gaza Strip."

Upon asking an Arab doctor about his opinion on this situation, he said that al-Maqasid Hospital, where he works, has a library rich with the latest accomplishments in the field of medicine and that this library eliminates the need for any other sources.

Nuh Da'na, a distributor of newspapers and books, said that there is a demand for reading and that this demand depends primarily on the type of book and the name of the author. He does not believe that the cost of books is an obstacle to its distribution because the price of an Arab book ranges from 80 to 300 shekels, which is not a large sum. Citing an example, he says that explicit sex magazines range in price from 250 to 750 shekels and that many buy them despite these prices. Nuh Da'na added that if one were to sell sex magazines exclusively, he would make many times the profit he makes from newspapers and other books. He believes that the sales are seasonal, adding that the sales have dropped recently with the approach of winter.

Most of those we interviewed believe that the spread of television and videos has affected readership greatly and has stolen people's time and days without their being aware of the theft, especially since the television programs are varied. The number video sale shops is increasing at a rate exceeding by many times the rate at which bookshops are increasing. This is an issue that requires a separate pause. The "cultural cassettes" must also be noted, considering that the cassettes of Muzaffar al-Nuwwab, Mahmud Darwish and others are selling in large numbers.

#### Who Reads?

It seems that most of the reading is confined to students and teachers in particular, whether in high schools, community colleges or universities. There are invaluable libraries at the universities, especially at Bi'r Zayt University. The community colleges and the enrollment of large number of youths in them have boosted the sale of books, with the purchases intended to form libraries either for these colleges that have been established without libraries and without any real planning or for the students themselves, who are required to have books and references connected with their studies.

However, there are numerous special cases. At the municipal library, I saw a simple-looking man borrow a book and depart. When we asked about him, Ghalib Abu al-Hajj said that he is an example of the serious reader. His name is Fayiz 'Uwaysat, and he is a worker in al-Sawahirah al-Gharbiyah. Last October, he borrowed five books. The latest book he borrowed is entitled "I Talk to You" by Najib Mahfuz.

There are also the young men and women who dropped out of school for various reasons and who have discovered lately the importance of learning and education. They have started to make up for what they lack by reading and borrowing from the libraries.

At the municipal library, there was a child with her relative. She was reading children's books. When we asked her name, she said that it is Rima Hallaq and that she visits the library every Thursday and has a private library of about 100 books, which befits her age.

## What Do They Read?

All those we interviewed or talked to agree that local literature has declined and tends to be unsalable, especially poetry, because the arena is crowded with names that do not rise to the desired level.

Mahmud Darwish and Nizar Qabbani, are gaining in sales.

The books in greater demand in the West Bank are political books, research books and books written on certain occasions. Books on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, for example, have been in big demand this year and last year. Kamilia Badr's book "A Glance at the Israeli Parties" has been printed twice, and so has the book "The Sea Canal" by engineer 'Abd-al-Rahman Abu 'Arafah. The most prominent political books are the books by 'Abd-al-Nasir and Layla Khalid and the "Ramadan War." Of the political books, those written by Palestinians are in strongest demand. These books include "Palestinian Political Thought" by Faysal Hawrani, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue" by Khalid al-Hasan and "The Political, Cultural and Economic Capabilities of the Palestinian People" by martyr Dr Na'im Khadr. It must also be noted that the book "Messages from the Center of the Blockade," which contains messages from leader Yasir 'Arafat to the leaders of the Arab and friendly countries during the historic blockade of Beirut last year, has been in big demand even though its distribution is limited. "The RPG," a children's book whose material was gathered by Khalil al-Sawahiri, and its introduction written by Khalil al-Wazir, alias Abu Jihad, has also been in demand even though it is distributed on a limited scale.

In comparison with the Arab world, the reading and cultural activity in the West Bank is prosperous. But compared to what we want, it is less than desired. Moreover, the activity is confined to a certain type of people. But there is a dire need to encourage reading among the youth by founding private and public libraries. Schools and learning institutes are especially required to get children accustomed to reading and to books.

8494

CSO: 4404/232

## ANOMALIES, CONTRIBUTIONS OF PRODUCTION INCENTIVE SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 28 Oct 83 p 5

[Article by Wasif Muhanna: "Positive and Negative Effects of the Application of the Production Incentive System in Economic Organizations and Companies"]

[Text] When Decree 1715 for 1977 was issued calling for the grant of production bonuses to workers in the productive sectors, it aimed at attaining many goals and solving many production and labor issues and problems.

We have the right, in particular, to consider the issuance of this decree the fruit of the struggle of the working class and its union organization, since its issuance came about as an embodiment of economic and production requirements to increase production, improve quality, reduce costs, raise labor output and strengthen the role of the public sector in leading the domestic economy and operating it in a modern practical manner.

The decree on production incentives was actually applied to the majority of public sector companies and organizations with the goal of realizing the achievements mentioned above. Has the decree on incentives really managed to achieve the aspirations and goals for which it came about, especially since the majority of the companies in our country, before it was issued, suffered from overall basic issues and problems which left their negative marks on the labor and production situation? Of these I might mention:

1. The failure to apply cost accounting.
2. The inability to use the available capacities in companies, in the form of means of production, and the palpably low productivity in these companies.
3. The failure to apply scientific methods for getting rid of production, marketing and financial problems, in order to reach the existing capacities in the companies.
4. The low income of people working in the public sector in comparison with the standard of living and the wages of private sector workers.

Let me repeat: Has the decree on production bonuses, in practical application, managed to achieve its goals? What obstacles have become conspicuous in the course of the application process?

To answer this sort of question in a scientific, accurate manner, it is necessary to return to the thorough study the Secretariat of Economic Affairs in the General Federation of Workers' Unions presented at the fourth session of the General Federation's Council. This study dealt in comprehensive fashion with the condition of our companies and organizations before the issuance of the decree, as well as the method of applying it and the positive and negative results of the application process.

The study reviews the goals of the decree on production bonuses, stressing that this decree, in substance, was made for the industrial production sector, but was put in general application among all organizations and companies of an economic character.

It spelled out the grant of production bonuses on the following bases:

Increased productivity.

Reduced costs in producers' units.

Preservation and improvement of the quality of products.

Lest the grant of incentives be subjected to the wishes of each company separately, and lest the success and application of the system depend on management's resources and ability to set out systems which would have an effective economic payout, the decree on productive bonuses assigned the Management and Productivity Development Center the task of carrying out the necessary studies for determining time standards and standard production, monitoring their development and recommending the performance level at which the granting of incentives would begin.

In this regard, the Economic Affairs Secretariat study stresses that a special committee has been formed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in accordance with the directive of the Office of the Prime Minister with the goal of monitoring the application of this system in the optimum manner. Its task will be to visit the bodies in which the system of production bonuses has been applied, in order to ascertain the extent to which the system has been properly applied, determine the results and the effects that have arisen from that, and consequently offer the necessary recommendations for improvement.

In fact, this committee has prepared a group of evaluation reports as a result of its field visits which contained the results it had reached concerning the economic and financial effects of the application of the production incentive system.

Following its study of these reports, the Economic Affairs Secretariat in the General Federation, out of a desire to provide more information, determined to distribute them to the federations of the governorates and the vocational federations to set out their recommendations, which would then proceed to be presented to the Office of the Prime Minister.

The Economic Affairs Secretariat reviewed the names of the companies the committee visited and the system of incentives in them. In all, these came to more than 26 firms.

What, however, are the results the committee has arrived at, in the light of its field excursions?

On this question, the study the Economic Affairs Secretariat presented to the General Federation council contained the positive and negative conclusions the incentive evaluation committee had reached. Among the statements on this subject:

The committee to evaluate production bonuses observed that there were numerous obstacles and difficulties among them:

1. The proliferation and diversification of products and differences in their sources of primary materials.
2. The occurrence of improvements in some production lines, such as replacement and renovation, or the obsolescence in some machinery, which called for a review of their performance rates.
3. The increased consumption or shortage of primary materials, according to the accounting system used in the various companies. One should bear in mind that a unified accounting system exists.
4. The improvement in skills of some workers as a result of an increase in their period working with the machine, or the deficiency in performance of some as a result of the turnover of manpower or the movement of production workers to other jobs in the company.
5. The fact that standards from one year to the next do not conform to the work days approved in the study of the criteria, which results in differences in production from one year to the next, and consequently differences in the level of performance from which the estimate begins.
6. The difficulty of determining the costs of the final product in its successive production stages, which ultimately results in imposing total costs on the producer, regardless of the stage or stages in which cost disruptions occur.
7. The failure fully to exploit available capacity, because of a shortage in the availability of primary materials or manpower turnover, which results in a rise in the producer's cost.

In addition, most companies do not function with the system of incentives in the desired manner, leaving that to time, although the rates of disbursement of production incentives are supposed to be studied constantly, in a quarterly manner at least, in accordance with approved bases, along with the effects of the negative and positive features of the incentive system and the evaluation of this system. Some company managements suffer from low average raises relative to others, and do not look at the cause of low production, which is directly connected to the incentives.



As regards the negative features of the application of the systems of production bonuses, the study by the Economic Affairs Secretariat of the General Federation has stressed that it appeared, from a study of the results of the application of the incentive systems in a number of economic companies and organizations, that a number of negative results manifested themselves, including:

1. The average production bonus for administrative workers in some companies exceeded the average production bonus for production workers. As an example, in the Oriental Food Products Company, the incentives the administrative workers get come to 610 Syrian pounds, while production workers get 118 Syrian pounds as bonuses on the monthly average, as a monthly average in the first quarter of 1983.

In the Syrian Biscuit and Chocolate Manufacturing Company, administrative workers get bonuses of 455 Syrian pounds and production workers 211 Syrian pounds, as a monthly average.

In the Modern Industries Company, administrative workers get 307 Syrian pounds and production workers 260 Syrian pounds. In the Paint and Chemical Manufactures Company, administrative workers get 853 Syrian pounds and production workers 613 Syrian pounds.

2. Some companies' failure to restrict themselves to standard production and the standard performance level.

3. Some companies' disbursement of production allowances to workers in spite of the failure to go beyond the performance level.

4. The lack of balance in working days in some companies during the year of application; these companies have not reduced the units of standard time periods.

5. No changes have occurred in the product quality level in most companies.

6. The manpower turnover, high costs of production, and low worker productivity have continued.

7. Some companies have not adhered to overtime hours.

As far as the positive aspects of the application of the incentive system go, the study asserted that the application of the incentive system has had numerous positive effects, which have helped improve the economic situation in economic organizations, companies and installations in the country, especially in terms of an unquestionable concern among workers to increase production and improve production quality.

There is a concern to appoint and increase manpower only in a carefully studied manner, in a fashion which will serve production, as well as to reduce holidays of all kinds, reduce maintenance days, preserve the readiness of machinery, reduce the period of lost time during work, reduce rates of waste and loss, control certain emergency shutdowns, and create attempts to get rid of bottlenecks in production and marketing areas.

It is to be observed that many companies have increased their production, while others have retained production quantities in spite of the obsolescence of some of their machines.

In general, one can say that the application of production incentive systems in the country's economic organizations, companies and installations has had a positive effect in increasing production and raising work performance in a tangible way.

Finally, in the light of this sort of fact, what can we say?

The General Federation of Workers' Unions is well aware that the system of production incentives arose to realize economic interests and the workers' interests together, and in fact concentrated efforts have been made by the union organization to obtain the greatest positive results during the application process, in spite of the many difficulties that have stood in the way of the execution of the incentives.

The sort of study which the Economic Affairs Secretariat of the General Federation has presented to the general council is only an affirmation of the union organization's interest in this subject, and all bodies concerned must seriously contribute to the process of transcending difficulties which have become prominent and mistakes which could have negative effects on the production and labor situation.

Facts of this sort which have been talked about and at the same time are the result of serious field studies by specialized committees and the union organization must be taken into account, and many measures and positions must be taken with regard to them.

11887

CSO: 4404/211

## VARIOUS IMPROVEMENTS IN RURAL LIVING CONDITIONS REVIEWED

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 31 Oct 83 p 4

[Article by Nadir Makanisi: "Housing in the Country's Rural Areas: Drinking Water Now Goes to 70 Percent of the Villages in the Countryside"]

[Text] Sources of potable water, especially surface and natural water which one need not work hard to reach, were the first centers around which villages in the country were established, in addition to locations where there were basic resources for making a living, such as farmland and pastures.

With the increase in the number of villages and human settlements, and the discovery of new ways for obtaining water, other villages started to appear which were not connected to springs and rivers, and rural settlements appeared which depended on advanced means for providing water from rivers, such as water wheels.

The shortage of water in the country led the population to concentrate about water sources and get as close to water as possible, as permitted by other conditions for the construction of housing. Therefore, housing accumulated around water sources in old villages in concentrated fashion.

Roughly half the population of the country lives in the rural areas, and the other half in the towns; the ratio of the population in the countryside to the total population was 52.1 percent in 1981, while in 1960 it was 61 percent. This is evidence of the migration of rural inhabitants to cities and the increase in the rate of urbanization of the population.

### Housing and Housing Problems in the Rural Areas

The form of rural housing, the primary materials of which it is built, and its general planning have a big influence on the general appearance of the countryside. The primary materials available for housing construction has a large effect on the general form of housing.

Dr Zafir Musawwah, director of the regional planning section of the Ministry of Housing, prepared a comprehensive study on rural housing, in the course of which he mentioned the following types of village housing:

#### Soil adobe housing:

This is widespread in the north of the country, from the north of Hums and al-Salmiyah to the Turkish border, from the west of the Idlib area to the Governorate of Dayr al-Zawr, and in some parts of the al-Jazirah, especially on the banks of the al-Khabur. In the construction of this type, soil is used in unmixed form or mixed with dry hay and straw. This is distinguished by the construction of domes, which are a distinctive feature of soil adobe housing.

#### Wooden adobe housing:

This is widespread where there is wood, especially in areas where poplars are grown, such as the Damascus plain, the valleys of the Euphrates and the al-Khabur, the al-Jazirah, Palmyra, Lower al-Qalamun and Idlib areas and 'Akkar. One of its features is horizontal roofs made of wood.

#### Wood-stone housing:

This type of housing is widespread in areas where stone for building is available, where walls are built of stone and roofs of wood. This can be found in hilly areas and plateaus, such as al-Qalamun, al-Zibdani and Golan.

#### Stone housing:

Basaltic rocks only are used in constructing this, without reliance on wood; even roofs are made of long stones abutting on walls that are of different lengths and are conspicuous from the inside and outside. This type is widespread in the hilly areas of southern Syria, in Hawran and Jabal al-'Arab.

#### Stone-cement housing:

This type predominates now in Syrian towns and villages; reinforced concrete is used in this to build roofs, while the walls are of stone or cement materials.

#### The Rural Housing Plan

The rural housing plan is determined in accordance with the function of the people living in the rural areas; as a consequence, housing is broken down into two segments, the first regarding human function and the second the economic function. A change has occurred in economic factions in villages which depend on machinery without animals, where we do not find quarters for livestock and the retention of fodder; rather, their place has been taken by quarters attached to the housing where tractors and plows are kept.

#### Supplying Rural Dwellings with Services

The government has devoted great attention to developing and improving the countryside by providing general basic services and promoting rural industries.

It has exerted great efforts to improve housing in the countryside by setting out topographic and organization plans for villages and providing necessary basic services, electricity, water, sewers and roads.

As regards the setting out of topographic and organization plans, more than 600 plans have been set out for villages in the light of which old residential areas, new expansion, and areas allocated to all kinds of services, administrative, cultural, commercial and recreational, have been determined.

In the field of potable water, about 70 percent of the inhabitants of rural areas in the country now benefit from clean water systems.

The proportion of people benefitting from sanitary drainage comes to 50 percent. In the field of rural revival centers, eight centers have been built in various areas of the country. At the beginning of this year construction was begun on about 25 centers distributed among various areas.

In the realm of rural electrification, a complete plan has been set out to provide electricity for rural areas in the country. This consists of a 10-year program which began in 1978, in the desire to introduce electric power to 5,800 villages, to be carried out over three stages, founded on the gradual spread of the service system.

The period for the first stage is 3 years; this has the goal of providing electricity for 1,200 villages in 11 governorates, which have been reduced to nine now that the provision of electricity in the Governorates of Dar'a and al-Suwayda' has been completed.

#### Model Rural Housing in the Euphrates, Al-Ghab and Al-Qunaytirah Projects

##### Rural housing in the Euphrates Dam project:

The government has proceeded to build some villages in reclaimed areas and areas that are being reclaimed now. In the pilot project, 6,768 rural dwellings and 162 dwellings for employees were built. In the Bir al-Hasham project in al-Balikh, 80 rural apartments and 20 apartments for employees were built, and in the Maskanah area west of the 21,000-hectare project, two villages were built, one a major one and the other a branch one in the government farm area. In addition, six other villages were erected to work an area of about 12,000 hectares. The construction of these villages has not yet reached the desired level, although the condition of housing and services in them is much better than the current condition of housing and services in them is much better than the current condition of the villages in the area. The use of building materials in the form of cement blocks and reinforced concrete in these villages is totally different from the adobe building materials in the old villages, and it is necessary to devote attention to studying the use of local building materials and to develop them in a manner which will provide suitable low-cost housing that will be suitable for the environment.

#### Rural housing in the al-Ghab area:

The Ministry of Housing has set out preliminary organizational plans for about 10 villages, the construction of the first village, for about 600 dwellings, has begun, and planning and construction studies for three other villages have been started. The study and construction of the remaining villages will be carried out subsequently.

#### Redevelopment of the liberated villages in al-Qunaytirah:

Nine villages were occupied during the Israeli aggression of 1967 and their inhabitants were forced to migrate to various areas of the country. Their homes were deliberately destroyed.

Following the liberation of these villages during the October 1973 war of liberation, a special construction committee was formed to revive the al-Qunaytirah area and develop it agriculturally. It was decided to build 600 dwellings in al-Ba'th town; work has been initiated on the first stage, which contains 300 dwellings. There are about 1,500 dwellings in the liberated villages. The projects to reconstruct the liberated villages are considered to be an advanced step in the area of rural housing, and the economic, social, construction and defense aspects of the project have been taken into consideration.

#### The Use of Local Materials and Benefit from Solar Power

Some experiments and research works have appeared on the possibility of constructing houses of local construction materials after they have been developed and processed.

The Ministry of Housing, in participation with Damascus University, has erected houses composed of samples of mosaic, and the Military Housing Organization is following up on work in this area with the goal of developing it.

A few years ago a study was set out to construct a suburb for people working in Damascus International Airport. The suburb would contain 2,000 housing units designed in the form of buildings in the style of Arab houses with home gardens. Solar energy would be used to air condition these houses and provide hot water for household use. The General Technical Studies and Consultation Company is now performing this study, and is on the verge of completing it. Work on constructing the first part of this suburb has begun.

11887

CSO: 4404/211

MINISTRIES REPORT ON BUDGET ALLOCATIONS FOR 1984

Deficit Budget Financing Considered

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 9 Nov 83 p 9

[Article by 'Abd-al-Razzaq Isma'il]

[Text] Article 129 of the temporary constitution stipulates that the federation's annual draft budget is to be presented at least 2 months before the start of the fiscal year to the National Federal Assembly, so that it may hold discussions and present its observations.

Article Nine of Federal Law 14 for 1973 regarding the preparation of the federation's general budget stipulates that the ministries are to present a preliminary estimate of expenditures to the Ministry of Finance in the month of September prior to the start of the fiscal year.

Article 15 of the same law stipulates that the minister of finance is to submit the draft budget, accompanied by the estimate, to the Council of Ministers for approval, and the approval must be given before October each year.

Although the temporary constitution and Federal Law 14 stipulate the dates related to the budget, as far as all parties to it are concerned, it has now become a rule that there is a delay in issuing it each year, with the resultant confusion this delay causes in the activity of the government's ministries, organizations and agencies and the negative effect on various projects.

What is certain, then, is that there is a season every year, which one can call the "season of the budget headache," because of the proliferation of what is written and said about it and the queries that are raised concerning it, that ends only when the budget is issued. What is not certain are the reasons for this delay. Some people say that the government ministries are the cause, due to their delay in presenting their draft budgets, and some people say that the Ministry of Finance bears the main portion of the responsibility for the delay. There are people who specify other reasons for the delay which have no relationship to the federal ministries, including the Ministry of Finance. Where does the truth lie?



## Financing Is the Reason

Muhammad 'Isa al-Suwaydi, deputy minister of labor and social affairs, considers that if it happens that some ministries are late in presenting their budgets, that delay is limited to a few days, and one cannot consider it the main reason for the delay in the issuance of the general budget.

What then is the main reason?

Al-Suwaydi says, "The way the federal budget is financed is the main reason. Here it is necessary to state that the Ministry of Finance is not deficient in any way; rather it is the issue of financing, the responsibility for which is subject to confusion."

Al-Suwaydi adds, "There is a rationale in the delay in the issuance of the budget which the people concerned are aware of. This delay is considered a sort of 'guidance of spending,' where the ministries continue to spend one-12th of their previous budgets, or one-24th in the case of some sections. In this manner, spending remains within the limits of the rates of the previous year."

## We Arrange Our Affairs in Approximate Fashion

The delay in the budget has negative repercussions on all ministries. What are the limits of this influence on the activities of your ministry?

"The budget is composed of four chapters, and there is no doubt that the delay in the budget has an influence in one way or another, in varying proportions, on one ministry or another, and on one chapter or another; however, as far as chapter four (projects) goes, there are tendencies not to include new projects as far as all ministries go, and these tendencies are governed by financial matters."

Al-Suwaydi went on to say, "Each ministry has a specific policy as far as construction goes. For example, the Ministry of Labor has a program to establish social development centers, old people's and youth homes, and so forth. The construction of these centers will be affected by the government's financial situation, and the same thing applies to the other ministries, since each one of them has a specific program. Although the failure to construct new facilities will negatively affect the ministries' projects, we are convinced that the officials are aware of the dimensions of his subject, and we are confident that they are anxious to support the ministries, especially the service ministries."

[Question] What are the considerations on whose basis you have set out your new draft budget?"

[Answer] It is necessary to point out that the ministries, with this year's budget, are to arrange their affairs in approximate fashion. As regards the new budget, we have made an estimate of what has been done and spent from the chapters in the previous period and in the light of that we set out our recommendations for the coming budget, taking into consideration the general

circumstances of the government. Nonetheless, it is our intention to ask for support for some chapters in the budget, because it is hard to observe austerity in these chapters, such as social insurance, support for cooperative societies, and the expenses of disabled persons' centers, and old persons' and youth homes. If we consider the expansion in services and the rise in prices, it will be necessary that that be accompanied by an increase in spending.

[Question] All the ministries state that they are setting out their draft budgets on the basis of their actual requirements. If that is the case, why should these ministries be given less than they demand?

[Answer] When any ministry is given less than is asked for, that is not done haphazardly, because officials in the Ministry of Finance have taken what was spent the previous year or before that as a base, and, in the light of that, the sums listed in each chapter are specified.

#### A Very Short Period!

"When the ministries receive the general statement on preparing their budget from the Ministry of Finance, the competent department proceeds to make a general statement to the various departments and sections to set out their future conceptions of the ministry's requirements; these include the requirements of the departments in the regions and the other departments. After all the departments send their estimates to the financial department, these are studied and the financial department then summons the people concerned to a general meeting to discuss the bases and conceptions regarding the budget. After that, the general conception is set out in the form of a budget draft. Then another meeting with the minister is held for officials to discuss this draft, until the budget is produced in its final form in the light of the discussions with the minister. This estimated budget is sent to the Ministry of Finance, which in turn examines the draft estimated budget of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the appropriate date for discussing the budget program is set by the Ministry of Finance."

After Ahmad al-Mutawwa', the assistant deputy minister of agriculture and fish resources for administrative and financial affairs, explained the way in which the ministry prepared its budget, he denied that the Ministry of Agriculture had been late in presenting the draft of this budget, stating:

"Normally, the Ministry of Finance issues the general statement on the preparation of the budget on 15 July of each year, and requests that the budget be presented on 1 September. That is, the period is 46 days. This period is adequate, and the Ministry of Agriculture has committed itself to it. In the past we were not late in presenting the draft budget, but this year we received the general statement on 27 September, with the proviso that the draft budget be presented on 15 October -- that is, the period was very short, relative to the previous years. We do not know if there are any circumstances which caused the Ministry of Finance to delay the general statement. In any event, the general circumstances governing everyone have prompted some ministries to delay presenting their budgets. Also, we should not forget that the delay in the issuance of the budget for this year has

affected the ministries' preparation of their draft budgets for the new year."

[Question] What is your definition of a budget?

[Answer] The budget is a plan of action, and each ministry puts what it was not able to carry out in the preceding plan in its coming plan of action.

The Specialized Subheadings Have Not Been Reduced

What chapters in your new budget have not been included in the reduction?

Answering the question was Basim Abu Ghazalah, the financial overseer of the Ministry of Agriculture, who said:

"We requested the same allocations as were made in this year's budget for production accessories for farmers and fishermen. These include fertilizers, seeds, insecticides, fishing equipment, agricultural machinery, fishing nets, and farm machinery equipment. We also requested the same allocations that are needed to operate the central laboratory and carry out the agricultural and veterinary quarantine project, as well as the necessary allocations for livestock resource services and agricultural pest control. That is, the ministry's specialized subheadings have not been reduced, because they are basically to achieve its goals, and without them it would not be possible to offer integrated activity for the agricultural sector."

At the end of the conversation, both Ahmad al-Mutawwa' and Basim Abu Ghazalah asserted that the delay in the issuance of the general budget threw the course of work in all ministries into confusion and had negative effects on agricultural development, since the Ministry of Agriculture offers services to farmers, fishermen and livestock growers, and they represent important sectors of the country's economy.

We Have Been Late, But We Have Our Excuse

Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Malik, director of financial affairs of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, said,

"We have been somewhat late in preparing our draft budget for the new year, and one of the main reasons for this delay was the need to prepare final lists as far as people whose services have been terminated go, which has an effect on the first chapter. The second reason is related to the chapter on projects. So far, there still are many instalments due contractors which have not been paid out by the Ministry of Finance, and we do not know if they will be paid out this year or not. If they are paid out this year, the sums disbursed will not be transferred to the new budget. In summary, one can state that the picture is not clear to us as far as the projects go. In spite of that, our budget will be ready in a few days."

'Abd-al-Malik added, "The bodies that are responsible for the approval of the general budget are responsible for the delay in its issuance. The ministries have not been a cause for this delay at all."

Concerning the features of the new budget of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, 'Abd-al-Malik said:

"There has been a reduction in most chapters of the ministry's budget, in the first chapter (wages and salaries), following the termination of some people's services, the second chapter (general expenditures), the third chapter as well (capital expenditures) and also the fourth chapter (projects). This chapter is connected to the government's policy, and the preparation of the budget for it is done through the Ministries of Planning and Finance and the ministries benefitting. In exchange for this reduction in the various chapters, we asked for an increase in support for some chapters above the current level this year, in view of their extreme importance."

#### The Ailment and the Remedy

[Question] Where are the areas of confusion in the method for issuing the general budget?

[Answer] The condition of the government budget is unsound as far as the preparation of the budget and the method of discussing it with the different ministries are concerned. On some occasions, a ministry is asked to reduce some chapters by specific percentages without taking account of the importance of these chapters for the ministry concerned. In other words, there is no actual study of the ministries' actual requirements on the part of the Ministry of Finance. This causes an embarrassing situation to arise for the ministry concerned in the course of the year. As far as our ministry goes, the delay in approval of the budget causes it many problems, especially in the area of the project budget. As a result of the delay, a delay arises in the payment of money due some contractors, which has an effect on the productive competence of the contractor and puts him in a difficult financial position. Consequently, this situation affects the performance of the project. To that one should add the current financial position of the government and the delay that has caused in the payment of money owed to contractors. That will all lead to a serious situation as far as the contracting sector in the government as a whole goes.

[Question] What do you consider the remedy to be?

[Answer] The recent measures for rearranging the organization chart in the ministries of the government are a very good beginning for correcting the course of things. In addition, "guiding spending" as far as the different aspects of spending in the ministries goes will result in the organization of expenditures, and their disbursements in their proper areas, so that ultimately we will arrive at high productive competence in exchange for such spending. In another area, the speed of financing of the government budget when it is approved will aid in the process of regulating spending. Without the presence of financing, it is difficult for the Ministry of Finance to pay out the money owed, and in this instance the Ministry of Finance is not responsible for the delay.

### Budget Provides Fellowship Allocations

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 22 Nov 83 pp 1, 16

[Article by Husayn al-Samadi]

[Text] The Ministry of Education has allocated 122 million dirhams in the draft budget for the coming fiscal year to the subheading on fellowships. Informed sources in the ministry have told AL-KHALIJ that the budget for the current year, which is nearing an end, probably will not include disbursements for new students, and disbursements on all new fellowships will be defrayed by the budget for the coming fiscal year.

The costs of students on fellowship and higher studies in 1984 come to approximately 79 million dirhams, and the costs of students on stipends and grants will come to 40 million dirhams. Meanwhile, the costs of the students and people in university and higher studies who are expected to be sent next 1 October will be approximately 3.3 million dirhams.

It should be pointed out that the rate of spending on university and higher level students in America and Europe is 68,000 dirhams a year, and the rate of spending of university and higher students in Arab countries is 35,000 dirhams a year.

In another area, a responsible source in the Ministry of Education pointed out that if the ministry wanted to send citizens on scholarship for higher university studies at the start of the new fiscal year, it would be possible to replace the people who are graduating and those whose aid is being cancelled. This of course depends on the Ministry of Finance's agreement to the proposed sum for the section on fellowships in the 1984 budget, which is the same as the sum that was listed in the budget for the current fiscal year.

### Labor Ministry Submits Budget

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 30 Nov 83 p 2

[Article by Mahir al-Kayyali]

[Text] The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs will submit the draft of its budget for the coming fiscal year, 1984, to the Ministry of Finance and Industry today.

This was declared by Muhammad Rashid al-Mughanni, the assistant deputy minister of social affairs and labor for financial and administrative affairs, who said that the total of the three chapters in the budget came to about 777,833,000 dirhams.

He added that the first chapter's share of the budget, which includes salaries, daily wages, raises and various allowances, will come to approximately 76 million dirhams.

The share of the second chapter of the budget, which includes accessories in the form of goods and services, social aid, assistance to societies of public utility, assistance to cooperative societies and dues in international bodies, will come to about 697 million dirhams.

Al-Mughanni said that the share of chapter three of the budget, which includes fixed assets, will come to about 4.5 million dirhams.

He pointed out that the budget will thus be recording an increase of 171 million dirhams over the amount contained in the 1983 budget.

He stated that the increase includes about 156 million dirhams which were inserted for exceptional aid on which the Council of Ministers had previously issued a decree, while the remaining increase includes some increases in dues in international organizations and aid to societies and clubs.

The assistant deputy minister for financial and administrative affairs pointed out that the ministry has been concerned to set out a minimum level for the estimates which will guarantee that it performs the tasks that have been imposed upon it.

He added that 92 positions have been created on the basis of agreement by the Council of Ministers to the ministry's memorandum on its requests to open up boarding sections in the disabled persons' care and accreditation homes.

It should be mentioned that the ministry's budget for this year, 1983, came to 606,589,000 dirhams.

#### Abu Dhabi's 1984 Budget

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 25 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] The Abu Dhabi Financial Department is now preparing the draft budget for the government of Abu Dhabi for next year, 1984, now that it has finished discussing all the departments' budgets, except for those of the municipality of Abu Dhabi and the Water and Electricity Department.

This was pointed out by Khalfan al-Muhayribi, the assistant vice chairman of the departments, who added that the draft budget would include allocations for new projects and that the preparation of the draft budget would take place in light of the government's policy of guiding spending.

It is worth pointing out that the general budget revenues for this year came to 21,516,341,000 dirhams. Its expenditures for the same year have been estimated at 24,284,839,125 dirhams. Meanwhile, the ordinary budget for the Abu Dhabi departments came to 4,608,152,000 dirhams, the development budget, excluding the federal projects, 5,901,747,000 dirhams, capital payments, 425 million dirhams, the emirate's contribution to the federation budget, 9.5 million dirhams, and international and practical aid for the emirate, 3,850,040,125 dirhams.



## Temporary Budget Financing Measures

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 27 Dec 83 pp 1,12

[Text] At its meeting yesterday under the chairmanship of Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid, the deputy prime minister and crown prince of Dubai, the Council of Ministers gave its agreement to a memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Finance and Industry which included the draft of a federal decree approving temporary monthly sums for the federal ministries and organizations amounting to one-twelfth [of the total], to be deducted from the sums that will be included in the government's general budget for the fiscal year 1984, as of next 1 January.

The council also gave agreement to a memorandum from the Ministry of Communications calling for an increase in postal tariffs now in effect domestically, regionally and internationally, at various rates not to exceed 50 percent.

These increases will lie within the context of the international tariff in effect in accordance with International Postal Union statutes.

The council agreed to a memorandum of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs concerning the technical cooperation agreement signed recently with Iraq in the field of social affairs.

The council also agreed to a memorandum from the Civil Service Council on the study of organization charts of the federal government ministries, departments and organizations in the country.

The council read a report from the minister of communications on the activity of the General Emirate Transportation and Service Organization this year.

## Information Ministry Budget Requests

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 1 Jan 84 p 8

[Article by Thabit Malakawi]

[Text] The Ministry of Information and Culture has proposed a sum of about 469.3 million dirhams for its budget in 1984, an increase of about 199.6 million dirhams over 1983, to cover some costs of special ministry projects and some other expenditures related to areas of information and culture in the country.

In another area, the Ministry of Information and Culture has advanced the principle of the policy of austerity, in response to the general policy of austerity on whose basis the government is proceeding at the present time.

Yes to Guidance

In this regard 'Abdallah Aman, the assistant deputy minister of information and culture, stated that the Ministry of Information and Culture has



committed itself to the Ministry of Finance and Industry letter on the need to reduce the ministry's general budget, and therefore has sought to reduce expenditures in subheadings which were a factor in inflating the ministry's expenditures. (These subheadings will be mentioned in detail shortly.)

'Abdallah Aman emphasized that the ministry was not suffering from over-staffing in its apparatus. Rather, he pointed out, there were new sections, including the Film Production Unit, where there were only nine persons, including two doormen, though its total costs come to about 35 million dirhams. In addition, there were other projects which have been carried out and which the ministry has been given though there are no employees to run them. He said, "The ministry will confront the higher ministerial committee on guidance with this issue at the meeting it is to hold with officials of the Ministry of Information and Culture."

It might be important to state that the first chapter of the ministry's budget will not be subjected to the general rule of reduction, and if there is a modest reduction in it that will just be attributable to the decline in the volume of the additional work the ministry has decided on since last year. The ministry has also requested new positions to cover the burdens of operating the Second Program station, and, if these are provided, that will mean that the Chapter One budget will go up. The budget for this was 96.5 million dirhams in 1983 and that has increased by 200,000 for 1984.

#### The Reason for the Increase

The reason the ministry's total budget for 1984 had risen, which seemed initially to contradict the principle of austerity, may be attributed, as informed sources in the ministry said, to the existence of actual previous commitments in the ministry in some subheadings which had faced a deficit in previous years; covering these commitments had been prescribed by the Council of Ministers.

This was also to cover the costs of completing some projects whose budget was listed in the 1982-83 budget and in the one for 1984 as well. Two other subheadings were also newly created in the second chapter, the news service distribution system for the news agency, costing 5.6 million dirhams, and the satellite communications subheading, at 400,000 dirhams a month, and there was a necessary increase in television, totalling 129 million dirhams, to cover program expenses, which had dropped in 1983, and the expenses of operating the Second Program on Abu Dhabi television, which costs about 20 million dirhams.

The Ministry of Information lowered the budget for television programs from 48 to 35 million dirhams in 1983, but it appears that this reduction has had a negative effect on television operations, and the ministry has requested about 70 million dirhams in addition to cover television programs, and radio programs with them, including the FM programs.

#### Reductions

The Ministry of Information and Culture is conducting thorough supervision over many media, cultural and artistic activities in the country by

administrative sections attached to general departments in the ministry for this purpose.

The details on the new budget proposed for these sections or the activities they are carrying out will of necessity give the reader a clearer picture of the importance and effectiveness of the activity and the extent of official interest in it as well, simply by casting light on its proposed budget and comparing it with the actual budget set aside in the ministry's budget for 1983.

The memorandum points out that most of the subheadings on spending have not been subjected to any reductions in the proposed budget, since the guidance or austerity policy had dealt with them in the 1983 budget. Consequently, there is no scope for reducing them further. There has just been a reduction in the subheading on dues to international conferences, where the amount requested was reduced to 7.5 million dirhams as contrasted with 10 million dirhams in 1983, and the subheading on building rents, which totalled 41 million dirhams in 1983 then dropped by 6 million dirhams.

#### Proposed Increases

Meanwhile, the ministry has considered that it would be proper to increase the remaining subheadings on spending on the ministry's activities, in order to cope with the deficit and the additional costs accompanying the development and provision of these services in a suitable manner. These subheadings are:

Theatrical and artistic activity: the budget for this in 1983 was 3.4 million dirhams. The ministry has asked for an additional 2 million dirhams to cover theatrical festivals. This sum will cover the expenses of open local stage activities, 2.4 million, local stage support for four groups, 800,000 dirhams, and cultural season activities.

The subheading on missions and travel: the ministry demanded an increase in the budget for this subsection to keep abreast of Arab and international events. The memorandum stated that this subsection had suffered annually from financial problems. The 1982 budget was 2 million dirhams.

The subsection on exhibits: the ministry requested that the budget for this be 4 million dirhams, which is the same as the budget for 1982. It had dropped in 1983 to 1.5 million dirhams.

Electricity and telephones: the Amertel organization had cut off foreign communications for most of the ministry's telephones, leaving the zero [number] in the office of the minister and the deputy minister. A study has not yet been made on the amount that this subheading has saved by cutting off the zero [number]. Its costs in 1983 were 2 million dirhams.

Magazines and periodicals: the ministry requested an increase in allocations to this subheading in order to provide that for the ministry's libraries.

Hotels and hospitality: it asked for an increase of about 10 percent of the 1983 budget, which comes to 1.5 million dirhams.

Publications: the proposed increase is 1.8 million dirhams over the 1983 budget, which came to 1.3 million dirhams.

Subsidies for local papers: the ministry asked for an increase of 3 million dirhams to subsidize new local papers that would be likely to appear in 1984. The budget for this subheading in 1983 was 7.65 million dirhams.

Bonuses for common troupes: the proposed increase is approximately 3 million dirhams above the budget for 1983 (3.3 million dirhams), resulting from the increase to cover the festival on Gulf people's arts which will be held in the country in 1984 in the framework of the Cooperation Council countries.

Training of officials domestically and abroad: the ministry has asked for 1 million dirhams. The budget for this subheading for 1983 was 150,000 dirhams in 1983.

Press relations: the ministry requested that the allocations to this subheading be increased in order to satisfy this subheading's mission of strengthening relations with the Arab and foreign press. The 1983 budget was 5.2 million dirhams.

Maintenance: machinery and equipment: this was 28 million dirhams in 1983; the ministry has requested 5 million dirhams to cover the systems coverage and maintenance expenses of the Western Province.

These are roughly the most important subsections on spending in the Ministry of Information and Culture. There are other subsections, but the expenditures in the subheadings there are less than 1 million dirhams, except for the subheadings on advertising commissions, whose budget in 1983 came to 15 million dirhams, whereas it was 8 million dirhams in 1982. We have not learned whether this figure will decline or increase in the proposed or actual 1984 budget.

#### Completion Projects

The costs of the Ministry of Information and Culture's completion projects came to 201,286,000 dirhams, and 61,206,000 dirhams had been spent on them up to the end of 1982. The remaining expenses came to 140.08 million dirhams. The sum of 28,661,000 dirhams of the total costs was included in the 1983 budget. The remaining amount will be carried forward and constitute part of the 1984 budget.

The table on completion projects includes buildings, equipment, roads, transmission stations, systems and so forth.

Among the most expensive of these projects are the project to erect and outfit the buildings of the cultural center in Sharjah, which comes to about 34.3 million dirhams, the project for the television transmission stations in Ra's al-Khaymah, al-Fujayrah and Umm al-Qaywayn, whose costs are 26.3 million dirhams, which had been listed in the 1983 budget at about 2.2 million dirhams, then the project for a major television production studio and annexes in Abu Dhabi costing 40 million dirhams, 4 million dirhams of which had been included in the 1983 budget.

In addition, there is the construction of six cultural centers, in Dubai (11 million), Ra's al-Khaymah (8.2 million), Bid' Zayid (5.9 million), 'Ajman (5.6 million), Umm al-Qaywayn (5 million) and al-Fujayrah (5.9 million dirhams). These projects have been carried out, as the memorandum points out, except for the Bid' Zayid cultural center, of whose expenses 5 million dirhams had been listed for 1983.

As the detailed memorandum points out, most of the completion projects were supposed to have been completed by the end of 1983. That is the point which 'Abdallah Aman raised in the course of his response to the ministry's protests on the administration organization chart for the projects which the ministry has actually received.

#### Media Revenues

The total Ministry of Information and Culture revenues which it is estimated will be collected by the end of 1983 are 22.245,000 dirhams, most of which came from television and radio advertising revenues, which came to 22 million dirhams, revenues from fines for late deliveries, 100,000 dirhams, revenues from film, newspaper and magazine censorship, 40,000 dirhams, and other revenues.

The ministry's revenues in 1982 were 20.25 million dirhams.

11887

CS0: 4404/235

MINISTRIES REPORT ON BUDGET ACTIVITIES FOR 1983

Allocations for Roads

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 9 Nov 83 p 6

[Text] The 1983 budget provided for approximately 188 million dirhams to be spent on domestic and foreign road projects in Al-Shariqah, Umm al-Qaywayn, 'Ajman, al-Fujayrah and Ra's al-Khaymah, in addition to the Dubai-al-'Ayn road.

A report by the Ministry of Planning explained that of this sum, 2.5 million dirhams were spent to start the Dubai--al-'Ayn road. The cost of building this road has been estimated at 160 million dirhams.

In al-Shariqah, 1.5 million dirhams were spent on the completion of the al-Shariqah-al-Dhayd road, which is a divided highway. The total cost of this road has been estimated at 66 million dirhams, of which 64 million dirhams have been spent so far. Moreover, 4 million dirhams were spent for domestic road construction in al-Shariqah.

The report stated that consultants are studying the proposed road between al-Dhayd and al-Rafi'ah and al-Dhayd and al-Rashidiyyah, as well as the road between al-Fujayrah and Khawr Fakkan and the road between al-Dhayd and al-Fujayrah. All of these roads belong to al-Shariqah.

The sum of 7 million dirhams from the UAE federal budget was spent on domestic roads at Umm al-Qaywayn, as well as for roads at Falaj al-Mu'alla and Kabir. The estimated total cost for these roads is 47 million dirhams.

The federal budget for 1983 set aside the sum of 27 million dirhams to be spent on domestic roads at 'Ajman.

As for Ra's al-Khaymah, the sum of 128 million dirhams was allocated to be spent on domestic and foreign roads there. These roads are the al-Shariqah-Ra's al-Khaymah road and the Dawwar-al-Ma'murah-Rams-Sha'm road. The sum of 45 million dirhams was allocated for the latter alone. In addition, the sum of 27 million dirhams was allocated for domestic roads at al-Rams and Sha'm. The sum of 12 million dirhams was allocated for the road between Ra's al-Khaymah and al-Khawran.

Total expenditures on roads in al-Fujayrah in the 1983 budget totaled 18,091,000 dirhams. Of this sum, 17 million dirhams were spent on domestic roads. The nearly completed road between al-Dhayd and al-Fujayrah received 620,000 dirhams. Its total cost has reached 67 million dirhams, of which 65 million dirhams have so far been spent.

#### September Commercial Bank Budget Described

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 15 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] Statistics released by the Central Bank state that the combined budget for the commercial banks reached 76,901,000,000 dirhams at the end of September, as compared with 75,152,000,000 dirhams for the same period last year.

On the asset side of the budget, cash in the form of local currency accounted for 209 million dirhams, as compared with 412 million dirhams last year. Deposits with the banking apparatus accounted for 2,492,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 2,288,000,000 dirhams last year. Foreign assets accounted for 13,245,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 22,760,000,000 dirhams last year. Government bonds accounted for 4,001,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 4,717,000,000 dirhams last year.

Private sector bonds accounted for 13,216,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 11,903,000,000 dirhams last year. Claims on other financial institutions amounted to 1,157,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 845 million dirhams. Other assets amounted to 2,269,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 2,228,000,000 dirhams for the same period last year.

On the liability side of the budget, liabilities were distributed in the following fashion. Cash deposits amounted to 5,999,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 6,335,000,000 dirhams in September 1982.

Semi-cash deposits accounted for 26,128,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 21,813,000,000 dirhams last year. Foreign liabilities accounted for 22,177,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 27,190,000,000 dirhams last year. Government deposits amounted to 4,184,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 4,817,000,000 dirhams last year. Capital and reserves accounted for 10,476,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 10,218,000,000 dirhams last year. Other liabilities accounted for the sum of 7,427,000,000 dirhams, as compared with 4,710,000,000 dirhams last year.

The combined budget for the commercial banks does not include interbank transactions.

#### Allocations for Electricity, Water

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 22 Dec 83 p 6

[Text] The annual investment project report, which is organized according to sectors and economic activities and was issued recently by the Ministry of

Planning, stated that the electricity and water sector occupies first place in terms of the relative importance of investment, in view of the vital importance it has for the other economic sectors and the various aspects of life.

The report said that the cost of the projects in this sector amounted to 3.96 billion dirhams, as compared with 4.06 billion dirhams last year. Some 351 million dirhams of that were allocated for this year, amounting to 22.13 percent of total investments, as compared with 517.7 million dirhams for last year.

The report indicated that this year new projects were not registered in this sector. Moreover, many electricity projects were completed last year. Thus, they were not registered in this year's program. This explains the decrease which occurred in the sector's total costs, in comparison with the situation last year. In addition, registration has been postponed to next year for those projects which have not yet been contracted for.

In connection with the transportation and communications sector, the report said that it enjoyed the second position with respect to the relative importance of investment. Its costs amounted to 2.37 billion dirhams, as compared with 2.27 billion dirhams last year. Some 267.4 million dirhams of that were allocated, accounting for 16.2 percent of total investment. A small increase of 1.2 million dirhams occurred in comparison with the previous year.

In connection with the finance, insurance and real estate sector, the report said that its costs did not change much this year in comparison with their levels last year. They amounted to 929 million dirhams, meaning that a decrease of 2 million dirhams occurred. As for the amount allocated this year, it was 159 million dirhams, accounting for 9.7 percent of total investments, as compared with 185 million dirhams last year.

With respect to agriculture and fish resources, the report indicated that despite the vital importance of this sector with regard to providing society with food security, it did not receive sufficient interest, since the costs of the projects in this sector amounted to 720.7 million dirhams, meaning that a decrease of 60.3 million dirhams happened in comparison with 1982. As for the amount allocated for this year, it was 140 million dirhams, accounting for 8.5 percent of total investments, in comparison with 186 million dirhams during 1982. This year's investments include the sum of 35 million dirhams, which was set aside for agricultural and fishing-related loans, the purchase of seeds and fertilizers, and for machinery and agricultural tractors.

Concerning the manufacturing industry sector, the report said that the costs of projects in this sector increased this year, reaching 99.5 million dirhams, as compared with 96.5 million dirhams during last year. Moreover, the sum allocated this year was larger than last year. It reached 37 million dirhams, accounting for 2.2 percent of total investments this year, in comparison with 29 million dirhams last year. In general, this sector is considered backward. It must receive greater attention from officials and planners in the future, since it plays a prominent role as well in the diversification of income sources and the avoidance of dependence on a single, depletable source of income.



Concerning the commerce, restaurant and hotel sector, the report explained that the projects in this sector included internal divisions, the construction of cooperatives in the country, and the creation of centers for marketing farmers' produce. This year, the costs of these projects amounted to 193 million dirhams, in comparison with 195 million dirhams last year. Of this, 9.4 million dirhams were allocated, accounting for no more than .6 percent of total investments this year, as compared with 7.6 million dirhams last year.

With regard to the construction and building sector, the report said that this sector contained only one project, which is being executed by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. It is the mobile materials testing workshop project, the cost of which is 1.5 million dirhams. Of that, .9 million dirhams were allocated this year.

#### No New Investment Projects

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 1 Jan 84 p 2

[Text] The total value of the projects included in the state's investment program for 1983 amounted to 11,763,000,000 dirhams, as compared to 7,559,000,000 dirhams for 1980.

This was stated in the annual report of the Annual Program Administration, which belongs to the Ministry of Planning. The report was issued yesterday, following approval by the cabinet of the state's annual budget last August.

The report pointed out that the 1983 investment program did not include any new projects, and that all the projects amounted to a continuation of past projects. It stated that projects not yet contracted for were not listed in the program.

The report stated that the Ministry of Electricity and Water had taken first place in terms of importance for the third year in a row. This was true of both total costs and expenditures. The ministry's costs in 1983 rose to about four times their level in 1980, reaching 3,683,000,000 dirhams in 1983, as compared with 1,047,000,000 dirhams in 1980.

The report stated that the Ministry of Electricity and Water was executing a number of important projects, including the electrification project on the western coast, the expansion of the Daba station and the provision of increased capacity to the distribution net in 'Ajman.

In the central region, the electrification project in Umm al-Qayawin is currently being completed, as are the electrification projects in al-Dhayd, and Falaj al-Mu'alla and the 33 kilovolt distribution line project in Umm al-Qaywayn.

Among the larger projects being executed by the ministry are the project to set up additional generators between Qidfa', al-Fujayrah, Khawr Fakkan, Daba and Kalba, the completion of the project to electrify the rural regions in the northern emirates, and the expansion and improvement of the electricity networks in Ra's al-Khaymah.

The report noted that the Ministry of Communications occupied second place, after the Ministry of Electricity and Water. The cost of its projects was 1,708,000,000 dirhams in 1983. As concerns the other ministries' projects, the cost of health projects in 1983 reached about 1,288,000,000 dirhams. Of that, 104 million went to build hospitals. The cost of education and instruction projects reached 904 million dirhams, while public works projects cost 1 billion dirhams in 1983.

The report by the Ministry of Planning noted that because of the excessive importance of the agricultural sector in the structure of the national economy, interest had been shown in the projects of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Wealth, especially during the last 4 years.

This year, the costs of the investment program reached 792 million dirhams, as compared with 229 million dirhams in 1980.

The report said that in view of the great role played by the Ministry of Information and Culture in the life of society, the execution of its projects was given special importance. This caused many of its projects to be carried out in the last few years. The cost of this ministry's projects amounted to 222 million dirhams in 1983, as compared with 214 million dirhams in 1980.

His Highness the Head of State issued a decree on 9 July separating the Ministry of Justice from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Awqaf. The ministry projects amounted to 175 million dirhams in 1983. All of this was spent for mosques. The projects of the Ministry of Justice cost 127 million dirhams. Among its most important projects were the construction of a court building in al-'Ayn and the creation of a supreme court.

12224

CSO: 4404/234

RA'S AL-KHAYMAH PHARMACEUTICALS PLANT BEGINS PRODUCTION

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 29 Dec 83 p 17

[Article: "Ra's al-Khaymah Pharmaceutical Plant To Market Its Products Shortly"]

[Text] Ra's al-Khaymah--The pharmaceuticals plant in Ra's al-Khaymah, the UAE, has begun producing some kinds of drugs and is expected to offer its products to the Gulf markets shortly. In their next meeting, the ministers of health of the Cooperation Council member states will discuss a report on the plant and its production capabilities.

Hamad 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Midfa', the UAE minister of health, accompanied by a delegation of the Permanent Pharmaceuticals Committee of the Arab Gulf States General Health Secretariat currently visiting the UAE, toured the various sections and the research, development, examination and quality-control laboratories of the pharmaceuticals plant owned by Ra's al-Khaymah Arab Drug Industry Company. The minister and the delegation were received by Shaykh Sa'ud ibn Saqr al-Qasimi, the chairman of the company's Board of Directors.

The delegation heard an explanation from Dr Sa'd al-Khayyatah, a member of the company's Board of Directors and the plant general manager, on the commercial production of drugs by Ra's al-Khaymah plant, certain types of which have already been supplied to the Gulf states.

Dr al-Khayyatah pointed out that the plant produces at present 21 varieties of drugs, a figure which will rise to 28 varieties next April. These drugs include regular and sealed tablets, eyedrop bottles, syrups, disinfectants, ointment tubes and suppositories.

The company director noted that in the design of the plant, consideration was given to the possibilities of future development and expansion to bolster the existing production lines and to add new lines. The director also noted that the company is currently completing the studies for building a unit for the production of sterilization materials and a unit for the production of antibiotics.

At the conclusion of the visit, the minister of health expressed his happiness and pride in the start of production by Ra's al-Khaymah pharmaceuticals plant, considering this start a step on the path to securing an Arab drug strategy accompanied by a food, economic and agricultural strategy, which seeks to achieve self-sufficiency in all spheres and to break the circle of monopoly.

It is to be noted that the Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries Company was founded in 1979 with 200 million dirhams in capital, to which agencies, organizations and citizens from the Arab Gulf states, the Arab Pharmaceutical Industries Company and Ra's al-Khaymah Government have subscribed.

The delegation of the Permanent Pharmaceuticals Committee of the Arab Gulf States General Health Secretariat had arrived in Ra's al-Khaymah to prepare a report on the plant of the Gulf Medical Company for Drug Production in Ra's al-Khaymah and to present it to the ministers of health of the Arab Gulf states at their conference to be held in Abu Dhabi on 2 January 1984. The delegation will meet with a number of the Ministry of Health officials and with Hamad al-Midfa', the minister of health, to exchange views on the means to bolster the Gulf drugs plant so that it may supply the drug needs of the area markets and of the Arab markets.

Hamad al-Midfa' described this plant as one of the most modern plants set up in the area. The plant turns out its products in accordance with the latest international drug standards. Its construction costs have amounted to 250 million dirhams.

Dr Mu'ayyad Salih, the assistant director of the Pharmaceuticals and Supply Department of the Ministry of Health and member of the delegation of the Arab Gulf Permanent Drug Committee, said that the plant will offer its products to the Gulf markets and the other Arab markets as soon as the company controlling the plant completes its registration procedures.

8494

CSO: 4404/249

## ALL ELIGIBLE MEN REPORTEDLY ORDERED TO JOIN ARMY

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 3 Jan 84 p 17

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Mon. — The Communist regime in Kabul, now into its fifth year of war against Muslim fighters, has ordered all eligible men to sign up for military service or face imprisonment.

All able-bodied young men, reservists, draft dodgers and students who have failed university entrance examinations must appear before the authorities by March 21. Radio Kabul announced last night.

In addition, any man found without identification papers will be drafted immediately even if he has already served or has a legitimate deferment, the State-run radio said in a broadcast monitored here.

Western diplomats here say the strength of the Afghan army, more than 80,000 when Soviet troops entered the country four years ago last week, has fallen to about 40,000 due to losses in battle and defections to the anti-Communist fighters.

There are about 105,000 Soviet soldiers in the country but they tend to man tanks and artillery while Afghans are sent ahead for ground combat, say the diplomats, quoting reports from their embassies in Kabul.

They say the army has tried to make up the slack by sending press gangs through the cities

looking for draft dodgers and young men are now a rare sight in Kabul bazaars because of the increasingly frequent searches.

The radio admitted many men had escaped military service by using forged deferment cards and called on the population to inform the police about such cases.

It also warned men always to carry all their documents for identity, employment, military service or deferment, or face immediate drafting if they are caught. "No excuse will be accepted."

The broadcast warned press gang leaders not to tear up any documents, an apparent reference to reports that they have sometimes destroyed valid deferment cards to get enough men to fill their quotas.

The radio did not define the age limits for military service. The normal limits are 19 to 40 years. But Western diplomats say press gangs have recently been taking men between 16 and 45.

Kabul has been resorting to increasingly stricter measures in recent months to fill the army's ranks. It announced in August that students failing university entrance tests or repeating classes would be liable for immediate call-up. — Reuter.

OFFICIALS DISCUSS SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO BANGLADESH

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 27 Dec 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] The visiting vice chairman and managing director of Saudi Fund for Development Mr Mohammed Abdullah Al-Sugair and members of the fund delegation Monday called on the DCMLA and Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud at the latter's secretariat office says BSS.

They discussed the possibilities of SFD assistance in the Bakhrabad Demra gas transmission line and the gathering facilities, exploration drilling in Patharia (Sylhet) Joypurhat Limestone Project, Maidhyapara Hardrock Mining Project, Greater Dhaka Power Distribution and Augmentation Project.

Assistance for nuclear reactor maintenance and safety system, food irradiation and solar power development also came up for discussion during the meeting.

The DCMLA apprised the delegation of the various projects in the power sectors which included solar resource assessment solar dryer, solar water heater and air preheating, solar pumping, irrigation, mini hydro power generation for irrigation and improved draft animal equipment.

As for Joypurhat Limestone Project estimated to cost 220 million with a foreign exchange component of 170 million dollars, the SFD has already provided 30 million dollars under the first Saudi assistance for the project. The fund, being a leading donor has been requested to contribute at least another 70 million dollars to make its total contribution for the Limestone Project to 100 million dollars.

The SRD has allotted 20 million dollars for the 117 million dollar Maidhyapara Hardrock Project. The fund also provided over 9 million dollars for the drilling of two exploratory wells at Patharia in the field of oil and gas exploration.

During the nearly one hour discussion, Mr Sugair assured the DCMLA that the fund will duly consider his (DCMLA's) proposals for providing more assistance to Bangladesh in her development efforts.

Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud appreciated SFD for its assistance to Bangladesh and said the fund was making positive contribution towards the development of better relation between Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile an earlier report adds: The Managing Director of the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), Mr Mohammed Abdullah Al-Sugair arrived in Dhaka Monday on a three-day visit to Bangladesh.

He was received at the airport by the Secretary of the External Resources Division, Mr Nofizur Rahman and officials of the Saudi embassy.

Mr Al-Sugair, who is accompanied by three officials of the fund will sign today (Tuesday) an agreement with Bangladesh providing 25 million dollars soft term loan for a deep tubewell irrigation project.

CSO: 4600/1440



ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AGRICULTURAL LOANS ANNOUNCED

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 27 Dec 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Asian Development Bank will provide Bangladesh with two loans totaling 110 million dollars under an agreement signed at the Bank's Headquarters at Manila on December 22 according to a message received in Dhaka on Monday, reports BSS.

Finance and Planning Minister A. M. A. Muhith who was on a short visit to Manila last week and the ADB Vice-President Mr A. T. Bambewale signed the agreement on behalf of their respective sides.

Of the total amount 70 million dollars has been earmarked for Third Crop Intensification Programme and 40 million dollars for Bangladesh Krishi Bank.

The loans are interest free and bear a nominal service charge of one percent. The repayment period of the loans is 40 years with a grace period of 10 years.

The Third Crop Intensification programme consists of the following: (I) Provision of about 200,000 mt of Triple Super Phosphate (TSP), 60,000 metric tons of Diamoniam phosphate (DAP) to partially meet shortfalls in supply anticipated over a three-year period countrywide. (II) Provision of about 3,000 mt. of Zinc sulphate for selected areas of the country which are known to suffer from zinc deficiency. (III) Improvement of research capability in soil analysis and plant nutrition of Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute.

The total cost of the programme is about 77.3 million dollars equivalent consisting of 70.0 million dollars in foreign exchange cost and 7.3 million dollar in local currency cost. The Asian Development Bank will meet the entire foreign exchange cost. The direct benefits from the programme are expected to accrue from the incremental crop production resulting from the use of fertilizer provided under the programme. About one million tons of incremental foodgrains and about 22,000 mt of other crop are expected to be produced as a result of the programme.

CSO: 4600/1440

DHAKA, SRI LANKA REVIEW ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 27 Dec 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bangladesh and Sri Lanka on Monday reviewed the entire gamut of economic, trade and technical cooperation between the two countries at the Ministerial level meeting held in Dhaka, reports BSS.

The discussion on bilateral economic cooperation were held between the visiting Sri Lanka Minister for Finance and Planning, Mr Ronnie Del Mel and his Bangladesh counterpart Finance and Planning Minister Mr A. M. A. Muhith at the Planning Commission.

An official spokesman said the discussions were held within the framework of existing economic, technical shipping and general trade agreements between the two countries.

Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, at the meeting agreed that there were "good prospects" for expansion of trade between the two countries, the spokesman said adding Sri Lanka expressed interest in buying jute bags, carpets, newsprint, dryfish and hard and particle boards from Bangladesh.

Bangladesh offered bitumen, telephone cables, electrical goods, potato and tobacco for sale to Sri Lanka.

The spokesman said that since the signing of the general trade agreement between the two countries in 1977 the volume of trade was so far "very small" and the balance of trade being adverse against Bangladesh.

Bangladesh and Sri Lanka also emphasised early ratification of shipping agreement between the two countries and Sri Lanka's joining in Bangladesh-India-Pakistan and the West Asia Gulf conference lines.

The establishment of Joint Chamber of Commerce and greater cooperation between the state trading organisation of the two countries also came for discussions.

The spokesman said the meeting had also identified a number of areas for technical cooperation between the two countries specially in agricultural research in rice and wheat variety, coconut, tea and rubber and the management of public sector industries.

It was further agreed the spokesman said that the officials of both the countries would work out the feasibility of establishing direct air link between Dhaka and Colombo.

The subject of cooperation in tourism particularly on joint efforts for organising group and package tours was also discussed at the meeting.

The spokesman said that the meeting had also reviewed the cultural agreement between the two countries and emphasised that early preparation of the cultural exchange programme would facilitate the exchange of scientists students and journalists as well as sports and cultural personalities between the two countries.

The meeting also agreed that the joint committee proposed to be set up in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in May this year should meet annually while Ministerial level meeting of the committee should be held biannually alternatively in the two capitals.

Mr Ronnie Del Mel led the first Sri Lankan official delegation to Bangladesh in 1973 and it is he who moved a motion in the Sri Lankan Parliament for setting up of diplomatic relationship between the two countries.

Mr Del Mel who has been the Finance Minister of his country for a long time is one of architects of new economic policy pursued by the present government of Sri Lanka which has led to a quite high growth rate in their national and per capita income through the adoption of market oriented economy expansion of export flexible exchange rate liberalisation of import reduction of consumer subsidies and growth in agriculture specially in rice production.

The Sri Lankan Minister was assisted at the talks of Dr Loyd Fernando, Director of National Planning, Mr Winfred Nanayakkara, Director of International Economic Cooperation and the acting High Commissioner of Sri Lanka Mr N. Wijayaranate.

The Bangladesh Minister was assisted by the Secretaries of the External Resources Division Finance Division Shipping Jute Industries Planning and officials of the Ministries of Civil Aviation Tourism, Commerce and Post and Telegraph.

CSO: 4600/1440

LAND REFORMS BILL APPROVED, FEATURES TOLD

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 27 Dec 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] A meeting of the Council of Ministers was held on Monday afternoon at Bangabhaban under the chairmanship of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, Lt Gen H. M. Ershad, reports BSS.

The Council amended the Code of Criminal Procedure (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1983 and extended the time limit for completion of trial of the cases pending before the Magistrates or the Sessions Judges on 7th August 1983 from 31st December 1983 to 30th June, 1984.

The Council also approved the Land Reforms Ordinance, 1983. The ordinance aims, at reform of the law relating to land tenure, land holding and land transfer with a view to maximising the production and ensuring a better relationship between land owner and bargadars. The main features of the ordinance are as follows:

(I) Limitations on acquisitions of agricultural land--the family who already owns more than 60 standard bighas of agricultural land shall not be allowed to acquire any new agricultural land by transfer inheritance or gifts or any other means. The family who owns less than 60 standard bighas of agricultural land may acquire new agricultural land, but such new land together with the agricultural land owned by him shall not exceed 60 standard beighas.

(II) The right of tenancy for the bargadars has been recognised for a period of five years from the date of barga contract. Any person cultivating the land of another person as bargadar immediately before the commencement of this ordinance shall be deemed to be a bargadar in respect of such land under this ordinance.

(III) If the bargadar dies before the expiry of the period of barga contract the cultivation of the barga land shall be continued by the surviving members till the barga period expires.

(IV) No bargadar shall be entitled to cultivate more than 15 standard bighas of land.

(V) The produce of any barga land shall be divided in the following manner, namely:

(A) One-third shall be received by the owner for the land.

(B) One-third shall be received by the bargadar for the labour.

(C) One-third shall be received by the owner or the bargadar or by both in proportion to the cost of cultivation other than the cost of labour borne by them.

(VI) No eviction from home stead any land up to one standard bigha used as a homestead by any owner in the rurual area shall be exempted from all legal processes including seizure distress attachment or sale by any officer court or any other authority and the owner of such land shall not be divested or dispossessed of the land or evicted there from by any means:

Provided that nothing under this provision shall supply to the acquisition of such homestead under any law.

CSO: 4600/1440

# KHAMENE'I DISCUSSES POLITICS IN CHRISTMAS MESSAGE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 1 Jan 84 p 3

[Text] Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Ali Khemene'i, the president of our country, in the course of a message of felicitations to Iranian Christians on the occasion of the New Year, by referring to the assault of power wielders on the teachings of Christianity and the many crimes of several governments of Christian countries said: Do the teachings of Lord Jesus confirm silence in face of the many crimes committed against humanity? Has not the time come for the religious leaders of Christian countries to disgrace world criminals in the face of history? The following is the text of the president's message:

In the name of God the most compassionate, the most merciful, I wish to convey my congratulations to the Christians of the world and especially to our Christian Iranians; I pray to the Almighty that the New Year will be together with peace and wellbeing for them and all the people of the world. The gift of the divine prophets to humanity has been peace, happiness, and security, together with honor and dignity; their path has been one of brotherhood and sympathy for the purpose of achieving spiritual values and prosperity.

The followers of the great sublime Prophets of God, likewise, can and are duty bound to follow their path. It is only in the shadow of this divine movement that a common and uniform front against all atheist systems will be formed, and spiritual values and religious consciousness, which emanates from man's pure nature, will be guarded from inhuman forces, and the struggle between right and wrong will, ultimately, end with the triumph of right over wrong. In today's world the teachings of Christianity, like other divine religions, have become the target of attacks and aggressions of dominating powers and cruel rulers. The governments ordained in many Christian countries, through the aggressions made against human beings, have trampled upon the teachings of the spiritual values of this religion, and the true followers of Lord Jesus, like the followers of other divine religions are in the course of being attacked and assaulted by dominating powers and corrupt rulers. The dominating powers of the world, through the use of the vast propaganda networks at their disposal, have kept the social consciousness of people as well as that of the Christians, uninformed of the existing realities of the world, were it not so, how could the true followers of Lord

Jesus in the world be passive in the face of so much crime being committed by their respective governments against humanity and human beings?

These governments fuel the flames of war, here and there, throughout the world. The deprived people of Lebanon and Palestine, on the eve of Christmas are the victims of the avarice of international satans; all such crimes are tolerated in a deadly silence. Would this silence and toleration of the encroachments upon the dignity of human beings be considered consistent with the teachings of Jesus Christ?

The Iranian Christians have witnessed the martyrdom of thousands of their innocent countrymen at the hands of Saddam's criminals in cities, residences, and mosques. They know that such crimes have been committed with the confirmation and political and military support of governments who rule over millions of Christians the world over. Would the teachings of Lord Jesus confirm silence in the face of such crimes? The aggressive governments of the world who trample upon the teachings of Christianity are, in fact, the descendants of the same evil rulers who threatened and assaulted the Lord Jesus Christ, Son of Mary. Has not the time come for religious leaders of Christian countries to disgrace these criminals in the face of history?

The only way for humanity to rescue itself from the quagmire created by corrupt governments is to return to the teachings of divine religion and the obedience of the edicts of the sublime prophets. The propagation of such teachings is among the primary responsibilities of religious leaders. I ask the Almighty to safeguard all believers in monotheism and all seekers of God from the plots and ploys of atheists, and to make the New Year a year of prosperity and peace for all Christians especially Iranian Christians.

12382

CSO: 4640/84



IRANIAN MINISTER SPEAKS ON MOSLEM COMMON MARKET

GF231338 Karachi DAWN in English 20 Jan 84 p 18

[Text] Karachi, 19 Jan--Mr (Vahhaji), Iranian deputy minister for commerce, today said the creation of common market of Islamic countries is expected in the near future for solving the economic problems of the Moslem world.

Delivering his speech on the inauguration of the Iranian trade exhibition here, he said the trade fair of Islamic Republic of Iran in Karachi is a step toward the expansion of mutual relations with Moslem brothers. He said 40 companies from private sector and ten from public sector, like national industries and Ministry for Heavy Industry of Iran are taking part in the fair. He said the two neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan have deep and common religious, historical and cultural relations since ages.

He said today the main features of our trade are wheat, rice, sugar and oil for which both the countries in the past depended on developed countries. He hoped the trade relations between the two countries would further increase.

Speaking on the occasion, Mr Ebrahim Rahimpur, charge d'affaires in Pakistan, said that RCD [Regional Cooperation for Development] would be revived in the near future for strengthening trade and cultural relations.--PPI

APP adds: Mr (Vahhaji) said a number of high-ranking political and economic delegations from both the countries have visited each other resulting in cooperation, collaboration and signing of agreements in the fields of economics, politics and culture.

The Iranian deputy commerce minister wished and prayed for the success and development of "our Moslem Pakistani brothers" and thanked for all the help in making the trade fair a success.

Mr Rahimpur said the transport problem between Pakistan and Iran has already been eased and the exhibition would also increase the trade relations between the two Islamic countries.

Items displayed at the Iranian trade exhibition are industrial goods like buses, mini-buses, car frames, handicrafts, traditional goods, dry fruits and many other items. The Iranian exhibition would continue for several weeks.

PPI/APP

CSO: 4600/320

## SUICIDE OPERATIONS DISCUSSED BY MINISTER OF REVOLUTION GUARDS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 9 Jan 84 p. 3

[Text] Ahvaz - KEYHAN correspondent - Rafiqdust, minister of the Islamic Revolution Guards, accompanied by Shamkhani, deputy chief commander of the Guards, journeyed to Ahvaz to participate in the anniversary ceremonies for the Hovizeh operation martyrs. He gave KEYHAN an exclusive interview in which he answered our correspondents questions concerning the status of the war and the fronts, the Here I Am Khomeyni Plan, the superpowers' concluding a political and military treaty with the regime ruling Baghdad, the dead-end the United States and France have reached in their struggle against Islamic movements in the region, and the situation in Lebanon.

As his trip continued he inspected brigades, divisions, bases and Guards centers in Khuzestan. When asked by our reporter concerning the status on the fronts and the war's future, he stated: Islam's warriors continue to hold the initiative on the fronts. The world is waiting to see what we will do. God willing, we are getting ready to deal world arrogance another blow.

Regarding the delay and waiting period that occurs after each war operation against Iraq, the Guards minister said: We do this because we are following an Islamic method throughout the war. After each operation we give the aggressors the opportunity to come to their senses and surrender to the truth. Therefore this combat practice of ours is an Islamic practice, we only battle with the aggressor on the battlefields, and we never take aim on Iraq's cities and military centers although they are within our firing range.

### War's Future

Concerning the war's future, he said: The war's future is completely clear. We will continue the war until the ultimate victory of Islam's warriors over the Ba'thist enemy and Saddam's ouster.

### Organization of the Here I Am O Khomeyni Plan

Concerning the status of the forces participating in the 'Here I Am O Khomeyni Plan', the Guards minister stated: The organizing by veterans of the fronts for the 'Here I Am O Khomeyni Plan' was connected with the Guards. Praise the Lord, this was welcomed very warmly. The veterans of the fronts registered persons in the plan, and some time ago the first phase of experimentation and

maneuvers was carried out. It made us very hopeful, and God willing, larger maneuvers will be carried out soon.

Continuing his comments, he pointed to the purposes of the plan, and said: We have prepared further training for those participating in the plan, and God willing we will use the participants in activating the warfronts.

He added: Basically the general purpose behind the veterans of the fronts organizing the participating forces into military formation is to deprive the superpowers of the possibility of even thinking about intervening in Iran.

#### Conclusion of U.S. Political and Military Treaty with Iraq

Asked by our reporter about his evaluation of the superpowers concluding political and military treaties with the doomed Saddamist regime, the Guards minister said: One of the results of the Val-Fajr IV operation was that the United States realized it would no longer continue covert cooperation and aid to Saddam's regime, and that it was compelled to make this cooperation public. The United States recently announced that it will not tolerate Saddam's fall, and it is giving Iraq warships for this reason.

As he continued his comments, Rafiqdust pointed out: It is a victory for us that the Muslim and Arab nations awake to the lies spread by Iraq's rulers, who have always spoken about their enmity to the United States and severing relations with it, and yet the United States welcomes these relations. Thus these treaties have no significance at all for us because we believe they are like foam on the waves.

He added: We will not fight by their method, not because we fear their methods but because our methods are those of Islam's early period, of which today's world is ignorant. We therefore believe that we will be victorious on the battlefield.

#### Superpowers' Plot in Lebanon

Concerning the plots and intervention of the arrogant powers in the region's Islamic lands and in Lebanon, the Guards minister, Rafiqdust, said: At the present our fronts extend from our borders to the south and east of Lebanon. The Lebanese people are struggling Muslims who have been inspired by our Islamic revolution. World arrogance in the last 15 years truly deceived the region's people, hypnotized the Palestinians, and drew them into political games, but today the Palestinians and Lebanon's people have awakened and risen up in the manner of the Islamic revolution against the region's oppression.

The Guards minister added: World arrogance more quickly saw the effect of the revolution in that region than it did in other places, and it wants to extinguish the flames of the Islamic revolution before any problem develops relating to its interests. It started off bombarding military centers, and when this had no effect, it bombarded cities, innocent people, civilian centers and Lebanon's Muslims. This is the same action that Saddam's regime is perpetrating against Iran's defenseless Muslim people in residential areas. We are certain

that these actions will cause greater cohesion and awakening among the rest of the region's Muslims and will ultimately lead to the death of world imperialism and Zionism.

#### Region's Muslims' Suicide Operations

Concerning the suicide operations by the region's Muslims against U.S. and French interests and the attribution of these operations to the Islamic republic, the minister of the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards said: We proclaim that these operations and bombings are in no way our work. But we believe that the Iranian Islamic revolution has affected the region's Muslims so that when they see the oppression by the tyrannical rulers of their own countries they sacrifice their lives and strike great blows against their enemies.

He added: World arrogance's purpose in attributing these operations to Iran really stems from its enmity to Islam and Iran's Islamic revolution and from its understanding that if the Iranian Islamic revolution were left to its own devices, the superpowers would disappear.

He added: Their fear of these suicide operations is completely clear. They are so frightened that they are spending heavily to maintain their security. He added: But these barricades are worthless against the will and faith of one Muslim. A Muslim will inflict a blow on God's enemies by any means possible wherever it is necessary for him to do so.

9597

CSO: 4640/98

IRNA CARRIES PAPERS HEADLINES ON IRAQI THREAT

GF061734 Tehran IRNA in English 1657 GMT 6 Feb 84

[Text] Tehran, 6 Feb (IRNA)--All national newspapers today splashed their front pages with warnings against the Iraqi regime that the Islamic Republic would firmly react to any criminal action.

The head of the Supreme Defence Council and military commanders made final decisions to counter Iraq's threats and aggressions, the cross column KEYHAN headline reads.

KEYHAN's other headlines read:

President: Any Aggressive Action of the Iraqi Regime Will Be Given a Proper Response With Measures Taken,

Chief of Staff: We Will Demolish all the Installations and Industrial Centers of the Ba'thist Regime,

Prime Minister: Our Faithful and Courageous Combatants Are Prepared To Give a Crushing Response to any new Crime by Saddam,

Air Force Commander: We Are Prepared To Launch any Required Military Operations Against the Enemy,

125 Majlis Representatives in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief: Our Moslem People Will not Permit Saddam To Continue his Countless Atrocities,

Foreign Guests Request To Be Sent to Border Cities and Warfronts.

The morning paper JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI as well as the evening KEYHAN printed photographs of last night's meeting of President Khamene'i and the commanders of the armed forces.

Evening daily ETTELA'AT carried portraits of President Khamene'i and the chiefs of the armed forces.

President: We Will Give a Proper Response to the Aggressors Against Any Aggressive Action by the Ba'thists, JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI's leading headline reads.

Other sub-headlines carried warnings against Iraq from the prime minister, and the commanders of the armed forces.

JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI's front page editorial was also on the Iraqi imposed war and the anniversary of the Islamic revolution.

After discussing important military matters and taking proper measures in the gathering of the head of the Supreme Defence Council and the commanders of the military, president announced: We will respond to any aggressive action by Iraq, the evening ETTELA'AT wrote in red and black letters.

CSO: 4600/319

PAKISTANI PAPER ON COSTS OF IRAN-IRAQ WAR

GF131210 Karachi DAWN in English 7 Jan 84 p 3

[Commentary by M.B. Naqvi from the Economic and Business Review supplement]

[Text] The first question an economist asks is how Iran distributes the burden of its war with Iraq? It is continuing for more than three years and, not unnaturally, is costing a lot of money. Who ultimately pays for it?

The Iranian fiscal system is simple enough. Maximum reliance is placed on indirect taxation and oil revenues. There is not much of direct personal taxation, though big companies do pay up in several ways. There is also not much of a domestic debt, except the government's borrowing from the central bank. All deficits are as a matter of policy, financed by borrowings from the central bank system.

How much does the war really cost is not easy to determine. We have the informed guess of \$5 billion plus for the year ending March 84, based on budgetary figures. Some people think that it is an under-estimation. It is also not to be forgotten that the new regime is also executing a five year plan at the same time and is in its second year.

Quite obviously most of the resources are contributed by the oil industry; that its share has statistically increased in recent years (after the initial disruption following the 1979 upheavals and the war of 1980) should not be overemphasized. Statistics, without perspective, can mislead. But as a secular trend it has declined from the days when it used to provide over 85 percent of the national budget in the early years of the shah.

One [words indistinct] impact of heavy government outlays on totally unproductive expenditures like the war and on long-gestation development projects is rapid expansion in money supply. During the Iranian year 1362 (corresponding to March 1982-March 1983) the money supply grew by not less than 24.2 percent over the previous year. In the latter money supplies had grown by 17.8 percent. In the current year, ending March '84, the rate is sure to have gone up even further.

This expansion of money stock has to be juxtaposed with the fact that both agricultural and industrial production are merely recovering and slowly at



that. We have already mentioned their figures. This amounts to a prescription for generating inflationary pressure. Ordinarily, this hits the common man most. Is that the situation?

The answer is neither simple nor obvious. The crucial point is how do the business classes fare in the process of supplying and financing the war? It is known that, unavoidably, the contractor class is making good profits. Up to a point, the process is inevitable and its happening in Iran should occasion no surprise. It is also to be noted that the process of savings and industrial investments in the private sector is virtually at a standstill for quite some years. Personal savings are a different matter, which is a notable component of the M2.

The latest figures available are for the Iranian year 1361 (1981-82). Out of the total money supply (M2) of I Rls 6350.7 billion not less than I Rs 2,185.8 billion are savings deposits and I Rls 681 billion are time deposits. In other words just less than half of the money supply is in the banking system doing very little.

The point repeatedly asked me by Iranian economists was that what makes the life tolerate for the government and the common people is the fact that the velocity of money exchanges is quite low. The people with personal savings are content to sit on them; there is not much of speculative buying and selling. The fear of draconian punishments awarded freely by several competing lawenforcing agencies keeps businessmen chary of even the otherwise usual racketeering.

For the rest, despite the somewhat uncertain contours of what the law in fact may mean in specific situations and cases and the multiplicity of agencies, the distribution system does somehow work more or less as desired by authority. While prices are high in the open market (that is quite legal)--generally four times--there is not much variation from shop to shop or among areas and cities. In the control-cum-rationing system, despite delays, queues or erratic supplies, people can generally buy all essential goods at fair prices in allowed quantities. The latter system cannot be free from inconvenience and some defects. But on the whole it keeps the low income groups in the cities and towns reasonably well supplied. Villages are, apparently, outside its scope.

While evidence of poverty is widespread specially in small towns, the kind of poverty seen in India and Pakistan is not to be found in Iran. The bread prices are cheap which is the staple food. A truly poor man can be seen eating bread with some raisins, apple or onion. Actual hunger seems to be absent.

What do the well-to-do do with their profits? One can find for them no real opening, except either increase their savings bank accounts or to smuggle out their wealth in whatever form possible. The flight of capital from Iran has been phenomenal and keeps the free market value of the Iranian rial down to ridiculous levels. The rial should have been a hard currency, but is not. Officially 80 to 90 rials equal one dollar. But a foreigner who can bring in undeclared dollars can sell them for anything up to 450 to 500 rials per

dollar. This is despite the extraordinarily rigid and harsh exchange control system imposed on both Iranians and foreign visitors.

One reason, as mentioned before, is the central bank's tight credit policy. There are enough reasons why investments are not taking place. The central bank's deflationary policies, dictated by inflationary pressures, add to them substantially. The central bank has devised a flexible package of credit policies favoring in approved spheres industrial investment and agricultural growth. But this favored credit is not growing rapidly enough. For instance, investment banks have given the private sector I Rls 1,068.5 billion by the end of the Iranian year 1360 (1980-81). By the end of next year the figure had climbed to not more than I Rls 1,160 billion, which represented a growth of 8.6 percent over the year. It is not known or expected to have grown much further since.

The question the economists keep asking is: How long can this comfortable enough mosaic of sunny and cloudy patches continue?

CSO: 4600/321

EHSAN TABARI'S 'BRAIN STROKE' REPORTED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 14 Jan 84 p 1

[Text] Tehran, (IRNA) A founding member of the defunct Tudeh Party, Ehssan Tabari, has suffered a brain stroke in prison and is presently being treated, Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani said Thursday.

Tabarai, who is one of Iran's first and most famous Communist ideologues, has also "drawn a red line over his 40-year-past (with the Tudeh Party)," according to the speaker.

Speaking in a meeting with Education Minister Ali Akbar Parvaresh and his deputies, Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani said that Tabari had also spoken against Marx, Lenin and Engels "and many other thinkers he loved for a long time."

"This man has really faced a question," he said.

Speaker Rafsanjani's statements indicated that the Tudeh ideologue, who is commonly known in Iran as being the teacher of Afghan Ruler Babrak Karmal had confessed to charges of his party's spying activities for the Soviet Union. All other leading figures of the party have confessed to spying.

Currently dozens of secret military members of the Tudeh Party are being tried at a military tribunal on charges of spying for the Soviet Union, hiding arms and attempting to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

CSO: 4600/303

SAUDIS CRITICIZED FOR 'MYOPIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISLAMIC REVOLUTION'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 14 Jan 84 p 2

[Article in "Opinion" column: "Saudi Arabia Sees Islamic Revolution with Myopic Eyes"]

[Text]

It is never too late for a good thing. Truth must be out and so for the benefit of our readers who have missed reading the Third World quarterly 'South' we extract from the December issue of this journal as follows:

First, we were gladdened by a letter of mild criticism from a reader of the magazine on a special survey of Saudi Arabia (South, November 1983) which thinks this particular piece to be "more a state advertisement coming straight from a Saudi Ministry than a survey worthy of your (SOUTH) magazine."

However, the letter goes on to say that the "survey or not" could not have come at a better time in its attempt to "improve the poor image of Saudi Arabia."

It goes on further to say the Saudi rulers "are seen in their committed role as the protectors of US interests (interwoven with those of Israel) in the Middle East, in return for that of the monarchists in the region."

"It is no wonder a shout of condemnation of the United States and Israel is enough to court immediate arrest by Saudi security and for foreigners, immediate deportation, the letter says.

More, the claim of the king's rule by consensus among all quarters of society, is "in fact a consensus among the ruling princes and the privileged elites, who are the beneficiaries of the distribution of posts or business monopolies. A consensus, even if it were among the public, would hardly be a substitute for democracy," the writer avers.

"It is said that Saudi Arabia is the only family business concern in the world which is a member

of the United Nations. With neither democratic rights nor a parliamentary institution, the Saudi subjects cannot be considered a nation," the writer said. Then going on it said "a nation would surely want to have a say in the country's oil which is being drained out and cashed at a rate which is so unnecessarily high that the value of the exports - if divided equally - would make each Saudi subject a millionaire."

And finally he says it is easy now to understand "*the myopic attitude of Saudi rulers towards the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the resurgence of Islamic value as criteria for the self-rule of the Ummah. There is no kingship in Islam.*"

We make no apology for the profusion of quotation marks, but we will be happy if hopefully our readers will come to agree that we have made our point in the context of the political transformations that are taking place in this region and on the emphasis that the Islamic Republic places on the very high value of Islamic ideology, which we have no doubt will see a great revival in the near future.

CSO: 4600/304

## CONTRADICTIONS IN REGIME'S CLAIMS VS POLICIES NOTED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 12 Jan 84 pp 14-15

[Article: "With or Without Consent"]

[Excerpts

COME WHAT MAY, the regime wants to continue — with or without the formal consent of the people. The armed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan came as a windfall, buttressed by the PIA hijack which gave it an opportunity to put the 1973 Constitution in the morgue and go ahead happily with its long-term plans to ride in tandem with friends in the West. What was needed at home was a single coat of distemper of Islam on the old facade of the socio-economic system. And that's what you see being done right now with the big brush of Radio and PTV and the NPT.

**Thoughtless**

Thoughtless announcements are being made: a women's one-day conference, held to highlight the "seerat" of the Holy Prophet, was told the other day that by the end of 1984 (that is, in about 360 days) Pakistan would establish an interest-free economic system in consonance with the tenets of Islam. And that this will be yet another mile-stone in the way of fervent efforts to enforce Nizam-ul-Islam in the country.

Two days later, official sources were quoted having said, in what looked like an inspired report, that the country would need to raise at least two billion dollars in external capital from socialist and oil-rich Middle East countries to finance the Sixth Plan. It is said that approximately 10 billion dollars (in foreign exchange) will be needed over the next five years to fill the external resource gap.

Observers juxtapose the two situations — interest-free economy by the end of the current year and the quest for loans which obviously cannot be

free from interest — and wonder if what the simple women were told was not merely a wish.

The contradictions are too obvious. The "think tank" — the Council of Islamic Ideology (C.I.I.) — says one thing and the holders of power another.

**His vision of Pakistan**

The CMLA-President clearly painted his vision of Pakistan when he addressed the concluding session of the two-day conference of the ulama representing all sects. Said he: Pakistan is the second Islamic polity after the one created by the Holy Prophet in Medina 1400 years ago in the real sense of a Muslim State.

This opportunity, he said, should be exploited fully for the 'imposition' of the Islamic system. He requested the ulama to cooperate with him in this task.

And as one of the steps towards that end, the CMLA-President issued a directive that from now on an "ayat" of the Holy Quran and a hadith be recited in all mosques after 'fajr' prayers and Friday congregations.

The CMLA-President observed that, keeping in view the human infirmities and weaknesses, the implementation of Islamic principles have to be equitable and less rigorous. "Hands can be cut but the Islamic point of view is more in favour of justice than punishment."

The emphasis in practice appears to be more on punishment rather than justice — public floggings, tardy proceedings of cases before martial law courts; judgements reserved for months. Severe punishments speak for themselves.

# MISUSE OF HOSPITALITY BY REFUGEES DISCUSSED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 12 Jan 84 pp 7-8

[Article in the "Between the Lines" column: "Limits of Hospitality"]

[Text] The Punjab governor has dutifully taken note of the known transgressions of many Afghan refugees by reiterating Government policy and announcing that officials who, in violation of the law, help these guests--entertained on purely humanitarian grounds--to acquire rights to which they are not entitled would be "taken to task."

Unless Gen. Jilani was mistranslated, the consequences to be suffered by Government servants for deliberate disregard of the law of the land--probably for a consideration--are far too mild to promise that his orders will be effective. According to persistent reports, many Afghan refugees do not consider it sufficient that they have been allowed to enter our land, given rations and living accommodation, granted substantial family pensions, and even allowed to earn additional incomes. Most of them have never had such a good life. However, some, particularly the affluent, are tempted to settle down in this country or use it as a base for setting off in search of greener pastures. They have entered into the business of acquiring Pakistan's National Identity Cards and passports which are enough to establish their Pakistani citizenship for the purpose of purchasing property here and also for seeking employment in the Gulf area.

## The Burden

When Pakistan opened its doors to welcome Afghans seeking refuge, it did not bargain for the influx of a large population on a semi-permanent basis. Already, Pakistan is spending about one million dollars a day on their upkeep--an amount that could be put to better use to meet clamant local needs. Now, many Afghans are thinking in terms of settling down in Pakistan, just as their ancestors did in the past. It is perfectly clear that while the present financial and economic burden of caring for the Afghan refugees is heavy enough, the country cannot view with equanimity the possibility of a large part of the present Afghan contingents staying on here. It should also be kept in mind that the longer their sojourn the more difficult it will become to persuade those of our guests who wish to overstay their welcome to begin the homeward trek.



#### Length of Stay

Apart from the question of the length of their stay, which will depend on current negotiations with the Afghan Government under U.N. auspices, and which provides a strong incentive for speeding up the talks and if possible improving the methodology to produce results, the equally disconcerting factor is that, since the Afghans are unused to our way of life, many of them seek ways of earning money that openly violate the laws of the land. This happens with regard to otherwise lawful pursuits, but their activities frequently extend to smuggling of goods, including such contraband as narcotics.

All these factors make it necessary for the Pakistan Government to define the limits of our hospitality, and ensure, in the wider interest of Pakistan and its people, that these limits are not breached.

CSO: 4600/311

## BRIEFS

PROPOSAL FOR WOMEN JUDGES--Rawalpindi, Jan 15--The Minister of State for Health, Special Education and Social Welfare, Begum Afifa Mamdot, has disclosed that the Government was seriously considering a proposal to appoint women judges for the cases of women where only female advocates will be allowed to appear and plead the cases. She was speaking as chief guest on the occasion of lady councillors convention of Rawalpindi district at District Council Hall here yesterday. The Minister of State maintained that the Government was making earnest efforts to provide equal opportunities of education training and employment to rural women in the country. A separate Women's Division and Pakistan Women's Commission have been established to achieve the same goal, she added.--APP [Text] [Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 16 Jan 84 p 5]

REFUGEE SETTLEMENT OPPOSED--The Pakistan National Party, District Sahiwal, in a resolution has strongly opposed the settlement of 70,000 Afghan refugees in Dera Ghazi Khan. These Afghan refugees could create a lot of socioeconomic problems in the Punjab, the resolution said. The resolution expressed the fear that the settlement of Afghan refugees in the Punjab could lead to an increase in drug trafficking, highway robberies, dacoities, smuggling and other evils. The PNP therefore urged the authorities concerned to reconsider their decision to settle Afghan refugees in the province. [By Ivan Rajkumar] [Text] [Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 12 Jan 84 p 17]

CSO: 4600/311

END